The expansion of BRICS since 2023, somewhat haphazard and lacking clear criteria, has enhanced its political outreach and given it a greater global focus. The New Development Bank (NDB), created collectively by the original five BRICS members in 2015, has also expanded, but there is no automaticity in countries joining BRICS also joining NDB, or vice versa. The question is whether BRICS is expanding too fast for NDB to acquire the economic scale and internal capacity needed to support its increasingly ambitious agenda.
It seems that BRICS is trying to enable NDB to become more responsive to a wider Global South constituency. NDB originally had five shareholders, each with an equal share of the subscribed capital. It subsequently expanded to include Bangladesh, the UAE, Egypt, and Algeria, and, in June 2026, Uzbekistan, its tenth member and its first from Central Asia. Uruguay was also admitted as a prospective member but has not yet completed its accession.
The UAE and Egypt subsequently joined BRICS. Bangladesh, Algeria and Uzbekistan have not. NDB is becoming more of a development bank for emerging economies and the Global South than simply a BRICS bank.
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The issue is perhaps one of scale. BRICS has rapidly become a multi-continent grouping, while NDB’s capital resources remain limited relative to the infrastructure, energy, and connectivity needs of an expanding Global South. NDB’s authorised capital is $100 billion, of which $50 billion was initially subscribed equally by the five founders.
{{/usCountry}}The issue is perhaps one of scale. BRICS has rapidly become a multi-continent grouping, while NDB’s capital resources remain limited relative to the infrastructure, energy, and connectivity needs of an expanding Global South. NDB’s authorised capital is $100 billion, of which $50 billion was initially subscribed equally by the five founders.
{{/usCountry}}NDB’s rules ensure that new members cannot fundamentally alter the balance established by the founding five. The combined voting power of the founding members must remain at a minimum of 55%, while no non-founding member can hold more than 7% of total voting power. New members, therefore, have smaller individual shares than the original five.
NDB’s expansion should now enhance its creditworthiness and internal governance so it can meet the growing expectations placed on it by BRICS and the wider Global South.
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NDB’s ambitions are rising. It has set a target to provide 30% of its financing commitments in member countries’ national currencies. NDB’s 7 billion renminbi Panda-bond issuance demonstrated the ability to raise funds in China’s domestic capital market and reinforced its commitment to local-currency financing. It earlier raised funds in the South African rand in 2023-24 and is planning an Indian issue too.
As the BRICS agenda includes reducing excessive dependence on the US dollar and encouraging greater use of local currencies, this aspect of NDB matters for BRICS goals. However, NDB’s local-currency portfolio is still developing, and the US dollar remains important in international trade and finance. NDB is, therefore, better seen as a contributor to diversifying the global financial system than as an instrument of rapid de-dollarisation.
This is important for India, which has no interest in replacing dependence on the dollar with dependence on the yuan. A Chinese- dominated NDB would not support India’s strategic autonomy. The distinction between NDB and more China-weighted institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is, therefore, important to maintain. An NDB with credible multilateral governance, local- currency financing, and the ability to access global capital markets would be the right institution for the BRICS countries and the wider Global South.
BRICS recognises that NDB must become better integrated with its growing financial agenda. The 2025 BRICS Leaders’ Declaration agreed to incubate the BRICS Multilateral Guarantees initiative within NDB as a pilot initiative. It also encouraged continued dialogue between the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism and NDB. At the same time, work continues on the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative, although the precise role of NDB in that initiative remains to be determined.
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NDB is, therefore, not being cast aside or restricted. Rather, it is being encouraged to transition into an important institutional home for some of BRICS’ economic and financial innovations.
BRICS is, however, developing several parallel mechanisms: local-currency settlements, payment arrangements, guarantees, national development banks and other forms of South-South financial cooperation. Ideally, these should complement NDB. If they do not, they could fragment the BRICS financial architecture.
This is where BRICS could be outrunning NDB. If every financial initiative develops independently, BRICS could create a collection of overlapping mechanisms rather than a coherent financial architecture. NDB’s advantage is that it has established itself as a multilateral financial institution, with a balance sheet, access to international and local capital markets, and strong international credit ratings. The bank currently carries AA+ from S&P, AA from Fitch and AAA from Japan Credit Rating Agency. In the future, NDB should, therefore, be well connected to these initiatives and help develop them, rather than become a rival.
NDB’s collaboration with private capital is also growing, which matters because the infrastructure needs of the Global South are far beyond what NDB alone can finance. India and NDB have already discussed how private capital can be mobilised more effectively for development projects.
So, how can BRICS encourage NDB to move more rapidly? BRICS provides the political momentum. NDB is expected to provide institutional credibility, development finance, and effective delivery. This would help NDB become not an anti-West bank, but a credible Global South institution that complements existing multilateral financial institutions and addresses the development needs of the Global South more effectively.
BRICS should not allow its rapid expansion to fragment the financial architecture that it has begun to build. The real test for BRICS now is whether it can channel its strategic ambition into building the institutional capacities needed to support it. NDB is the clearest test case. Its success will show whether BRICS can convert its growing political weight into durable economic and financial institutions.