The US attacks allow Netanyahu to end war with Iran and in Gaza, says predecessor

Mr Obama remained steadfast in his position, and Israel responded by conducting an extensive campaign to thwart Iran’s uranium-enrichment activities

THE AMERICAN attacks on Iran’s three nuclear sites mark a dramatic escalation in the conflict that began on June 13th with the Israeli assault on Iran. President Donald Trump, in his characteristically unpredictable fashion, resolved to undertake an action he had eschewed for years, both during his first term in office and in recent months, despite making repeated threats against Iran.

A combination picture shows satellite images over Fordow underground complex, before and after the U.S. struck the underground nuclear facility, near Qom, Iran, June 20, 2025 (L) and June 22, 2025.(Reuters)

It must be noted that, to the American president’s credit, he has actualised what several of his predecessors had promised. George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Joe Biden all cautioned that a nuclear Iran posed a danger to world peace, and that America would use all means at its disposal to prevent it from producing a nuclear bomb.

Throughout those years, and especially since his return as Israeli prime minister in 2009, Binyamin Netanyahu transformed the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons into the central preoccupation of Israel’s national-security policy. He issued warnings, made threats and prepared for a military strike against Iran. America supported the policy and its objective but refused to permit an Israeli or a joint Israeli-American military operation to proceed.

In the face of Mr Netanyahu’s threats and preparations for military action, Mr Obama went to great lengths to avert an attack, even conducting secret negotiations with Iran, which culminated in a widely supported international agreement. This accord was intended to restrict Iran’s nuclear activities to civilian applications. Although many saw weaknesses in the deal, numerous security experts in Israel considered its control mechanisms sufficient to significantly curtail Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear bomb. Mr Netanyahu, however, criticised the deal and orchestrated an international public campaign against it. He secured an invitation to address a joint session of America’s Congress to challenge Mr Obama and urge the lawmakers to reject the agreement. This was a bold manoeuvre that cast a dark shadow over Israeli-American relations at the time.

Mr Obama remained steadfast in his position, and Israel responded by conducting an extensive campaign to thwart Iran’s uranium-enrichment activities as much as possible. Much of this was covert, though at times it was clear that attacks had been carried out against nuclear facilities or high-level scientists. No one claimed responsibility, yet it was widely understood that Israel’s Mossad was probably involved.

On one occasion Israel did officially take responsibility for an unprecedented operation in Iran: the infiltration by Mossad agents of a warehouse in Tehran containing thousands of documents and computer files about Iran’s nuclear activities. The indications from this, surprisingly, were that Iran had scrupulously adhered to all commitments undertaken within the framework of the deal with Mr Obama and, in practice, had kept to its undertaking not to move towards being able to build a bomb.

Despite all this, after taking office in 2017 Mr Trump decided to withdraw from the agreement his predecessor had signed, in effect paving the way for the Iranian leadership to announce a resumption of accelerated enrichment to a level that brings it perilously close to being able to build a nuclear bomb in a short period. Joe Biden talked about reinstating the deal in some form during his presidency, but it wasn’t to be. And then Mr Trump was re-elected. He reiterated the commitment of all his predecessors to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear capability.

America’s bombing of the Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan nuclear complexes over the weekend is game-changing. It will transform the immediate conflict between Israel and Iran, postponing, for the time being, the peril posed by Iran’s nuclear programme. But its repercussions will reverberate far beyond that.

America’s entry into the war builds on Israeli attacks involving hundreds of aircraft, supported by precise and detailed intelligence and unparalleled cyber capabilities. The decision to launch these attacks was courageous and exceptional—and the credit must go entirely to Mr Netanyahu.

For years, we in Israel grew accustomed to Mr Netanyahu’s haughty and bombastic rhetoric, in both Hebrew and English, as he threatened to annihilate Israel’s enemies, with Iran chief among them. In reality, we always assessed that a vast chasm existed between his oratory and his capacity for making decisions that entail considerable risk, both to Israel’s security interests and to his precarious position in politics and standing in opinion polls.

This time, Mr Netanyahu surprised his opponents in Israel, myself among them, as well as his critics abroad. Although numerous signs had pointed to a military campaign against Iran, it seemed that the Iranians, too, had learned to distinguish between the prime minister’s incendiary rhetoric and his ability to translate it into a comprehensive military operation. This time, they erred—and suffered a major defeat. Iran has been weakened not only in its confrontation with Israel but also as a regional power. Its ability to undermine the political stability of the Middle East is much diminished.

However, one must not lose a sense of proportion. Iran is not a terrorist organisation. It is not Hizbullah, Hamas or the Houthis. These are all proxy groups that Iran has cultivated to assist in its ongoing confrontations with Israel—but they are not Iran.

The notion that a series of pre-emptive military strikes can bring a nation of over 90m people to its knees—a nation with a cultural heritage spanning millennia, with industrial systems, an academic infrastructure and natural resources that make it one of the world’s largest suppliers of oil and gas—is arrogant and unrealistic. Iran will not collapse or shatter, even after the exceptionally painful blow of the American attack. And remember, it still possesses a formidable arsenal of long- and short-range missiles.

Mr Netanyahu, along with his defence minister, Israel Katz, and their messianic partners in government, wishes to expand the war—in Gaza and the West Bank as well as against Iran. They may derive satisfaction today from the American action. Yet it is also worth remembering that for more than a week Israel’s society and economy have been almost entirely paralysed. Schools are closed, centers of production and commerce are shuttered, the international airport is barely operating and hundreds of thousands of Israelis scattered across the world are unable to return to their country.

The question is, what now? What does Mr Trump truly desire? Does Israel possess a coherent plan to bring the war with Iran to a conclusion? And what will Iran do?

I cannot offer any counsel to Iran, except perhaps to suggest it suppresses its embarrassment and fundamentally rethinks whether its fundamentalist strategy truly serves its interests, its economy, its stability and its security. Has the time not come to reconsider its priorities and to open a new chapter of dialogue with America and Europe? Is it advisable for Iran to now attack American bases with ballistic missiles, dragging the world’s mightiest armed forces into a much broader, more destructive war against it?

I presume that Mr Trump, buoyed by admiration for his momentous decision, will wait patiently to see if and how Iran copes with the humiliating blow it has suffered before approving further military action. The president has time. A great deal of time.

And what of Israel? It is abundantly clear that the American action obviates the need for continued combat against Iran. In the past nine days, Israel has achieved outcomes that exceed anything it could have anticipated. Mr Netanyahu, meanwhile, has succeeded in diverting attention away from the bogged-down war in Gaza, the fact that 50 Israeli hostages are still held by Hamas, and that Israeli soldiers are being killed, alongside large numbers of uninvolved Palestinians. Continuing the campaign in Gaza will not lead Israel to an achievement worthy of its price—the price of its fallen soldiers, the loss of its hostages, the deaths of Gazans and the erosion of international support for Israel.

In ordering the bombers in, Mr Trump has given Israel a splendid opportunity to conclude the war in Iran, liberated for a long period from the nuclear threat it posed—something Israel has yearned for for many years. This is also a convenient exit point for the war in Gaza.

Past experience indicates that Mr Netanyahu knows how to start a war but lacks the capacity, the imagination and the strength of character—being entirely dependent on his political partners—to know how to end one. In the coming weeks he will be walking a tightrope. If he is wise, courageous and responsible, he will halt the fighting and earn accolades. If he proves arrogant and bombastic, he will demolish all the achievements, the security and the hope that he could have brought to the State of Israel.

Ehud Olmert was the prime minister of Israel from 2006 to 2009.