Delimitation: Balancing regional equity and electoral integrity
This article is authored by Ravindra Garimella, former joint secretary (legislation), Lok Sabha Secretariat and Amal Chandra, coordinator, SFL (India).
In the intricate tapestry of India’s federal democracy, the forthcoming delimitation exercise, scheduled to follow the long-delayed 2026–2027 census, emerges as one of the most consequential moments vis-a-vis the exercise of franchise by millions of Indian citizens in decades. It intertwines constitutional mandates with contemporary anxieties about representation, electoral credibility, and the integrity of the democratic process itself. Enshrined in Article 82 of the Constitution, delimitation was envisioned as a periodic recalibration of parliamentary and assembly constituencies based on decadal population shifts. The purpose was simple yet fundamental: to ensure proportional representation in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies while safeguarding the constitutionally mandated reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Yet the freeze on seat reallocations since the 42nd Constitutional Amendment in 1976—extended to 2026 through the 84th Amendment—has created profound representational asymmetries. What was originally intended as a corrective measure to incentivise family planning has, nearly half a century later, left India with a map of representation that no longer matches its demographic reality.
The freeze was introduced during the Emergency period to ensure that states which implemented population stabilisation policies would not be politically disadvantaged. This rationale, while pragmatic at the time, has had unintended long-term consequences. Constituencies in states such as Uttar Pradesh now encompass over three million voters on average, while those in states like Tamil Nadu average fewer than two million. This means that a voter in Chennai effectively carries more electoral weight than one in Lucknow, a situation that runs contrary to Article 81 of the Constitution, which upholds equality in the value of every vote. The Supreme Court, in its July 2025 ruling, reaffirmed that any nationwide delimitation cannot proceed without the publication of census data, save in exceptional cases such as Jammu and Kashmir. This judgment underscored both the procedural rigor demanded of delimitation and the centrality of the census itself to India’s democratic machinery. This underscores the imperative need to hold a timely census.
The delay in holding the census, therefore, is not a mere bureaucratic inconvenience but a structural risk to democracy. Originally scheduled for 2021, the census has been deferred multiple times, with the government now indicating 2026–2027 as the likely window. This deferral has cascading consequences. It perpetuates frozen representation, denying populous states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the parliamentary voice their numbers warrant. It delays the implementation of the 106th Constitutional Amendment of 2023, which promises one-third reservation for women in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies but is contingent upon delimitation after the next census. This, in turn, leaves unresolved the demand for a caste census, which the government has linked to the delimitation process. Without accurate caste data, the redrawing of constituencies risks reinforcing entrenched hierarchies rather than enabling genuine social justice. The census delay thus strikes at the core of representative democracy, freezing India in an outdated demographic snapshot and preventing institutions from adapting to the present.
The political implications of delimitation are already being fiercely debated, and the most prominent fault line is the north–south divide. Projections suggest that the Lok Sabha could expand to between 753 and 848 seats. Uttar Pradesh could rise from its current 80 to as many as 143 seats, while Bihar may grow from 40 to 85. In contrast, the combined representation of the southern states may fall from 26% of seats to below 20%. For leaders in the south, this constitutes a demographic penalty for progressive social policies. Fertility rates in Kerala and Tamil Nadu, at 1.8 and 1.7 respectively, are among the lowest in the country, reflecting decades of investment in public health and education. By contrast, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have fertility rates of 3.0 and 2.7, respectively, which are far above the replacement level. The fear in the South is that successful family planning will be punished with diminished parliamentary influence, even as these states continue to contribute disproportionately to national revenues. This fear is compounded by the formulas used by Finance Commissions for tax devolution, which often rely on population figures. Leaders in the South argue that they are being asked to give more and receive less, an imbalance that risks eroding the cooperative spirit of federalism.
Northern voices, however, argue that equitable representation is the bedrock of democracy. Vast constituencies with diluted voices, they contend, deny citizens in populous states the democratic weight they deserve. For them, the question is not one of penalising the South but of correcting the longstanding underrepresentation of the North. The government has repeatedly assured both sides that the concerns of all regions will be taken into account and that safeguards will be introduced to prevent any state from feeling marginalised. Yet these assurances remain broad and general, while the underlying tensions continue to fester.
The scope of delimitation extends beyond the Lok Sabha to state assemblies as well. States like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar may see dramatic increases in their assembly constituencies, while Kerala and Tamil Nadu may experience relative stagnation or even reductions in their share. This reshaping of state legislatures carries significant implications for resource allocation, political bargaining, and governance at the state level. Just as critical is the redrawing of reserved constituencies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, mandated under Articles 330 and 332. Population shifts and migration have altered the distribution of these communities across states, meaning that old boundaries no longer reflect current realities. Past exercises of delimitation have triggered local disputes over which groups benefit or lose from changes in reserved seats, and the next round is likely to spark similar contestations.
Delimitation, if mishandled, carries risks that extend beyond numbers to the very foundation of Indian federalism. For southern states, reduced representation could intensify feelings of marginalisation, while northern states could see long-suppressed grievances burst into political demands for greater recognition. The potential exists for unrest reminiscent of the agitations around linguistic statehood in the 1950s and 1960s, or the polarizations seen in U.S. redistricting battles. Economically, the stakes are no less severe. Southern states contribute close to 30% of India’s GDP, and a reduction in their bargaining power could destabilise national resource allocation. The widening of the North–South divide risks undermining both political harmony and economic growth, jeopardizing India’s ability to function as a cohesive federation.
Given the multiple complexities to address these, there are possible ways forward. One proposal is to expand the Lok Sabha to its maximum feasible size of around 848 seats, without reducing any state’s current allocation. This would allow under-represented states to gain seats while ensuring that others do not experience absolute losses. Another is to reform the Rajya Sabha so that it functions more effectively as a counterweight, preserving the voice of smaller states and regions that would otherwise see their influence diluted in the lower house. Such institutional innovations could help balance demographic equity with federal stability.
What is clear is that the road ahead requires both political will and imaginative reform. The next Delimitation Commission must be inclusive, incorporating not only government representatives but also the opposition, civil society, and regional voices. Its functioning must be transparent, with clear guidelines for how constituencies are drawn and how reserved seats are allocated. Electoral rolls must be modernised with auditable technologies. Interim mechanisms may be needed to implement women’s reservation without waiting indefinitely for census-linked delimitation. And above all, there must be a spirit of consensus-building, with an all-party dialogue that acknowledges both northern aspirations and southern anxieties.
The next census must be executed with utmost care and accuracy, incorporating not only population data but also caste and migration metrics, so that the political map of India is redrawn to reflect its true demographic and social realities. The success of this exercise will determine whether delimitation is remembered as a moment of democratic renewal or as a trigger for division. It also needs to be asserted that electoral integrity stands out as critical factor.
Delimitation is not merely about redrawing boundaries on a map. It is about reaffirming the democratic principles that underpin the Republic. For the North, it represents long-delayed fairness to burgeoning populations. For the South, it is a test of whether progress and prudence will be punished or rewarded. For women and marginalised communities, it is the promise of empowerment through genuine representation. If approached with transparency and consensus, delimitation can rejuvenate Indian democracy and align it with the realities of a nation of 1.4 billion people. If mishandled, it risks widening regional divides, corroding trust in institutions, and unraveling the federal compact that has held India together since Independence. The task before India is not simply to redraw its electoral boundaries, but to preserve and strengthen the democratic fabric that gives those boundaries meaning.
This article is authored by Ravindra Garimella, former joint secretary (legislation), Lok Sabha Secretariat and Amal Chandra, coordinator, SFL (India).
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