Giving teeth to terrorism

The West's post 9/11 foreign policy has unified the terror world, writes AG Noorani.

When, on August 10, President George W Bush delivered "a stark reminder that this nation is at war with Islamic fascists", he implied that there is a unified movement, 'Islamic' in character, and its goal is to destroy the US. David E Sangar of The New York Times aptly called this "a narrative of never-ending conflict, in a war to be fought in Baghdad, in Lebanon" and everywhere. It has sparked a critical debate in the US about "whether five years of war declarations and war-making have helped to make the country more secure. Or, even in the absence of a major attack on the US since September 11, 2001, has this strategy created greater danger by providing terror groups with exactly what they crave: the sense that they are a unified army of jehadists?

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"And has the strategy radicalised large swathes of the Muslim world in ways that were not imaginable as recently as in 2003? But critics argue that by merging the global war on terror with the Iraq war, the Bush administration is creating new jehadists, from Indonesia to Walthamstow," in East London.

British ministers reject, as the US does, suggestions of any link between terrorism and foreign policy, but are no more convincing than the Americans in providing an explanation for the motives of the terrorists other than their 'distorted view of the world, a distorted view of life'.

In the article, 'The poodle's dilemma', The Economist notes that Tony Blair shares Bush's outlook when he spoke of a "clash between civilisation", in his speech at Los Angeles on August 1. It was a shocking performance, intellectually bankrupt and morally perverse. He declaimed, "This is war, but of a completely unconventional kind; 9/11 in the US, 7/7 in Britain, 11/3 in Madrid, the countless terrorist attacks in countries as disparate as Indonesia or Algeria, what is now happening in Afghanistan and in Indonesia, the continuing conflict in Lebanon and Palestine, it is all part of the same thing."

A unified movement inspired by a common goal. We have heard its variant before: 'international communism' guided from Moscow-led communists to power in China and Vietnam and instigated trouble elsewhere. Contradicting himself, Blair added that while "this movement... has an ideology, a world view", it "doesn't always need structures and command centres or even explicit communication. It knows what it thinks". Neither the e-mail nor the phone but telepathy enables concert all the way from Indonesia to the US. What is it that the jehadis are after? It is not regime change but 'values change', just what the American Don Quixote and his British Sancho Panza are also after. "We decided not to change regime but to change the value system. We made both Iraq and Afghanistan into existential battles for Reactionary Islam. We posed a threat not to their activities simply; but to their values, to the roots of their existence. We committed ourselves to supporting moderate, mainstream Islam." He detects "an arc of extremism that now stretches across the region". The duo will assist 'Modern Islam' to sweep it away.

There are no local roots, no local grievances, "whatever the outward manifestation at any one time - in Lebanon, in Gaza, in Iraq and, add to that, in Afghanistan, in Kashmir, in a host of other nations, including now some in Africa - it is a global fight about global values; it is about modernisation, within Islam and outside of it; it is about whether our value system can be shown to be sufficiently robust, true, principled and appealing that it beats theirs."

This speech would have disgraced a college debater. Saddam Hussein did not share Osama bin Laden's ideology. He was secular. So was the JKLF in Kashmir, which led the revolt in 1989. The Hezbollah came later. Blair sees a 'Global Islamist Terrorism' to defeat which he will 'empower Moderate Mainstream Islam'. But the US's policies in West Asia have alienated the 'moderates' and 'reactionaries' alike; indeed, the Third World, cutting across the religious divide.

Neil MacFarguhar reported from Damascus that "the very people that the United States wanted to encourage to promote democracy from Bahrain to Casablanca instead feel trapped by a policy that they now ridicule more or less as 'destroying the region in order to save it'."

Scholars who studied the problem in depth have concluded that it is politics not religion that prompted terrorism. It is another matter that some terrorists invoked religion in their nefarious activities. Robert Pape, author of Dying to Win: Why Suicide Terrorists Do It, studied 462 suicide bombings around the world. Lebanese sources were scoured to collect martyr videos, testimonies and biographies of Hezbollah bombers. Details of 38 were established. "We were shocked to find that only eight were Islamist fundamentalists; 27 were from Leftist political groups such as the Lebanese Communist Party and the Arab Socialist Union; three were Christians, including a woman secondary school teacher with a college degree. All were born in Lebanon. What these suicide attackers - and their heirs today - shared was not a religious or political ideology but simply a commitment to resisting a foreign occupation."

Daniel Benjamin's book, The Next Attack, on the future of terrorism, states that the London to-be bombers "were clearly motivated in large measure by Iraq. They were obsessed about it".

Blair does not need to read books. He should read the letter of May 18, 2004, which Michael Jay, permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, wrote to Cabinet Secretary Sir Andrew Turnbull after a joint study with the Home Office on 'Young Muslims and Extremism'. "Experience of both ministers and officials working in this area suggests that the issue of British foreign policy and the perception of its negative effect on Muslims globally plays a significant role in creating a feeling of anger and impotence among especially the younger generation of British Muslims. The concept of the 'Ummah', i.e. that the Believers are one 'nation', has led to HMG's policies towards the Muslim world having a very personal resonance for young British Muslims, many of whom are taking on the burden both of the perceived injustices and of the responsibility of putting them right, but without the legitimate tools to do so. This seems to be a key driver behind recruitment by extremist organisations (e.g. recruitment drives by groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroon).

"The FCO has a relevant and crucial role to play in the wider context of engagement with British Muslims on policy issues and more broadly, in convincing young Muslims that they have a legitimate and credible voice, including on foreign policy issues, through an active participation in the democratic process."

There was no comment that policy should not be dictated by terrorism or by minorities; only a factual assessment of the roots of resentment plus a prescription for democratic engagement.

Scholarship is no less essential for sizing up al-Qaeda for what it is. The foremost authority on the subject is Olivier Roy. He holds that it is a brand name ready for franchise. "It is a network of militants and only exists as long as they attack." A local group without any links to HQs may act in its name. "Or al-Qaeda may claim responsibility for a local attack." They "help give the impression... that al-Qaeda is ubiquitous". It is "not a strategic threat but a security problem. War on the terrorism is a metaphor, not a real policy".