E-Paper
Window of hope
Ironically, the Indo-Pak peace process since the Agra summit, on July 15-16, 2001, shows some movement on Kashmir but little progress on CBMs.
Ironically, the Indo-Pak peace process since the Agra summit, on July 15-16, 2001, shows some movement on Kashmir but little progress on CBMs.
On May 28, 2003, the then Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, said, “I am prepared to negotiate with him (President Pervez Musharraf),” adding, “the solution of the Kashmir problem will, however, demand serious compromises.” Prime Minister Manmohan Singh indicated the limits to, and areas for, a compromise in May 2004: “Short of secession, short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything. Meanwhile, we need soft borders.” President Musharraf has accepted both the limits but added two points on which a compromise is possible, namely, the LoC cannot be made permanent and two, joint ‘management’, not joint ‘sovereignty’, of the two parts of J&K. Compromise is inherent and obvious on both points. We are so near and yet, so far.
On September 25, 2004, the two leaders “agreed that possible options” for a settlement “should be explored”. This was reaffirmed in the joint statement of September 14, 2005. It envisages an accord “to the satisfaction of both sides”; i.e., a compromise, but within the set limits.
The Prime Minister’s speeches in Amritsar on March 24 and at the RTC in Srinagar on May 25 this year reveal that he has thought out a broad outline of an accord. At Amritsar, he made four points: “a step-by-step approach”; dialogue by both sides “with the people in their areas of control”; borders cannot be “redrawn” but can be made relevant, “just lines on a map”; and “the two parts” of J&K can, “with the active” help of governments of India and Pakistan, work out “cooperative consultative mechanism”. This can well be developed to meet Musharraf’s proposals for ‘joint management’, as also on the LoC, especially if each side has a say on the autonomy in the other half of J&K. This process “must ultimately culminate in an Indo-Pak Treaty of Peace, Security and Friendship”, to crown a Kashmir accord.
At the RTC, the PM spoke of “institutional arrangements” between the two parts of the state and mentioned the treaty. The PM meaningfully said on May 30, 2005, that “the sky is the limit” once Pakistan understands where India can and cannot be flexible.
Musharraf fully understands that. He ‘left aside’ the UN resolutions (December 18, 2003). In Delhi on April 18, 2005, he urged a step-by-step approach and consultations with the people “to generate a consensus”. He is not inflexible — issues of ‘self-governance’ and ‘joint control’ need “to be analysed in a deeper context”. He agreed that “boundaries cannot be altered” and “an arrangement” can be devised “where the boundaries become irrelevant”. By itself, a “soft border is not the... solution... You must analyse what is beyond the border”. That is just what the two sides need to define. Musharraf has also thought out a broad outline. Its elements were stated on May 20, 2005, at a Safma meeting. He understood “India’s sensitivity over their secular credentials”. A settlement “cannot be on a religious basis”. But the clue lay in his hint while affirming the triple criteria — borders cannot be redrawn; LoC cannot be permanent; and boundaries must be made irrelevant. “The solution lies in a compromise between the three;” pointedly, “it lies in the third statement of boundaries becoming irrelevant”. On our side, the PM also spoke on September 16, 2005, of a need for ingenuity to reconcile those three propositions. Clearly, both leaders are inching towards a formula that reconciles them.
Musharraf went a step further on the third point on October 21, 2005: “Let’s make the LoC irrelevant. Let’s open it out.” This requires an agreed ‘arrangement’. On January 25, 2006, he injected the idea of joint management.
What “we cannot give to them (Kashmiris) and what residual powers would be left with the joint management mechanism, which should have people from Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris”. They will get, he said at Davos the next day, something short of independence and more than autonomy. Officials would jointly manage the areas on both sides of the LoC. This is closer to our PM’s “institutional mechanisms”. India and Pakistan cannot run a municipality together. Joint ‘control’ is a non-starter but joint management is negotiable.
Musharraf’s interview to Karan Thapar (January 8) offered an important idea — an Indo-Pak accord on autonomy for each part of Kashmir “with both countries guaranteeing it and overseeing it”, that is, each “guaranteeing the situation on the other side of Kashmir... these are my ideas but I am open to any suggestions”.
Musharraf’s latest suggestions, to CNBC on June 24, are along the same vein — “give self-governance to the people of Kashmir with a joint management arrangement on top. This is an idea I am proposing. We could debate and, modify the idea.” He has been flexible on all his ideas.
Both leaders are agreed on two basics. Kashmir will not secede from India. Boundaries will not be redrawn. The UN resolutions are “set aside”. Is there nothing that India can offer in response beyond a soft LoC plus joint mechanisms? By itself, this framework will not be acceptable to Pakistan or — what is realised — to the Kashmiris. They insist on a framework that ensures autonomy guaranteed by both countries for both parts of the state. This can be devised without undermining India’s sovereignty one bit. Why would Pakistan accept under a deal what it already has?
Some in our establishment hold that Kashmir can and should be ‘settled’ without any accord with Pakistan by altering what is hideously called ‘the ground realities’, through CBMs and otherwise. But let alone the alienated populace, even pro-Union parties like the NC and the PDP insist on an Indo-Pak settlement. Will Pakistan go along with CBMs endlessly?
Since September 25, 2004, when Singh and Musharraf agreed to “explore options”, the options have narrowed. Considerable common ground has been developed. The two sticking points — the LoC and joint management — are susceptible to compromises. Only the leaders can devise them. As Nehru wrote to the Cabinet Secretary on April 6, 1953, “Nothing substantial can come out of a discussion of the Kashmir issue on an official level. The only possibility is noting down various lines of approach without commitment.”
On January 19, 2006, the PM did not tell Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammed Khan that he would not visit Pakistan unless he was assured of a settlement; only that “it must yield substantive results in enhancing a great deal of mutual trust between the two neighbours”. Of that, he is now assured, thanks to statements by both. Only at a summit in Islamabad with Musharraf will Singh be able to bridge the gulf between the rival positions through an understanding on the basics, or make significant progress towards it.
This is one of the most promising moments in the history of Kashmir negotiations. It is in true nature of promising moments to be transient and fleeting.
