E-Paper
Why Myanmar’s elections offer no simple off-ramp to crisis
This article is authored by Cchavi Vasisht, associate fellow, Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi.
With the elections in Myanmar scheduled for December 28, 2025, the preparations are in full swing with an expectation of a new government to be in power by April 2026. Though the elections are being held under the 2008 Constitution and from a far-away lens may seem to be a sign of the return of democratic principles in the country. But in reality, it reflects the political uncertainties in the country which is amidst a civil war, facing persistent humanitarian and economic challenges, along with challenging geopolitical shifts. The United Nations have decried the elections as “fraud” or “sham”. And the military’s efforts to legitimise its rule through polls have been widely criticised as manipulated and non-inclusive. Even ASEAN has refused to send its observers for the elections.
The civil war, triggered by the 2021 military takeover, has evolved into a long standing and multi-layered conflict involving Myanmar's military, the National Unity Government (NUG), and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). The systematic abuses continue with extreme human rights violations and arbitrary detentions, polarisation, and displacement exceeding 3.3 million. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), between January and May 2025, the military conducted 1,134 airstrikes, compared to 640 in 2024 and 197 in 2023, during the same period. And now concerns are increasing as the conflict zones are expanding as the date of elections approaches. The economy has contracted and there is a parallel illegal economy as a result of the rise in unorganised crimes and scam centres.
In the political sphere, the Myanmar military has taken control of central regions of Myanmar along with administrative and financial control of the country. The military is facing heavy losses in bordering regions and the forces are burdened and overstretched but have yet not collapsed. The NUG has gained huge international legitimacy and commands humanitarian and financial support from across the world; but it lacks territorial presence. The Ethnic Armed Organisations, numerous in number, though share a common goal of challenging the military rule, many of them are at odds with one another, making the conflict inherently fragmented. Individually they control and govern their territories, such as the Kachin, Karen, and Rakhine groups; but the vision for a future structure of state along with the formation of a democratic and federal institutions is missing. It is, therefore, not a contest between pro or anti-democratic forces, but the core pathology is characterised by the power struggle between various stakeholders.
For the upcoming elections, 57 parties have registered, and the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) is leading the campaigns in the central region. However, the outcomes are largely predetermined. Forty opposition parties, including the National League of Democracy (NLD) have been banned and around 22,000 remain imprisoned as political prisoners, including the 80-year-old Aung San Suu Kyi.
Even the 11-member Union Election Commission (UEC) aims to serve the interests of the military. The new legislation, titled Election Protection Law, introduced in July 2025, imposes prison terms and even death penalty for any action which seems to disrupt the electoral process, under which a total of 125 arrests have been reportedly made. Even martial law continues to exist in nine out of the fourteen states, excluding the areas which are out of the military's control.
The constitutional provisions are being used to ensure that the military continues to rule indirectly as it did in the previous decade (2010-2020). By law, it is not compulsory to hold elections in the whole territory. Thus, even with 50% of territory, the elections will still hold legitimacy. The elections are being conducted in a phased manner, which will give space and time for the military to arrange for elections as and when the territory is under its control. A total of 202 townships will undergo elections in two phases in December 2025 and January 2026. The UEC has also decided not to hold elections in areas with unstable conditions. Previously in the 2010, 2015 and 2020 elections, the UEC cancelled elections particularly in conflict-affected areas like Rakhine, Chin, Kayin, Kachin, and Shan states, where ethnic armed organisations-controlled territory. And for the upcoming elections, the UEC has cancelled voting in 65 constituencies. The UEC can also relocate polling booths to safer locations, which again would be in the military’s interests.
Even the shift from first-past-the-post to a hybrid proportional representation (PR) for the Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw) and regional parliaments is central to the military's reforms, aiming to boost the electoral prospects of the USDP. And for the lower house (Pyithu Hluttaw) the First-past-the-post (FPTP) system is being used. For the first phase, elections will be held in 274 constituencies for the Pyithu Hluttaw, 75 constituencies under the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system and 26 constituencies under the Proportional Representation (PR) system for the Amyotha Hluttaw, 266 constituencies under the FPTP system, 42 constituencies under the PR system, and 29 ethnic affairs constituencies for the Region or State Hluttaws. The PR system is framed to potentially benefit smaller ethnic-based parties, as it is assumed that ethnic voters will vote for these parties. However, this outcome is not guaranteed, as the success of these parties will depend on how electoral constituencies are defined, and whether the voting patterns align with the assumption that ethnic parties will not split votes. The specific details of how seats will be allocated to townships, as required by the 2008 Constitution, are still unresolved.
Irrespective of electoral or political developments, instability is likely to persist in the foreseeable future. As long as the military remains in control, the prospect of a federal system in Myanmar is challenging. What is important to note is that even under favorable conditions, governments in Myanmar (whether civilian or military) have never exercised complete control across the country.
It is important for the stakeholders in Myanmar to lead the process, as only a Myanmar-led and Myanmar-owned one can provide stability in the country as well as the region. Though promoting regional diplomacy in South Asia remains challenging, Myanmar’s strategic location bordering the Bay of Bengal and connecting India's northeast to Southeast Asia makes it a crucial link for regional connectivity and geopolitical influence, but internal fragmentation and the interplay of external powers, therefore, underscores its role as a linchpin in economic, humanitarian and regional security.
This article is authored by Cchavi Vasisht, associate fellow, Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi.
