Ahead of Trump-Modi's February meet, a 5-fold challenge for India's diplomacy
The timing of Modi’s visit is the message as it speaks to India’s importance and bipartisan links in the US
President Donald Trump has announced that Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit Washington DC in February. In symbolic terms, the timing of the visit is the message. It speaks to India’s importance and bipartisan links in the US that Modi was among Joe Biden’s last guests and will be among Trump’s first guests.
In tangible terms, the visit should be judged on five parameters of how it meets the current moment in global geopolitics. In terms of the real political impact, it should be judged on a sixth parameter of whether it addresses a fundamental deficit in the worldview of the Trumpist ecosystem about international partnerships in general but India’s role and value in particular.
The five-fold test
One, does the visit send early signals of positivity about the future of the India-US strategic relationship with convergence both in Indo-Pacific and West Asia? Likely. Both are anxious about China, and both want a Saudi-Israel deal. There will be more convergence on Europe too where both seek an end to the war in Ukraine.
Two, are both sides able to have difficult conversations privately on trade, immigration, defence, and investments and arrive at a clear roadmap to resolve differences, without Trump possibly blurting out embarrassing details for the Indian side in public? Unlikely. Solutions aren’t easy, interests diverge at times, and Trump doesn’t understand discretion.
Three, can the visit prevent public damage from issues that are integral to Trump’s agenda but have the potential of hurting Modi’s political base (the diaspora and middle class in case of legal migration, Gujaratis in case of illegal immigration, and key business constituencies in case of trade)? Potentially, as long as India is able to offer Trump what he considers real political wins and reinforces his projection of strength.
Four, after testing and assessing each other in their new avatars, do both sides trust each other less or more, especially on China? To be determined for the US has sent mixed signals about its China policy and India has embarked on its version of normal diplomacy in abnormal times with China. Clear, transparent communication can help while ambiguity and opaqueness can erode trust.
Fifth, do they send some reassuring signals to critical tech and business investor constituencies about being trusted partners? In the wake of DeepSeek’s disruption of the entire artificial intelligence race, do they find new ways to collaborate to ensure national security for both, dominance and competitiveness in the case of America and growth of an ecosystem and innovation in the case of India?
Expect mixed results on the final issue. Both sides are invested in continuing the initiative on critical and emerging technologies or elements of it. On AI, there will have to be a reset, and the entire gamut of issues from the impact of chip restrictions to India’s twin assets (data and tech talent) and its ambitions to grow an ecosystem, coupled with the US goal to sustain its dominance, will have to be navigated. On semiconductors, it remains to be seen if the US encourages American majors to invest in India. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s Republic Day message to India mentioned space research in particular; this will continue. There is convergence on the need for supply chain diversification beyond China but expect discord on details. On defence, as Trump made it clear on his call with Modi, he expects India to buy more equipment — this means that co-production initiatives involving tech transfer are unlikely to be green-lit in a hurry.
All these five areas merit scrutiny. But in addition, in the run-up to the visit, a key aim should also be to address a fundamental deficit that exists in Trump’s world, and in the wider US public sphere, about India.
Where India adds value
To understand this deficit, and therefore set the stage for the visit, Indian diplomats should survey key Republican strongholds. Ask an American about what Indian students contribute to the US, and while the answer may revolve around their role as doctors and tech executives, few are likely to be able to tangibly quantify the financial contribution of students to the American economy — the only metric that matters in Trump’s America.
Here is a clue. According to a November 2024 report published by NAFSA: Association of International Educators, there were 1.1 million foreign students in the US in the 2023-2024 academic year. They contributed $43.8 billion to the US economy and helped create 378,000 jobs.
Out of this total number, according to OpenDoors which tracks foreign students in the US, there were 331,602 students from India, higher than any country, including China. A rough back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that as one-third of the total number of foreign students in the US, Indian students may well have contributed over $10 billion and helped create over 100,000 jobs in the US in just a single academic year.
