Trumpism and the liberal international order
This article is authored by Sriparna Pathak.
With the end of the Cold War and bipolarity in 1989, the world order that immediately emerged was a unipolar one with the United States (US) as the most powerful State of the international system. However, the rise of developing countries like India and China pushed the world order towards multilateralism, even though the US remained the hegemon. This order, characterised by open markets, multilateral institutions like the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), World Health Organization (WHO), among others pushed for cooperative security, bolstered by democratic values. The system represented a historically unique system of governance among states; like that of a leviathan, but not in the sense of an oppressive tyrant but as a powerful, rule-based framework that has shaped world politics. Despite China’s arrival on the world stage as a revisionist power, the system largely remained the same, with the US-China rivalry becoming one of the most dominant themes, if not the most dominant one in 21st century international relations.
Donald Trump’s election as the President of the US, in 2025 however has forced the existing liberal international order to undergo painful changes. The US, under Trump 2.0 has already withdrawn from multilateral frameworks like the WHO, the UN Human Rights Council and the Paris Agreement, and there are rumblings that it may withdraw from more such multilateral frameworks. Transnationalism and the threat of tariffs have become the order of the day, and the US has already slapped tariffs on friends, allies, and foes alike. The transatlantic rift between the US and Europe is another unprecedented one.
As such, the liberal international order is under immense strain, and discussions on the decline of US power are gaining momentum. The crisis of authority could also lead to a fragmentation or a replacement of the existing order, with an illiberal one, i.e. with China as the leading power of the international system. However, given that even China has benefited immensely from the US’s historic role as the stabliser, albeit with criticisms, even China would not want the system to be completely disrupted. In any case, as displayed by the vacuum left behind in Afghanistan by the withdrawal of the US and the lack of a stabiliser in the region still, in the form of China; Beijing replacing the role played by Washington is not something that is going to take place any time soon. Rather than becoming a stakeholder in the existing order, China however, will use its growing power and influence to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Thus, what is of prime concern in the era of Trumpism is the fact that the underlying openness and the rule-based character of the international order is in transition. The reason behind America’s hegemonic leadership of the liberal international order and how it was made acceptable to other States during the post-war decades lies in the fact that it provided security and other system services. China does not yet posses those types of capabilities. As problematic as the liberal international order has been, it is a better option than illiberalism, for stakeholders across the globe, and there was and continues to be a scope for a new bargain, but not for a new system.
Trump 2.0, like Trump 1.0 and the Biden administration correctly sees China as the challenger and the harbinger of illiberal values, be it in trade, openness, technology, values, or any other realm of 21st-century international politics. Policies in Trump 2.0 towards China, actually seem like a turbocharged version of his first tenure policies- heavy on tariffs, and tech restrictions with a goal of economic decoupling. A group of congressmen has even introduced a legislation that seeks to block Chinese nationals from studying in the US on the basis of national security. The Stop Chinese Communist Prying by Vindicating Intellectual Safeguards in Academia Act (Stop CCP VISAs Act) comes on the heels of several cases where Chinese students have been caught spying on the US military or stealing advanced technology from American companies. The US, has also finalised a rule prohibiting Chinese technology in cars, under national security concerns.
While all of Trump 2.0 policies are to Make America Great Again (MAGA), and the focus is primarily on enhancing the country’s national strengths, the fact also is that the US has benefited itself from the international rules-based international order, and its role as the hegemon. China has more aggressively started pushing its investments and technologies into other countries, in a desperate bid to protect itself from the shocks emanating from the changes to the existing international order. Other countries will have to ensure their own national interests remain intact. Chinese technology and investments have proven to be problematic earlier, and it is irrational to expect changes in the near future.
Trumpism will cause several strains to the existing order and a renegotiated international order will emerge. The US will still want to retain its position as the hegemon, as seen in his conversations on the Russia-Ukraine war, or the quagmire in West Asia. While the tweaks continue to take place, other countries of the international system have to brace for newer shocks and figure out how to protect their own national interests. Domestic buffering will have to be taken seriously, and resilience will have to be built through subsidies for affected industries, along with investment in alternative energy sources to mitigate short-term shocks. Offering deals that align with Trumpism, as has been the case with leaders of Gulf countries, through arms purchases, or even Australia’s past success in avoiding tariffs by aligning with Trump’s rhetoric could be considered. In conclusion, countries could blend economic diversification, pragmatic diplomacy and geopolitical agility to weather the strains caused by Trumpism and evolving American foreign policies.
This article is authored by Sriparna Pathak, associate professor, Chinese Studies and International Relations, Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat.
