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India’s military at inflection point as stage set for theatre commands, budget the first big signal | Point Blank
Here’s this week’s lowdown of a special segment on Hindustan Times, Point Blank, with Executive Editor Shishir Gupta
When HT’s Executive Editor Shishir Gupta sat down with Senior Anchor Aayesha Varma this week to discuss theatre command, his message was unambiguous. India’s armed forces are on the brink of a transformational shift, and the defence budget is the clearest early indicator that the political leadership has decided to move ahead on the path of progress.
From Kargil to CDS to theatre commands
The idea of transforming India’s higher defence architecture has been on the table since the Kargil Review Committee recommended the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in 1999. Yet it took two decades and strong political backing for the post to actually be created.
On August 15, 2019, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the institution of the CDS, breaking through years of hesitation rooted in fears of concentrating too much power in the military and reviving a “commander-in-chief” style system.
General Bipin Rawat, who was appointed as India’s first CDS, became the face of this reform push. He openly articulated the need for integrated theatre commands, where the Army, Navy and Air Force would fight as a single entity under one commander for a specific geographical theatre. After all, this approach would prove to create a Viksit Bharat, a unified India, in more ways than one.
General Bipin Rawat’s approach was top-down and driven, but his death in a helicopter crash in December 2021 in the Nilgiris hills stalled the momentum just as he was trying to push the system through in his tenure.
His successor, General Anil Chauhan, from the same Gorkha regiment, adopted a more consensus-driven, bottom-up approach — but on the core question, there is continuity: both men see theatre commands as non‑negotiable for a modern Indian military.
The next formal step is a note to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for final approval.
Shishir Gupta suggested that this is likely to happen before General Chauhan demits office, expected by 30 May 2026, setting a timeline for a “huge transformational change” in India’s military posture, especially considering the growing number of geopolitical conflicts.
Political consensus, military buy‑in
In the latest episode of Point Blank, Shishir Gupta underlined that the political and strategic establishment has broadly aligned on the direction of reform.
Prime Minister Modi has consistently favoured giving operational freedom to the armed forces, as seen in multiple operations since 2014, particularly during Operation Sindoor in 2025, where he is said to have told commanders to “do what you have to do” rather than micromanage from the top.
On the structural question of theatre commands, the signals are equally clear.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has approved the concept in principle. National Security Adviser Ajit Doval has examined the proposals. The three service chiefs – General Manoj Pande, Air Chief Marshal V.R. Chaudhari and Admiral R. Hari Kumar – along with CDS General Chauhan, have all signed a document explicitly endorsing theatre commands.
At the Combined Commanders’ Conference in Kolkata in September, the Prime Minister reportedly gave clear directions that the commands must be created.
Why theatre commands, and why now
At the heart of the debate is India’s changing place in the world.
Economically, India is already the fourth-largest power after the US, China and Germany, and is poised to become number three, a message re-emphasised by the central government in the Union Budget speech on February 1, delivered by finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman.
Militarily too, Shishir Gupta noted, India sits at number four, behind the US, Russia and China.
All three countries ahead of India in military terms already operate theatre commands. China has five theatre commands, the US and Russia also run their forces through theatre structures. For India to operate at that level, Gupta argued, it cannot afford to let its three services function in “different silos”, each with its own networks, doctrines and “kingdoms”.
Historically, the Army, Navy and Air Force maintained separate communication channels and intelligence systems. If the Army needed air support during an operation, requests would move up to service headquarters and then back down the chain, creating dangerous time lags.
Under General Chauhan, a unified communication backbone has been put in place, allowing formation commanders from all three services to talk directly.
Gupta pointed to Operation Sindoor as a glimpse of the future: for the first time, the three service chiefs and the CDS sat together in one room as Indian forces hit terrorist camps in response to the Pahalgam massacre.
The result, he says, was a sharper, more precise response – exactly the kind of jointness theatre commands are meant to institutionalise. An institutionalised harmony between the forces can only bring more benefits, and prove to be a stronger shield against India’s enemies.
What will India’s theatre map look like?
While there is consensus that theatre commands are coming, there has been debate over their exact number and shape. Different models have been discussed, including:
- Western theatre focused on Pakistan;
- Eastern or central theatre focused on China; and a
- Maritime theatre
What is in the realms of discussion is the question of where exactly a separate Northern command should go, given its unique challenge of facing both Pakistan to the west and China to the east along disputed borders.
The other point under discussion is this: does the presently operational triservice in the Andaman and Nicobar islands come under the eastern or maritime theatre command as the principal adversary in the region is going to be China?
Currently, the tri services command operates under the CDS, General Anil Chauhan.
Gupta said that conversations have now converged on three clear theatre commands: a West theatre command, an East theatre command and a Maritime theatre command.
The maritime command is particularly critical: India has a 7,000 km coastline and 1,062 islands to secure, along with a doctrinal requirement to be able to respond to crises across the Indian Ocean region – from the Maldives and Sri Lanka to Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Mauritius and Seychelles.
Budget as first big indicator
If policy intent is one pillar, money is the other.
For Gupta, the defence budget is the first hard indicator that the government is serious about building and sustaining theatre commands.
Post‑Operation Sindoor, defence spending has seen a significant jump.
The Ministry of Defence projected a 20 per cent increase in capital expenditure; the government sanctioned 22 per cent. Within that, the modernisation budget – the subset that pays for new platforms and technologies – was raised even more, to 24 per cent.
This is not just about buying more hardware. It is directly linked to theatre commands in two ways:
- Creating the infrastructure required for integrated commands across land, sea, air, cyber and space; and
- Acquiring enough assets so they can be effectively distributed among the three theatre commands without leaving critical gaps.
Gupta noted that the government has sent another crucial signal, that when it comes to the armed forces, “there is no bar” as long as the spending contributes to projecting dominance and power across Asia. Big-ticket plans include acquiring 114 Rafale fighters, long‑range stand‑off missiles, high‑altitude long‑endurance drones, medium‑altitude long‑endurance drones and armed unmanned systems – with an emphasis on making these platforms in India.
Beyond the colonial template
Underpinning this entire shift is a broader mindset change.
The legacy model of the Indian military was largely inherited from the British Raj, with separate service fiefdoms and a fragmented approach to planning and operations. Gupta argued that this colonial template is no longer tenable for a country that wants a seat at the very top table of global power.
The emerging structure – with a single principal military adviser in the CDS, integrated theatre commands, unified communications, joint intelligence and cyber frameworks, and a sharply rising modernisation budget – is intended to give India not just more military power, but more usable, responsive and coherent power.
In Gupta’s telling, the message from the political leadership is straightforward: the stage is set for theatre commands, the money is being put on the table, and now it is time for the CDS and the services to deliver a military architecture equal to India’s ambitions.