Ask an American about what Indian companies contribute to the US, and while some may be able to point to TCS sponsoring the New York marathon (it is indeed quite striking to see people in Manhattan running in T-shirts flashing the Tata brand), few are likely to be able to point to the actual tangible Indian investments in the US.
Here is a clue. In a report titled Indian Roots, American Soil, published in May 2023, the last time any credible data on the issue was available, a Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) survey found that 163 Indian companies had invested $40 billion and created 425,000 jobs in the US.
A 2020 CII report said 155 Indian companies had invested $22 billion and created 125,000 jobs. A comparison of the two suggests there was either a major increase in investment by new companies, or an expansion of investment by companies already in the US, or better reporting by companies — in all three scenarios, it is clear that Indian corporate presence in the US is way more substantial than thought. And the figures may not be exhaustive, for the survey is contingent on the participation and disclosure of Indian companies. And it may only have grown since.
Break it down further and the nature of investments offers more insights into Indian contribution to the US. According to the report, Indian companies are present in all 50 states. The investment by value is highest in Texas and Georgia (incidentally both are Republican states) while job creation is also highest in Texas. 29% of Indian investments are in the life sciences, pharmaceutical, and health care sectors. 21%of companies are in the information technology and telecommunications sector, 18% in manufacturing, 10% in financial, legal, logistical, and design services, five percent in automotive, four percent in food and agriculture, three percent in tourism and hospitality, and two percent in energy.
And the figures don’t reveal the hidden stories. On a trip to North Carolina (another state Republicans won in this presidential cycle) with the then-Indian ambassador in 2023, this reporter visited HCL Tech’s facility. Among HCL’s various initiatives, one stood out — hiring graduating American high school students, offering them a training stint at the company, exposing them to work with an internship, helping them enrol in college and paying their fees, and then getting them back as full-time staff to the company in what is clearly a win-win for local communities, students, colleges and the company. In that one facility, 87% of employees were local Americans and 13% were on H-1B, a complete inversion of the ratio when the Indian tech company first started its operations in the state.
These are two simple barometers, merely indicative of all the other ways India contributes to the US. This may be through defence purchases or as a market or as a source of talent. It may be through Delhi’s role as a strategic partner that wishes well for America more often than not (and except for a fringe perhaps, never wishes ill or seeks to hurt US interests in a targeted manner even at the worst of times), as a friend in the most fiercely contested region in the world that is more comfortable with a US-led order than the other one that’s on offer by a power in the proximity, and as free actor that does not seek a security guarantee (and has retained liberty of action in return), is not a security free-rider or liability but a potential asset. More intangibly, though this matters little in the Trump world, the US benefits from having a society where American appeal is embedded in popular consciousness and popular goodwill for the US remains high.
To be sure, India too needs the US, perhaps even more so because of the asymmetry of power. India needs the US as a geopolitical and strategic insurance policy (insurance is not a guarantee, the status an ally gets, but insurance is useful as seen in Galwan); and as an enabler of India’s rise (no other country could have gotten India the nuclear exception); as an indispensable partner to help build Indian capacity across domains (think of education, technology, services, manufacturing, human talent pool); as a home for a large number of migrants and the biggest source of foreign remittances, as the player which opens doors to other its allies and more.
The Indian contribution to the US and Indian need for the US — or the US’s need for India and the US’s admittedly higher contribution to India at this stage in ties — are all simultaneously true features, giving the relationship its bipartisan and binding and enduring quality.
But this is a piece about what India brings to the table. And guess what? Few Americans know anything about it.
Where Indian public diplomacy falters
Don’t mistake the bilateral optics and ties between a limited set of actors at the top for the underlying political demand from the American street about American geopolitical partnerships. That explains why Trump made his direct asks from India in his first call with Modi — more defence buys, fairer trade ties. He has shaped an impatient society that believes that every international partnership hurts the US and is a product of that society impatient with external interventions. That is the sum of the American First approach, which has now placed the onus on partners, friends, and allies to prove that they aren’t hurting the US. No one wants to do this, but given American centrality, it is unavoidable.
