Pay maintenance to wife even if her earlier marriage is valid: SC

The Supreme Court has directed a man to pay maintenance to his estranged wife, despite her previous marriage being legally subsisting.

The Supreme Court has directed a man to pay maintenance to his estranged wife, despite her previous marriage being legally subsisting, emphasising that a strict legal interpretation should not be allowed to defeat the humanitarian purpose of the provision that seeks to protect women from destitution.

The Supreme Court, in its January 30 judgment that was released earlier this week, overturned the high court’s 2017 decision, noting that maintenance laws should be interpreted in a manner that serves their intended social welfare purpose. (HT Photo)

In a significant ruling reinforcing the social justice objective of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), a bench comprising justices BV Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma highlighted that the objective of maintenance provisions should not be thwarted solely due to the absence of a formal divorce decree when other facts support the woman’s version.

“When the social justice objective of maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC is considered against the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience, deny maintenance to appellant no. 1 (woman),” the bench held in its recent judgment.

The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the new law that has replaced the CrPC with effect from July 1 2024, has retained the older provision on alimony under Section 144.

In the present case, the woman separated from her first husband in 2005 after the couple signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU), though no formal legal decree of divorce was obtained.

Subsequently, she entered into a marital relationship with another man. The second husband later sought annulment of their marriage, which was granted by a family court in February 2006. But the couple reconciled and remarried, and registered their marriage in Hyderabad, eventually having a daughter.

Following further disputes, the woman left the matrimonial home and subsequently sought maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC for herself and her daughter. The family court awarded her and the daughter a monthly maintenance but the high court set aside this order on the second husband’s appeal that she could not be considered his legal wife due to her first marriage still being legally subsisting.

The Supreme Court, in its January 30 judgment that was released earlier this week, overturned the high court’s 2017 decision, noting that maintenance laws should be interpreted in a manner that serves their intended social welfare purpose. The court rejected the second husband’s argument that the woman could not claim maintenance as she was not his “legal wife” under Section 125 of CrPC, pointing out that the he had knowingly entered into a marital relationship with her, not once, but twice.

The bench cited the landmark case of Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal Vs Veena Kaushal (1978), where justice Krishna Iyer had emphasised that maintenance laws fall within the constitutional mandate of Article 15(3) and Article 39, aimed at protecting women and children from economic distress.

The judgment also drew from a 2024 decision authored by justice Nagarathna in Mohd Abdul Samad Vs. State of Telangana and Another, which underscored the financial vulnerability of married women in India by highlighting the lack of financial independence for homemakers and their reliance on their husbands for personal expenses. This judgment acknowledged that the economic contributions of homemakers often remain unrecognised and uncompensated, further justifying the need for a broad interpretation of maintenance laws. The Supreme Court stated that “financial security as well as security of residence of Indian women have to be protected and enhanced.”

Ordering the second husband to pay the woman and their daughter monthly maintenance, the court said that any alternate interpretation “would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with her, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations.” It further highlighted the peculiar facts of this case where the woman had an MoU of separation with her first husband and was not deriving any financial support from him.