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The valley of fear
The Jammu & Kashmir police are confident they can handle the security situation in the state. The army does not want to move out. People’s insecurity grows, reports Hilal Mir.
“The Centre has decided to withdraw a significant number of battalions from Jammu & Kashmir and transfer law and order to the state police” Home Minister P. Chidambaram
“The army will stay till the threat of militancy is eliminated completely”
Lt. Gen B.S. Jaswal, general officer commanding in chief, Northern Command
The Centre’s recent decision to withdraw forces partially from Jammu & Kashmir is part of the government’s resolve to hold talks with separatists.
The conciliatory gesture is in tune with what even mainstream parties such as the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), apart from the general people and the separatists like the Hurriyat, have been asking for.
But the army has ruled out “lowering the guard”, which means no reduction in strength. After “shifting” 15,000 troops from Rajouri and Poonch districts in October, the army had made it clear there would be no cuts now. The general officer commanding in chief of Northern Command, Lt. Gen B.S. Jaswal, told reporters that the army will stay till the “threat of militancy is eliminated completely”.
A day before Jaswal’s statement, Chidambaram had hinted at troop cut during his visit to the state.
The presence of the army and the paramilitary forces in J&K has made a deep scar in the psyche of the average Kashmiri. The situation can be compared to Manipur, where activist Irom Sharmila is on a fast in protest against the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which gives the security forces the powers to fire on a group of five persons and arrest without trial. Fringe areas in the country, which are outside the so-called national mainstream, feel resentment towards the Indian state and the heavy deployment of the security forces is seen as an instance of the state’s high-handedness.
The PDP and the ruling National Conference want internal security to be the responsibility of the state’s 80,000-strong police force .
While the Union home and defence ministries are apprehensive about the Kashmir police’s preparedness and capabilities in handling the situation on its own, state police chief Kuldeep Khuda told Hindustan Times that though it was difficult to set a time frame for the switchover, the police’s capability to handle CI operations had evolved over the years and it can handle the security.
“The police are pro-actively involved in operations. The inflow of intelligence to the police has increased tremendously,” Khuda said.
Until now, the army’s Rashtriya Rifles (RR), raised in the mid-nineties exclusively for tackling insurgency in the state, has been at the forefront all counter-insurgency (CI) operations in rural areas. In urban areas, the police and paramilitary forces perform the job.
“It is a requirement under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) that the police should always accompany the army during (CI) operations,” Srinagar-based defence spokesman Lt.Col. J.S. Brar said. He said any plan to relocate the army from civilian areas — orchards, government buildings, hospitals, private houses, hotels and roadside bunkers — would involve only the 63 battalions of the RR deployed in rural areas across the state. Similar action would signal withdrawal of the CRPF from towns and cities.
Until 2002, only a section of the J&K police, called the Special Operations Group (SOG), was involved in CI operations. But the group’s reputation was such that even the mainstream politicians began to dissociate themselves from it.
During the campaigning for the 2002 elections, the PDP termed the SOG as the creation of the ruling National Conference and made its removal and an “end to its atrocities” one of its main poll promises, and won.
How will mainstream parties sell to the people the idea of an indigenous police force handling internal security, particularly when people identify the police fighting militancy with the SOG?
“The police have done a spectacular job. What makes critics think they can’t tackle internal security on their own? Counter-insurgency requires synergy. While the army and Border Security Force stop intrusions at borders and RR fights militants in hinterland, the police and CRPF manage the interiors,” said a senior National Conference leader, requesting anonymity.
Given the past record of the SOG, human rights activist Parvez Imroz said he dreaded a situation where local police force would have to fight its own people in a highly militarised zone scarred by a prolonged conflict.
“The governments should focus on resolving the Kashmir issue rather than beefing up the number of security personnel. Manipur has the highest police public ratio in. Is it any better?” he said.