As Boeing 737 Max faces FAA scrutiny over possible fuselage cracks, a look at aircraft maker's troubled record

The Virginia-based aircraft maker has been embroiled in several controversies over the years amid questions over its safety standards.

Boeing's 737 Max programme is facing renewed regulatory scrutiny this week, after the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ordered inspections of hundreds of jets for possible fuselage cracks — the latest in a long line of controversies that have followed the aircraft and the company since twin crashes killed 346 people in 2018 and 2019.

In 2021, the US Department of Justice directed the Boeing to pay over $2.5 billion after it was found involved in a fraud conspiracy against the FAA in connection with the FAA's evaluation of Boeing’s 737 MAX airplane.(Photo for representation) (REUTERS)

Here's a look back:

Crack inspection order (2026)

The FAA this week finalised a rule ordering inspections on 471 US-registered Boeing 737-8, 737-9 and 737-8200 aircraft — part of roughly 1,429 such jets worldwide — effective September 10. The directive requires checks on a metal reinforcing plate — a bear strap — near the forward galley door, and on the fuselage skin of aircraft with existing repairs, to address what the FAA called "the unsafe condition" flagged in earlier reports.

No cracks have actually been found on the Max models covered by the rule. The concern stems from cracking reported on the same component on older, Next-Generation 737 jets, which the FAA said share "a similar design and build process" with the Max.

Boeing said it identified and reported the issue itself and has been working with operators on it for six years, having issued inspection instructions for Next-Generation 737s in 2019, ahead of an FAA mandate in 2021. It later extended the same inspections to Max jets voluntarily, a step the new directive now makes mandatory. "We support both directives and continue to support our airline customers," the company said.

In India, Akasa Air and Air India Express — the country's two largest 737 operators — said their fleets would not be affected. Akasa, whose 40 Max jets are among the youngest in the world, said they would not reach the directive's 30,000-flight-cycle inspection threshold for at least 13 years, beyond even its longest aircraft lease. SpiceJet, which also flies the 737, did not comment.

Alaska Airlines mid-air panel blowout (2024)

A 737 Max 9 operated by Alaska Airlines suffered a mid-air cabin panel blowout and rapid depressurisation while climbing through about 14,830 ft, shortly after taking off from Portland International Airport (PDX) in Oregon. There were 177 people on board; eight — one flight attendant and seven passengers — suffered minor injuries. Flight and cabin crew carried out emergency procedures, and the aircraft returned safely to Portland.

The FAA responded by temporarily grounding Boeing's Max 9 fleet worldwide and capping the company's production at 38 planes a month, a restriction it did not lift until October 2025, when it raised the limit to 42.

Then-CEO Dave Calhoun told staff the company was "acknowledging" its "mistake" and pledged full transparency with investigators. He stepped down later that year, with Kelly Ortberg taking over as CEO in August 2024. Four flight attendants sued Boeing for physical and emotional injuries the following year, Reuters reported.

The DOJ fraud case (2021-2025)

In January 2021, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) charged Boeing with conspiracy to defraud the FAA over its evaluation of the 737 Max, then agreed to defer prosecution provided the company paid $2.5 billion and met new compliance obligations over three years. Acting assistant attorney general David P Burns said the crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 had "exposed fraudulent and deceptive conduct by employees of one of the world's leading commercial airplane manufacturers," adding that Boeing "chose the path of profit over candour by concealing material information from the FAA."

The case did not end there. Following the 2024 Alaska Airlines incident, the DOJ determined Boeing had breached the terms of that agreement by failing to design, implement, and enforce a compliance and ethics programme to prevent and detect fraud violations, reopening the door to prosecution. Boeing initially agreed to plead guilty, but a federal judge rejected that deal. The trial judge in the case had earlier remarked that "Boeing's crime may properly be considered the deadliest corporate crime in US history."

The case was finally resolved in May 2025 through a non-prosecution agreement, under which Boeing paid an additional $444.5 million to victims' families and roughly $455 million towards compliance and safety investment — around $1.1 billion combined with the 2021 penalty — while avoiding a criminal conviction. Boeing must also retain an independent compliance consultant and cooperate with authorities for two years. Some victims' families objected to the outcome, arguing it let Boeing avoid accountability without an admission of guilt.

Internal emails (2020)

Boeing turned over hundreds of internal messages to the FAA and two congressional committees in December 2019, saying it did so proactively; the committees then pushed for the documents to be made public, and Boeing released them on January 9, 2020. In them, employees had sharply criticised the 737 Max's development — one calling it a plane "designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys."

In one instant-message exchange dated February 8, 2018 — eight months before the first of the two fatal crashes — an employee asked a colleague: "Would you put your family on a MAX simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn't." The colleague replied: "No."

Boeing apologised to the FAA, US Congress, airline customers and the flying public over the messages, calling the language used "completely unacceptable" and saying it did not reflect the company it needed to be.

The two crashes (2018-2019)

Boeing's Max fleet was grounded after two crashes involving the larger 737 Max 8 — Lion Air Flight 610 in 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 five months later, in 2019 — killed 346 people.

Boeing initially resisted grounding the fleet even after regulators worldwide had done so, before recommending the FAA ground it too, saying it was "supporting this proactive step out of an abundance of caution." Then-CEO Dennis Muilenburg later told a Senate hearing "we know we made some mistakes and got some things wrong," apologising directly to victims' families present in the room.

Muilenburg was stripped of his chairman title that October and resigned as CEO that December, with David Calhoun — who had briefly served as non-executive chairman — named president and CEO effective January 2020.

Separately, in April 2021, Boeing told the FAA it was recommending that operators of certain Max aircraft temporarily pull them from service to fix a manufacturing issue affecting a backup power control unit.