Island of violent return

If the LTTE were really interested in peace process, it would have accepted Rajapakse?s offer, which included checking rebel leader Karuna's activities.

The spiralling violence in Sri Lanka threatens to push the island nation back into all-out war after an uneasy four-year lull. Last Monday, the LTTE killed the deputy chief of the Sri Lankan Army, Major General Parami Kulatunga and three others in his security convoy when a lone motorcycle-borne suicide bomber dashed against the general’s car and detonated an IED. Although the LTTE, in keeping with its usual practice, has denied its involvement in the attack, there’s no doubt that it was probably a follow-up action on the group’s unsuccessful attempt last April to assassinate Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka, the Commander of the Sri Lankan Army. Given this escalation in violence, it is difficult to see how the stalled peace talks can be resumed any time soon, leave alone make progress on the twin issues that form the basis of the peace process: the ceasefire agreement, and finding a solution to the long-running ethnic conflict within the ambit of a united Sri Lanka.

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It is significant that the attack on the general comes shortly after President Mahinda Rajapakse had expressed his readiness to hold direct talks with the LTTE -- instead of through Norwegian facilitators -- to find a political solution to the impasse, provided the Tigers refrained from violence for 15 days. If the LTTE were really interested in the peace process, it would have accepted Mr Rajapakse’s offer, which included checking the activities of the group led by rebel leader Karuna against the LTTE. This makes it clear that the Tigers are bent on exploiting the situation, swearing by the ceasefire on one hand, while conducting low intensity conflict -- with terror attacks against selected targets -- on the other. At the same time they have been seeking to pressure the EU ceasefire monitors and the Norwegians through threats and intimidation.

Are they then seeking something more than a conventional federal solution, which would let them retain their military in any future political set-up, without merging them with the federal government? Or is it simply that they feel that it is in their interest to keep the Sri Lankan pot boiling indefinitely? If this is so, there is need for the Sri Lankan government and the international community to evolve a new strategy to deal with the LTTE.