E-Paper
Between engagement and disengagement: Japan’s Myanmar recalibration
This paper is authored by Pratnashree Basu, Sreeparna Banerjee, ORF.
Japan’s foreign aid policy towards Myanmar has been an important component of both, its broader approach to Southeast Asia and its Indo-Pacific vision. As one of Myanmar's largest development partners, Japan has consistently supported the country’s infrastructure development and democratic transition efforts, while also providing humanitarian aid. However, Myanmar's protracted political instability, particularly following the 2021 military coup, has forced Japan to recalibrate its aid strategy. This brief evaluates Tokyo’s engagement with Naypyitaw, examining the strategic adjustments it has made in response to pressing internal issues in Myanmar, shifting regional dynamics, and international pressure.
Within Tokyo’s broader Southeast Asian strategy, Myanmar holds an important and complex position. Historically, Japan has viewed Myanmar as a partner for economic engagement and regional connectivity in Southeast Asia. Japanese companies were strongly encouraged to enter Myanmar—often regarded as Asia’s last ‘frontier economy’—through incentives from the Japanese government and the persistent lobbying of the influential Japan-Myanmar Association. Indeed, the latter played a key role in the close cooperation that developed between Japanese firms and Myanmar’s ‘pseudo-civilian’ government. Before the February 2021 coup, Myanmar was a recipient of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF). Japan invested in infrastructure projects such as the Thilawa Special Economic Zone, as well as nationwide power and transport networks. It also played a role in Myanmar’s democratic transition, supporting peace negotiations with the country’s various ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and encouraging economic reforms.
However, the coup has made matters more complicated. While Tokyo continues to engage with the efforts of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to address the crisis, it has scaled back direct cooperation with the military regime. In September 2024, it downgraded its diplomatic ties by opting not to appoint a new ambassador following the end of Ichiro Maruyama's term. Instead, Shogo Yoshitake was made interim chargé d'affaires, a lower rank. However, it continues to face regular criticism for its economic involvement: in May 2024, for instance, it was reported that Yokogawa Bridge Corporation, a Japanese construction firm, had made payments to the military-owned Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) for the Bago River Bridge Construction Project, which raised concerns about Japanese aid inadvertently supporting the junta.
Japan remains cautious about disengaging fully, fearing that doing so could push Myanmar further into China’s sphere of influence. Instead, it has adopted a policy of limited engagement, maintaining humanitarian assistance while suspending the financing of development projects.
Myanmar’s future role in Japan’s Southeast Asia policy will depend on political developments within the country and the stabilising of its domestic affairs. If a path to democratic transition emerges, Japan is likely to re-engage more actively. However, as long as the military remains in power and conflict persists, Myanmar will remain a difficult balancing act in Japan’s broader regional strategy.
This paper can be accessed here.
This paper is authored by Pratnashree Basu, Sreeparna Banerjee, ORF.
