Eye on the Middle East | In the Middle East, Moscow hedges in the shadow of war
Russia’s principal interest lies in restricting the level of regional conflict to manageable levels, rather than ending it.
As alarm bells rang warning of potential escalation between Iran and Israel again, Russia’s Sergei Shoigu (Secretary of Russia’s Security Council) flew to Tehran to hold a host of meetings with top Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian on Monday, August 5.
Parallel to CENTCOM (the US military central command looking at the Middle East) Commander Michael Kurilla’s visit to Israel to discuss defence cooperation, Shoigu’s Iran visit is in line with Russia’s long-standing cooperation with Iran, propelled to new heights since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war two years ago. However, while Russia joined Iran in condemning Haniyeh’s killing, Shoigu reportedly asked Iran to “limit damage and avoid civilian casualties” in its response to Israel.
While this alone raises questions on what Russia’s interests and priorities are in the region, it is only a microcosm of the complexity of Moscow’s involvement in the fires raging in the Middle East today. Least of all, it undoes the notion of Russia being “absent” in the current crisis, as the State Department’s spokesperson recently asserted when responding to a question on Shoigu’s visit to Tehran.
The war in Gaza has changed the flow of engagement between Russia and key Middle Eastern states. Prior to October 7, Russia’s war in Ukraine predominantly defined Russian engagement with the region – Moscow furtively hunted for avenues of support for its war, and of refuge from Western sanctions. This in turn gave Middle Eastern powers greater agency to push for gains from an embattled Moscow whose war in Ukraine has turned far more protracted than it had hoped for.
Turkey and Russia entrenched their rapprochement in 2019 even as Ankara teetered on the brink of NATO’s tolerance by purchasing Russia’s S-400 missile defence system. Israel’s Netanyahu (who has made public displays of his friendship with Putin) refrained from joining Western sanctions on Russia after its war on Ukraine began, refused to arm Kyiv, became the largest importer of Russian vodka and expanded bilateral cooperation. This was arguably rationalised by the belief that this would induce Russia to accommodate the Israeli interest when engaging with Iran and influence the latter’s decisions. The Iran-Russia relationship itself reached unprecedented heights following the Ukraine war, with Iran supplying Moscow with drones, ballistic missiles and a host of military equipment (along with China and North Korea).
Across the Gulf, Saudi Arabia resisted US pressure to change oil production and dug its heels in the OPEC+ alliance with Moscow. It appeared that Middle Eastern states were drawn towards benefits from a vulnerable great power that they believed would offer more, for less — a logic not far from India’s own calculations for purchasing Russian oil.
The war in Gaza injected greater complexity into the Russia-Middle East equation, increasing Moscow’s agency. In October 2023 itself, Russia hosted high-ranking members of Hamas and Iran’s then-deputy foreign minister — turning the question of mediation on its head. Before then the prospect of mediation was by Middle Eastern states (especially Turkey and Saudi Arabia) between Kyiv and Moscow; this continues but with a reciprocal Russian interest in aiding crisis management in the Middle East.
Russia also gambled on burning its bridges with Israel through its engagement with Hamas and Iran post-October 7, arguably with the underlying belief that these bridges could be rebuilt as Israel itself seeks greater international support for its war on Gaza. Tacit agreements between Moscow and Tel Aviv are not uncommon — evident especially in Russia all but allowing Israeli air strikes on Iranian targets in Syria, even as the basis of its own intervention in 2015 was to support Iran-backed Bashar al-Assad against rebel forces and the Islamic State. Moreover, any Western hopes for a downturn in Russia-Turkey ties due to the latter’s strong outreaches to Ukraine ended up being a flash in the pan despite Erdogan’s categorical criticism of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
The war in Gaza has given Erdogan a greater opportunity to assert Turkey’s strategic autonomy in the region and test the West’s tolerance (despite continuing engagement with Ukraine) — on July 4, Russia freshly commended Recep Erdogan for his “political will” to strengthen the Russia-Turkey partnership with Washington reiterating its warning of “consequences” as recently as August 7.
Now, Russia presents itself as a party that has leverage over the key pieces of the Middle Eastern chessboard – principally Iran which is presently stuck between delivering on its much-publicised “promised” punishment to Israel and losing face. Russia now attempts to support the Iranian need to restore some form of deterrence, but rely on its good faith with Tehran, to cater to the Arab desire to control escalation. In the latter, its objectives are allied with the United States, in effect — given Washington's own lobbying to pressure Iran against a military response.
This is evident not just in Shoigu’s message of “limits” but also in Russia’s willingness to shelve plans to arm the Houthis to accommodate Riyadh’s concerns — even as Russian GRU units reportedly advise the Houthis militarily on the ground.
While Riyadh was evidently teasing divergence from Russia exactly a year ago in June 2023 on the question of reducing per-day oil exports to prop up flailing prices, in the period since October 7, Riyadh has actively cooperated with Moscow even more to withhold a combined 1.3 million barrels per day (more than 1% of the global demand).
Now both states remain allied over voluntary production cuts, which received a fresh boost in late 2023 after oil prices briefly fell despite Israel’s expanding war in Gaza. The Saudi interest in joining Russia to cut oil production bears an uncanny resemblance to July 2022 a few months after the war in Ukraine began, when ardent efforts by President Joe Biden to coax Riyadh into boosting production failed, increasing Brent crude prices by 2.6% to $103.88.
As Russian exports (Ural crude) reach record highs to importers such as India, with Saudi exports falling, Riyadh’s cooperation with Moscow to keep prices high can only be expected to continue, even outside of the demands of regional and global geopolitics. Moreover, Russia’s decision to stay clear of actively arming the Iran-backed Houthis arguably helps in reducing Saudi discomfort in dealing with Iran; Riyadh termed Ismail Haniyeh’s killing a “blatant violation” of Iranian sovereignty at the OIC extraordinary meeting in Jeddah, on August 7th in its first official reaction to the incident (which was notably delayed).
Hence, as Giorgio Cafiero highlighted for the Stimson Center, Russia has little reason to push for a ceasefire in Gaza — the longer the Middle Eastern crisis rages, the more it dilutes attention to Ukraine undermines Washington’s ability to shape the region’s politics as a security guarantor and allows Russia the opportunity to exploit the leverage it has over Israel’s principal opponents.
Perhaps the biggest evidence of the geopolitical capital and distracting benefit that Israel’s Gaza war has for Russia, was in December 2023, when Vladimir Putin made a rare and hasty visit to UAE and Saudi Arabia — greeted by 21 gun salutes and fighter jet flybys, much to European and American discomfort. For Russia, the current scenario is ideal — its principal interest lies in restricting the level of regional conflict to manageable levels, rather than ending it.
Bashir Ali Abbas is a research associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi, and a South Asia Visiting Fellow at the Stimson Center, Washington DC. The views expressed are personal.
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