E-Paper
The icemen goeth?
Stalin?s blockade of West Berlin in June 1948, ostensibly over the city?s new currency, created a grave crisis.
Stalin’s blockade of West Berlin in June 1948, ostensibly over the city’s new currency, created a grave crisis. But, in his reply to questions on the crisis by Kingsbury Smith of the International News Service, he did not mention this issue. On January 30, 1949, Ambassador Philip C. Jessup at the UN was instructed to ask his Soviet counterpart Yakov Malik if the omission was significant. Malik said he would inquire. On March 15, he invited Jessup for a chat to tell him that the omission was “not accidental” but refused to elaborate on it. That was enough for soundings to proceed leading to a lifting of the blockade on May 12 and a meeting of the Four Power Council of Foreign Ministers on May 23 “to consider questions relating to Germany”.
States act on press reports if they wish to settle; ignore them if they do not. Pervez Musharraf’s interview to Karan Thapar on January 8 was the most detailed exposition of his ideas on Kashmir, thanks to his candour and the interviewer’s homework and close questioning. It is detailed enough to serve as a basis for both sides to work on. It is best understood in the light of the record.
On July 16, 2001, at the Agra breakfast, Musharraf said “move from stated positions” and eliminate unacceptable extremes, i.e. plebiscite on his side and non-negotiable dispute on ours. On December 18, 2003, he was prepared to set aside the UN resolutions. On October 25, 2004, he wanted to identify the seven regions and change their status. On April 18, 2005, in Delhi, self-governance is mentioned casually but on May 20 “maximum self-government” is proposed with demilitarisation. Independence and “religious basis” are ruled out. On October 21, he suggested: make the LoC “irrelevant. Let’s open it out”.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s stand (May 2004) that “short of redrawing of boundaries the Indian Establishment can live with anything” is akin to P.V. Narasimha Rao’s statement in April 1995: short of azadi, the sky is the limit. Since secession is ruled out, the only alternative is the status quo — but with one profound difference. Some wish Pakistan would accept it without more. Musharraf knows he cannot sell that to his people. He therefore rejects the LoC as a solution by itself. But he does not demand its abrogation, only its “irrelevance”. He is clearly in search of a solution based on the PM’s criteria, but which ensures, by an Indo-Pak pact, maximum autonomy to both parts of Kashmir with institutional links between them. The LoC becomes an international but open border; confirmed yet rendered ‘irrelevant’ in daily life. The 10-page transcript of the interview, which takes over two hours to absorb the nuances, yields four helpful basic ideas. Bear in mind that this, thank God, was not a discussion between lawyers!
* “[Autonomy] within the Indian Constitution is not acceptable… we are working for something between autonomy and independence and I think self-governance fits in well.’’ But, at Canberra on June 14, Musharraf said “autonomous Kashmir is my earnest desire”. Autonomy of a kind ensures self-governance. Article 370 is no answer. As Nehru told the Lok Sabha on November 27, 1963: “It has been eroded.” More so now. As Home Minister G.L. Nanda said on December 4, 1964, it can be used as a “tunnel in the wall” to increase the Centre’s powers; a guarantee of autonomy has been abused to end it.
* Self-governance will apply to both parts of Kashmir. Its quantum, the core of the matter, is to be defined. “Let us work out self-governance and impose the same rules” on both sides. Also involve Kashmiris as well as ‘legal experts’. “The flexing out has to happen together jointly,” he responded.
* Demilitarisation is part of the accord. “Let us hand over security to the people.” Thapar rightly asked, “But as long as the terror continues, how can a responsible government demilitarise?” The president hinted that he is prepared to negotiate the sequence. “Has the Indian government ever said ‘Yes, we are for demilitarising and self-government’?” He rejected the idea that “all terrorism has to stop and then we will speak about demilitarisation and self-governance. But they don’t move forward at all”. He is given nothing. However, on May 20, he left the sequence open. Whether demilitarisation “should precede or follow cessation of militancy”. This can be settled only in talks, international experience shows. As the then External Affairs Minister, K. Natwar Singh, said on June 1, 2004, “I am not making stopping of cross-border terrorism a pre-condition for dialogue with Pakistan… It is not stopping anywhere in the world.”
* “Joint management would be a solution which we need to go into... There have to be subjects which are devolved; there have to be some subjects retained for the joint management.” By India and Pakistan? That would be an unrealistic condominium. This is not what Musharraf implies: “Sovereignty gets reduced” by grant of self-governance; but he added, “It is not undermined.” Specifically, “there has to be a division [of Kashmir]. We are not talking about giving independence to Kashmir.” Ergo, the LoC remains; now as an open international boundary. India and Pakistan will retain sovereignty over their respective parts of Kashmir, which are granted self-governance “with both countries guaranteeing it and overseeing it”, each “having a stake in guaranteeing the situation in the other side of Kashmir”.
Tentativeness marks other suggestions; e.g., ‘the test case’ of demilitarisation of Srinagar, Kupwara and Baramula. His refrain was two-fold. “I am open to any suggestions”, yet “no suggestion comes from the other side”.
India and Pakistan agreed on September 25, 2004, that “possible options for a peaceful negotiated settlement” of Kashmir “should be explored in a sincere spirit and purposeful manner”. Is there no duty on India’s part to contribute to this exercise? The PM’s criteria are fully met. Musharraf’s ideas blend the Aaland’s and South Tyrol schemes — mutual guarantees of autonomy while confirming existing sovereignties — with the Northern Ireland accord of 1998. It is based on the status quo. Reunification of Ireland is formally abandoned. It sets up a North-South Ministerial Council on matters of common interest, besides Dublin-London consultative bodies. Europe is studded with autonomy laws. The Greenland Home Rule Act, 1978, is one model.
The best course is for the parties to exchange confidential non-papers, without any commitment, giving their ideas on possible solution. Given the will, we have entered the outskirts of the last stage towards a solution of the 58-year-old problem. But the political will is not very evident, even though our concerns are now fully met. Article 370 of our Constitution and Article 257 of the Pakistani Constitution are flexible enough to sanctify any accord on these lines. Is there nothing that India can concede to Pakistan on Kashmir?
