The US-Israel war against Iran shows that overwhelming military and economic power no longer guarantee control. As adversaries resist and partners hedge, the US faces structural limits in translating dominance into stable outcomes.
Even as peace proposals and counter-proposals were “studied”, and rejected, by the parties to the war, uncertainty lingers across several aspects. This reveals a deeper reality: The US can mobilise overwhelming military and economic power, yet struggles to convert that power into durable political outcomes. When diplomacy falters, Washington increasingly falls back on coercive instruments — from naval pressure in the Strait of Hormuz to wider economic disruption. Yet this shift exposes a central limitation: Escalation can impose costs, but it cannot compel outcomes on its own terms. In the war against Iran, Washington has demonstrated its ability to escalate, impose costs, and disrupt adversaries. What it has not demonstrated is the ability to stabilise the situation on its own terms. The US can project force with precision and sustain economic pressure at scale, but it struggles to translate these capabilities into desired consequences. The result is a paradox at the heart of geopolitics today: American power, while unmatched, is increasingly constrained.
Despite overwhelming naval and air superiority, the US has struggled to fully secure the Strait of Hormuz. Sure, it has a blockade in place to ensure Iran doesn’t alone have full control of the commerce across the strait. But Iran’s asymmetric strategy effectively demonstrated first that control over the global commons cannot be taken for granted. For the US, this is not a failure of capability, but of translation. It can strike decisively, but it cannot prevent adversaries from exacting systemic costs. Disruptions in the strait have triggered price shocks that feed back into the American economy, constraining political support for the war. Overall, even as Iran faces disruptions due to the American blockade, that hasn’t yet forced it to stop inflicting economic pain on the US and its allies across the globe by shutting down Hormuz.
{{/usCountry}}Despite overwhelming naval and air superiority, the US has struggled to fully secure the Strait of Hormuz. Sure, it has a blockade in place to ensure Iran doesn’t alone have full control of the commerce across the strait. But Iran’s asymmetric strategy effectively demonstrated first that control over the global commons cannot be taken for granted. For the US, this is not a failure of capability, but of translation. It can strike decisively, but it cannot prevent adversaries from exacting systemic costs. Disruptions in the strait have triggered price shocks that feed back into the American economy, constraining political support for the war. Overall, even as Iran faces disruptions due to the American blockade, that hasn’t yet forced it to stop inflicting economic pain on the US and its allies across the globe by shutting down Hormuz.
{{/usCountry}}These limits are reinforced by shifts in the international order. Regional partners are recalibrating and hedging rather than aligning fully. At the same time, adversarial States are coordinating to blunt the impact of US sanctions and military pressure, while middle powers are refusing to choose sides. Prolonged conflicts impose economic and political costs that constrain Washington’s room for manoeuvre. The US now operates in a system where others can resist, evade, or opt out of the geopolitical paradigm of its choosing. In this environment, dominance no longer guarantees compliance and coercion no longer ensures outcomes. The forthcoming visit of Donald Trump to Beijing, despite deep strategic differences between the two powers, underscores this reality: Washington increasingly recognizes that even its principal rival remains indispensable in managing the current crises such as surrounding Hormuz.
China’s engagement with Iran underscores both the reach and the limits of American coercive power. By sustaining selected channels with Tehran, Beijing ensures that Iran remains economically viable despite sanctions pressure, while carefully balancing its broader global interests. Nor are these dynamics confined to adversaries. India, despite deepening strategic ties with the US, has remained cautious about entanglement in the conflict. Driven by energy vulnerabilities and a preference for strategic autonomy, New Delhi continues to engage multiple actors rather than align fully with any one side. Even close partners hedge — limiting Washington’s ability to build cohesive coalitions. The US can no longer simultaneously sustain its military dominance, economic stability, and political legitimacy. Each escalation strengthens one dimension while weakening the others. Military action disrupts adversaries but destabilises markets. Efforts to stabilise markets dilute strategic pressure. Attempts to avoid escalation preserve economic stability but erode credibility. In such a system, power is defined less by decisive action than by the ability to manage trade-offs — and that is where US dominance is increasingly constrained.
The war against Iran does not signal the decline of American power. It reveals its limits. The US remains the most capable power, but operates in an environment where others can choose from a range of options against its influence. In such a world, dominance does not translate automatically into control. Stability is no longer a by-product of power — it is contingent, negotiated, and fragile. The challenge for Washington is no longer how to project power, but how to exercise it within constraints it can no longer fully control.
G Venkat Raman is professor, humanities and social sciences, IIM Indore. The views expressed are personal