The year ahead in politics: It’s Centre forward in India
The country is at a turning point. If Modi wins a third term, he will match Nehru’s record of electoral victories, amid a Congress fade.
Indian citizens will have their 18th tryst with electing national political representatives in 2024. Each general election has, of course, thrown up a new legislature, and through that, a new political executive. But each election has also been a way for an extraordinarily diverse Indian society to talk to each other, organise itself into factions, compete with each other, answer fundamental questions about priorities, anxieties, fears and hopes, and then give direction to the Indian state, both in terms of the agenda and the actors who will take that agenda forward.
2024 will be no different, as the largest democratic exercise in the world — each Indian election surpasses the preceding one in having the most voters in the world — determines what citizens want for their future.
The political battleThe political contours of the battle are clear. Prime Minister Narendra Modi starts out as the favourite for a third term. The BJP, on its own, is seeking an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha, a feat that will lead to Modi matching Jawaharlal Nehru’s record of three successive electoral wins.
To do this, however, the BJP needs to enhance its victory tally in UP to offset any losses elsewhere; sustain or increase its tally in Bihar, with only a smattering of smaller parties as allies; sweep the western Indian border states, central Indian states and northern hill states again; minimise its losses in Maharashtra, where newer permutations have emerged amid splits and fresh alliances, and do the same in Karnataka, where the Congress just won state polls; maintain its dominance over the North-East; and continue to expand on the eastern coast from Bengal through Odisha down to Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. As ambitious as each of these targets sounds, the BJP has shown an ability to strike such targets on the nose as it rides on Modi as the unifying figure across states, classes and castes, and on an organisation that can get voters to the booths.
The Opposition is experimenting with a broader alliance and newer demands that seek to break the BJP’s wider coalition in terms of caste, class and regional fault lines. But the Congress remains the weakest link in the chain, particularly in states where it is in direct competition with the BJP. Glance at a map and it is clear that unless the Congress can erode the BJP’s tally in Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Assam, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Karnataka, the Modi juggernaut will roll on.
The absence of clear leadership that has the appeal to counter Modi, and the lack of a compelling alternative story, continues to haunt the Congress.
Four months before voters head to the booths, the best-case scenario for the BJP is an increase in vote share and a repeat of 300+ seats in the Lok Sabha. The best-case scenario for the Congress is getting to 100 seats and a consolidation of the anti-BJP vote in key states, with the aim of keeping the BJP down to 230 to 250 seats. How the two sides craft their messaging, fine-tune their organisation, deploy their financial resources, plan and execute their campaigns, pick their candidates, and ensure visibility in the public imagination, will determine whether they strike an emotional chord with a plurality of voters and, therefore, whether they can achieve their best-case outlooks.
The social conversationsBeyond the outcome itself, 2024 will offer a glimpse into how society itself is thinking of the following questions.
First, Indian democracy. There is a vital debate underway between regime supporters and critics, the government and the Opposition, and various segments within the international community, on the integrity, quality and future of India’s democracy. A smooth election and an outcome accepted by all sides will strengthen India’s claims of being a robust electoral democracy based on the very exercise of that franchise.
But the outcome will also reveal what voters think. Do they believe that the Opposition’s critique of the trifecta of a personality cult, compromised institutions, and regime-encouraged social divisiveness is serious enough to warrant a change? Or do they believe that the Indian democracy is just fine, or that the delivery record of the Indian State makes up for its deficiencies; do they, in other words, see another term for Modi as an opportunity, more than a threat?
The outcome of the polls will lead to varied interpretations, with, in the case of a BJP win, regime supporters using it to buttress their democratic legitimacy for past and future actions domestically and externally, and critics alleging that the verdict itself reflects a flawed democracy and an uneven playing field. Either way, 2024 allows India to have a discussion on democracy democratically.
The second big question will relate to how citizens view the interplay between religion and caste. The Congress has made a decisive break from its historical positions on the issue by demanding a caste census and backing a dramatic increase in reservations, while comparing caste to race-based apartheid. Remember, internally, the Congress has always relied on “upper castes”, even as this vote’s loyalty has shifted in recent decades. The party has also shared an often-antagonistic, sometimes-uneasy relationship with political forces representing backward castes, whose rise was based on an anti-Congress platform.
This time, it is banking, along with the older generation of “social justice” parties run by new political dynasts, on breaking the BJP’s Hindu social coalition by painting it as a vehicle of upper caste supremacy, emphasising disaggregated caste identities, and then weaving these segments together electorally with a relatively consolidated Muslim vote in the heartland.
For its part, a new BJP has crafted the widest Hindu multi-caste political coalition in electoral history. This makes political space for the aspirations of backward and Dalit subcastes and tribals through clever representational signalling; tweaks the current reservation architecture to make space for the economically marginalised among the upper castes and resentful dominant communities; banks on welfare to create a pan-poor constituency across castes; and relies on Modi’s Hindu subaltern roots to secure both identities, Hindus and subaltern. In addition, the party’s appeal among women across castes and classes, but particularly among the poor, has grown dramatically.
The outcome of the election will offer a sense of how a plurality of voters now likes to think of themselves, in terms of national, religious, caste, subcaste and gender identities.
The third big question will relate to the economy. How do Indians view their incomes, and their access to opportunities, basic necessities and livelihoods? Are enough voters experiencing economic distress post-Covid, and struggling with the absence of jobs and stable income flows as they cope with swings in inflation and altered aspirations? Is this distress deep and wide enough to cause a silent electoral backlash? Or is the combination of moderate economic growth (which is arguably creating opportunities downstream), an expansive and more effective welfare maze, entrepreneurship at various levels, and the promise of a better future with higher incomes enough to sustain their electoral attraction to the current government? How are these political messages aggregated and articulated and who are voters willing to trust more?
