Delhi HC judge recuses self from hearing Gymkhana Club case

The Centre had opposed the suit, saying that the notice was a valid exercise of its contractual right of re-entry under the perpetual lease deed and did not amount to compulsory acquisition.

New Delhi

The court recused itself from hearing the suits filed by the DGC Staff Welfare Association governing body.

Delhi High Court judge Prateek Jalan on Wednesday recused himself from hearing petitions challenging the Centre’s notice directing the iconic Delhi Gymkhana Club (DGC) to vacate the premises, citing “personal interest” in the matter.

On May 22, the Centre had issued a notice directing the club to hand over its premises at 2, Safdarjung Road, to the Land and Development Office (L&DO) by June 5, invoking a public purpose clause in the original lease deed.

“I will recuse in this. There are matters when one does not trust one’s own judgement. I would be more comfortable if somebody else hears this. There is so much personal interest involved. Subject to appropriate orders, list before another bench on Friday,” justice Jalan said.

The court recused itself from hearing the suits filed by the DGC Staff Welfare Association governing body. The matter would now be heard on Friday by a new bench.

In the suit, the petitioners had asserted that the May 22 notice was vague, failed to demonstrate concrete public purpose and, in fact, contained contradictory grounds. It was contended that the action had been taken without prior notice and was vitiated by legal mala fides.

The Centre had opposed the suit, saying that the notice was a valid exercise of its contractual right of re-entry under the perpetual lease deed and did not amount to compulsory acquisition. In its written statement filed through standing counsel Ashish Dixit, the Centre submitted that the premises are located in a sensitive and strategic area, are required for defence infrastructure, public security, institutional and governance infrastructure, as well as public-interest projects integrated with adjoining government land and these purposes would not become legally incompatible merely because the same has historically been occupied by a private club.

It argued that the club’s long-standing use of the property, expenditure on the premises, sporting facilities and heritage recognition do not confer immunity from Clause 4 of the lease deed, which reserves the lessor’s right of re-entry where the premises, or any part thereof, is required for a public purpose.