To sustain goodwill, India has to talk up both its value proposition and acknowledge the American indispensability to welcoming mainstream audiences as well sceptical conservative audiences in the new American political world.
There can be a view among conservative and cautious diplomats that it is better for India to keep a low profile. But this risks allowing others to set the narrative on India in Trump’s world, it is an admission of helplessness, and it will not prevent controversies and questions on India’s value in a foreign policy culture that is asking each country what they can offer. And given that India relishes high visibility during visits, being low-key at all other times may not be an option.
And that’s where Indian public diplomacy in the US perhaps needs to be more creative. There are three glaring gaps — in focus, in platforms, and messaging.
The first is the focus of India’s diplomatic communication. Besides external affairs minister S Jaishankar’s always sparkling and provocative interventions during his occasional visits in which he engages directly with US audiences, the primary intended audience for Indian diplomats appears to be the domestic political leadership and domestic political audience. The focus on visible even if symbolic wins, as a way to reinforce the image of the leadership, has permeated down. All systems have to do this to some extent — who doesn’t have to please a political boss and who doesn’t think they will win points for doing so — but this must co-exist with focusing on the primary audience in the country in which they serve. So shift gears towards the American public sphere, besides being honest with the Indian public sphere and preparing it for closer ties.
The second is the ability to communicate in the American public sphere itself. India comes up in the American media in four contexts — in the context of the US-China competition and American partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, in the context of what Delhi-based US journalists frame as India’s democratic backsliding and external actions such as the “murder for hire” plot; in the context of the Indian diaspora and its presence in various spheres, including politics as well as, more recently, issues such as H-1B visas; and the context of India’s ties with Russia or troubles with neighbours. And stories on India largely appear in legacy publications and their digital variants.
What all of this suggests is that India hasn’t succeeded in becoming a part of the conversation on other more mainstream US themes, in non-bilateral American public settings, on today’s newer US platforms. When was the last time you heard an extended discussion about India’s role during a full mainstream panel discussion on the US economy or the value its students bring on a major liberal US podcast or its role on a major American network or a major conservative American YouTube show? On a more functional day-to-day level, India hasn’t been able to reach American audiences where they are. And so it is easy for those who are a part of Trump’s base to club India in with others about which they may have ambivalent or hostile attitudes.
And the third gap is messaging. India essentially has one story that resonates with its set of partners in DC’s policy word, as the only other power capable of being a second pole in Asia and without which there is no Indo-Pacific construct. This is, needless to say, driven to leverage the US strategic competition with China. It is indeed India’s diplomatic dharma to play on this contradiction, given its much longer, more serious, proximate challenges from China. This is a useful message, as are the related themes that spring from it — of being a trusted partner in supply chain diversification and a source of talent and burden sharing.
But to make it more real, India needs to reach out to Americans skeptical of international partnerships and show how India adds value to American communities and neighbourhoods through Indian migrant doctors, health costs through cheap Indian pharma imports, employment through Indian investments, innovation through Indian migrant tech leaders, universities through the financial value added by Indian students, companies through Indian funders, workers and consumers and American life in all these ways, without being patronising and while recognising American generosity and openness.
Modi’s success in this visit will lie in not just setting the tone for positive bilateral ties. His and Indian diplomacy’s real success over the next four years — he will still be PM while Trump ends his second term — will lie in persuading the US political leadership, its base, and the wider US public sphere that India is both a partner of value and that it values the US. That will help mitigate the inevitable and consistent challenges that will erupt through the Trumpist disruption of the global order in the next four years. A mix of constructive and tangible signalling for now, charm offensive, and trust building for the future, while relaying concerns privately and holding on to redlines when it comes to core national interests, is the way forward for the partnership.