The electoral conversation will have various subplots: India’s place in the world, the distribution of power among social groups, the role and representation of Muslims in India’s electoral democracy, the continued appeal of a president-like head of government in a parliamentary system, and the place of regional identities in a time of rising nationalism, among others.
The electoral process itself will be expensive. It will be loud. It will see newer modes of communication. It will be hotly contested. It will be widely watched and scrutinised. It will shape India’s future domestically and its image externally. But as long as it is free, fair and peaceful, with a commitment to the rules of the game, India’s democratic promise will persist in 2024 and beyond.
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ALSO IN THE YEAR AHEAD
The inauguration of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya
Three weeks into the year, the new Ram Temple will be inaugurated in Ayodhya. The event is the culmination of decades of tempestuous acrimony, and a launchpad for a politics that will frame the future. Coming three months before India goes into the general elections, January 22 will see a celebration of massive scale, with powerful symbolism at play. Taking centre stage will be Prime Minister Narendra Modi, surrounded by Hindu seers from across the country, in an event that large sections of the electorate have waited for, for decades. The unveiling of the Ram Temple will be a powerful symbol, of one direction in which India may now be moving in.
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Recasting the future of Kashmir
August 2019 changed Kashmir’s trajectory forever. Article 370 was gone, the erstwhile state separated into Union territories, and thereby placed under Governor’s Rule. Five years on, more chapters of intrigue will be added to Kashmir’s turbulent history, with the Union government being asked by the Supreme Court to hold elections by September 2024, and announcing its intention to restore statehood. It is unclear in what order these two foundational events will unfold, but regional parties such as the National Conference and People’s Democratic Party (PDP) will hope that they can stop the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) juggernaut, and reclaim a semblance of lost power.
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Elections in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and more
Extremely significant assembly elections are due in 2024. Expect to see vital regional satraps fighting to preserve their space in Indian polity. There will be a volatile campaign in Maharashtra, where the Shiv Sena and Nationalist Congress Party have split, with factions led by Eknath Shinde and Uddhav Thackeray in the former, and Ajit Pawar and warhorse Sharad Pawar in the latter. All will now jostle for space alongside the BJP and Congress. In Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, Naveen Patnaik’s Biju Janata Dal and YS Jagan Mohan Reddy’s Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party will battle to retain power, in the wake of a rising BJP in the former, and the challenge of old warhorse N Chandrababu Naidu and his Telugu Desam Party in the latter. Haryana has the Jannayak Janta Party and Indian National Lok Dal in the fray, but will likely remain a contest between the Congress and BJP. Elections will also be held in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, where Prem Singh Tamang and Pema Khandu, respectively, will hope to be re-elected.
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A make-or-break year for regional satraps
The BJP may be the clear dominant force, and the Congress may be the principal Opposition (however far behind it trails), but cast an eye around the rest of India, and 2024 is clearly set to be a make-or-break year for the regional satraps, even those who have withstood the vagaries of Indian politics for decades. In Maharashtra, with his Nationalist Congress Party now split beneath him, the mighty Sharad Pawar (above) will look to leverage the Maratha demand for reservations, and his vast experience, in the 2024 elections. The Samajwadi Party’s Akhilesh Yadav and Bahujan Samaj Party’s Mayawati have to find a way to win some seats in Uttar Pradesh. Another BJP sweep and they will lose close to all relevance; Mamata Banerjee and her Trinamool Congress must ensure they prevent the BJP from rising to further strength in West Bengal.
The entire future of the Mahagatbandhan in Bihar seems to rest on 2024. If the constituent parties do well in the Lok Sabha, Janata Dal (United’s) Nitish Kumar could move into a role in the Centre, which would then allow deputy chief minister Tejashwi Yadav to ascend to state leadership; lose, and the entire alliance may well become unstable.
In Odisha, an ageing Naveen Patnaik could be fighting his last election. And having lost Telangana, Bharat Rashtra Samithi leader K Chandrashekhar Rao must fight to retain his space in that state’s politics. By the end of 2024, India’s political landscape may look entirely different, with a few personalities that have come to characterise the political landscape possibly fading away.
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Uniform Civil Code and simultaneous polls
Beyond electoral politics, particularly if the BJP remains in power, 2024 may be the year when the government begins to solidify ideas such as the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) and One Nation, One Election. Broad conversations are already underway. The BJP, which has principally been for UCC, has instituted a panel to look into what the application of such a code would entail in Uttarakhand, with more state governments where it is in power likely to follow suit. On the second front, the party has been arguing that a One Nation, One Election approach would save time and money, and allow politicians more time to focus on governance. While the Opposition and sections of civil society have vehemently opposed both moves, on the grounds that they would fundamentally alter Indian democracy and make it more inequitable, continued electoral success for Modi and the BJP would potentially make it easier to pass both laws.
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The search for an antidote to BJP’s mass appeal
If the BJP has built a strong mass base that thrives on a heady mix of welfare, delivery, nationalism and Hindutva, over the past year, there have been attempts by the Opposition to find an antidote, the most potent of which, some believe, is caste. If Bihar had already conducted a caste survey (a census can only be ordered by the centre), Rahul Gandhi and the Congress have raised the demand nationally, calling it a necessary “x-ray” that will reveal the dichotomies that lie within India. But caste is so nuanced and often polarising, that consensus has been hard to find even within political outfits. There has been some opposition to the caste census in Congress-ruled Karnataka, for instance, and not all the constituents of the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) are enthusiastic. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the BJP’s ideological parent, meanwhile, has sent mixed signals. How parties resolve these internal struggles will shape India far beyond 2024.
- By Dipankar Ghose