India at the UN: Growing insecurity
The country?s aspiration of a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council appears to be slipping out of grasp.
India wants to sit at the high table, but time is running out. A permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council is slipping out of India’s grasp: “Our chances have gone below 50-50,” says an Indian delegate here. Secretary General Kofi Annan has set a September deadline for reform — that’s when (on its 60th anniversary) the UN hosts a summit of world leaders, and Annan, who retires at the end of 2006, wants a legacy wherein reform overshadows corruption. “If it doesn’t happen by September, we’ll have to wait another 15 years,” says a diplomat, as the next review is scheduled for 2020.

And so the air in New York these days is thick with politics. There are two types of diplomacy in progress: the chess moves being planned at the Indian mission on 235 east 43rd street, a brass-fronted narrow medium-rise between 2nd and 3rd avenues; and the trench warfare at the UN headquarters two blocks away, alongside the East river, its aquamarine-glass, flat-front hiding the cajoling and threatening going on inside.
And though the mission under Permanent Representative Nirupam Sen is employed in the daily work of UN’s various committees and working groups, their actual work is networking. With 191 members, the UN is a complex interplay of alliances and rivalries, and every bit of inside dope from other missions is vital to the chess game. “If so much weren’t at stake, it would be fun to watch the politics at all levels — local, regional, bloc-level, continental, and global,” says a delegate. “It’s unfolding like a novel.”
But with each passing moment, India’s chances recede. This despite India forming an alliance with Germany and Japan (and including Brazil for show) into a group, the G-4, focused on joining the P-5 (US, UK, France, China, Russia) in the Security Council ruling the world. An indication of the looming failure is the G-4’s acceptance, on June 8, of a permanent seat without a veto till 2020. Sources at the mission name two culprits: India herself, and her new buddy, the USA.
For one thing, while US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nick Burns dropped a tantalising hint that America wanted Japan and “a developing” country (presumably India), he added that the US opposed the G-4 resolution. It should be noted the G-4 resolution is the only one on UNSC expansion that will actually be on the table. So, diplomats scoff. “The USA’s primary aim is to stall any expansion of the Security Council,” a source here says. “These leaks aim to divide and confuse the G-4.” It’s pointed out that the US has time and again made it clear they feel the UN needs more urgent reforms than UNSC expansion.
The US is not the only P-5 member that is opposed. Russia, despite all those years of Cold War coziness with us, isn’t interested. “As a declining power they’re especially keen to hold onto such privileges,” says a diplomat. And China has been openly critical. But China’s public opposition is not directed at India: “China sees itself as a leader of the developing world, and so cannot openly oppose the candidacy of another developing nation,” an Indian delegate says.
Chinese ire is focused, laser-like, at Japan. This is partly because of Japan’s own clumsiness. Japan, which bankrolls nearly 19 percent of UN expenses, has wanted a UNSC seat since 1970, and has been working on it since 1993. The USA has openly supported its claim, lulling Japan into believing the deal is done. Japan in the past year has so irritated China (with its Prime Minister’s visit to a war shrine, and a resolution on Taiwan) that “China has deployed its entire Security Council staff, except one junior delegate, to the task of lobbying everyone against Japan,” says a diplomat.
This, according to our people in NY, shows up two of India’s shortcomings in searching for a permanent UNSC seat: it has been doing too little, too late. Too little in the numbers it has deployed for the task — there are only 11 officials at the mission, far less than others with similar ambitions. “Even as a non-permanent UNSC member, India would need an official for every two-three topics,” says a delegate. “As a non-permanent member, the staff strength should be 20-25.”
On top of that, India thinks it deserves the UNSC seat without having to do anything for it. “We only started intense lobbying, sending special envoys, in March. The Japanese have been at it for much longer,” says the diplomat. Maybe India began only after Annan’s report, “In Larger Freedom”, was released, expressing a preference for two UNSC reforms detailed in a high-level panel’s report of December 2004. “Our policy earlier was not to seek the UNSC seat, just thank countries who volunteered their support,” says the diplomat. “We seemed to think that it was in our fate, so we needed to do nothing.”
And now we are racing against time. Take for instance the African Union summit in Libya this week. The G-4 was hoping its resolution on UNSC reform would be supported through an AU resolution. Instead, the African nations are scrambling for the two UNSC seats we’ve suggested for their continent. South Africa and Egypt feel they are the natural candidates, the former because the US keeps egging them on (as it does us), and the latter because it is a) African, b) Muslim, and c) Arab.
Not to be left behind, oil-rich Nigeria has also thrown its hat in the ring; responding to that, so has Senegal; and, quietly, so has Kenya. Diplomats fear even Libya’s Qaddafi will suddenly announce his country’s candidacy (on the grounds he “responsibly” gave up his nuclear ambitions). The result of all this, fear diplomats, is that there’ll be no agreement on a resolution. And this might be repeated in the Caribbcom (Caribbean nations) meeting on July 7.
This would derail the G-4 effort. Japan and Germany were confident of getting two-thirds of the general assembly to endorse their resolution; a wavering African contingent is easily bullied by the USA, and without this large vote bloc, adoption of the resolution won’t be easy. “The Africans should have jumped at the G-4 resolution, as it would have got them into the UNSC,” says the delegate. “The less said about them the better.”
On top of this, there is the Coffee Club, the informal name of the group of nations which oppose UNSC expansion due to regional rivalries. Under the formal name of “Uniting for Consensus”, about 18 nations are networking to defeat the G-4 resolution. The core of the Coffee Club is known as the Espresso Club, comprising founding nation Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, Argentina, and Spain. Other members include South Korea, China, Colombia, Albania and Algeria; the rest are in the closet. “We get to know about nations like Netherlands, which secretly opposes Germany,” says the delegate.
The odds are heavy, and India has a lot of work cut out. Some diplomats had suggested the G-4 table its resolution immediately after Nicolas Burns’s statement; it is now likely to come up after the Carribcom meet. Ambitions are being scaled down a bit; instead of aiming for a seat immediately, diplomats are thinking of pushing for the G-4 resolution to be adopted in principle, so that the actual seat arrangement can be worked out over the next few years.
Because, if by September there is no movement of any kind on the G-4 resolution, then it will meet the same fate as the 1994 open-ended working group on UN reform. It will get nowhere (that group still exists, but as a debating forum for junior delegates). And India will have to wait another 15 years for a chance to sit at the high table of international relations.

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