Grand Strategy: The role of reciprocity in India’s foreign policy

Why do some states stand by others during times of crisis? More specifically, how does reciprocity play a role in India’s foreign policy calculus?

A ‘sense of ‘reciprocity’ is a key variable in the foreign policy decision-making of countries. As a concept, reciprocity explains the foundation of cooperation among states and their normative conduct within an anarchic international system. Without reciprocity and reciprocal expectations, smooth conduct of foreign relations would be tough. And yet, US President Trump’s decision to impose ‘reciprocal’ tariffs on trading partners—regardless of whether they are allies or not—has sparked significant outrage today.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi (right) with external affairs minister S Jaishankar in New Delhi. (Reuters)

While in this case America’s trading partners are not keen on reciprocal relations with the US, the reality is that foreign policy decision-making of most states under normal circumstances is based on reciprocity. The global outrage against the American decision to seek reciprocity is largely driven by the fact that many countries — some more than others — have grown so used to American indulgence on tariffs and trade. Put differently, American indulgence, or the practice of not imposing reciprocal tariffs, also represents a form of American hegemony, which much of the international community was happy to accept.

The West and Canada are far more outraged with the US because, despite supporting US-led wars in the past including the unjustified ones, the US has not extended the same level of ‘reciprocity’ regarding Europe’s sensitivities about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, I want to focus on a different aspect of reciprocity in this column: Why do some states stand by others during times of crisis? More specifically, how does reciprocity play a role in India’s foreign policy calculus? India’s decision not to condemn Russia and to continue doing business with Moscow following Russia’s attack on Ukraine drew significant criticism from several of India’s friends in the West and North America. India abstained from pretty much all of the resolutions that sought to condemn Russian aggression. And now, Delhi has chosen to (indirectly) support Israel in the conflict between Iran and Israel, abstaining, for instance, from an SCO resolution condemning Israeli attacks on Iran. Even on the Gaza question, despite being more outraged by Israel’s actions and civilian casualties in Gaza in violation of international humanitarian law, Delhi’s reactions have fallen short of total condemnation.

Delhi’s decisions are driven by a sense of reciprocity. Delhi is grateful to Russia for its support during the 1971 conflict in which India defeated Pakistan, an event that has significantly shaped modern India’s self-image and its strategic culture. Successive generations of Indians have cherished the Russian support in 1971, a memory that continues to be strong in India. Russia has also been a close partner for India in other ways too, including supporting India when most countries criticised its nuclear tests in 1998. Today, Russia remains one of India’s top defence suppliers, making Delhi careful about its public stance regarding Russia. So, when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Delhi chose to reciprocate Russia’s historical support by refraining from condemning it.

But the trouble is that reciprocity is perceived differently by different states. Just as India’s decision to support Russia during the Ukraine war was driven by a sense of reciprocity towards Moscow, Russia’s decision not to fully back India during the recent India-Pakistan standoff reflects its own view of reciprocity: from Russia’s perspective, India’s neutrality in the Ukraine conflict was seen as a lack of support from an age-old friend when most of the world turned against Russia and so Russia decides to be lukewarm when India was facing a crisis. More so, if Russia picks China over India tomorrow, that would also be a reciprocal act considering how Beijing stood by Moscow through the Ukraine war.

Regarding Israel, Delhi’s sense of reciprocity is similarly rooted in history; the story of how Israel sent weapons to India during the Kargil conflict in 1999 remains etched in the memory of Indian strategic thinkers. Israel continues to support India through high-tech defense supplies and unwavering assistance against Pakistan-based terrorism. As a result, India ensures that its criticism of Israel is tempered at the least.

However, India also recognises that Israel is not insistent on complete reciprocity when it comes to India’s stance towards Israel, understanding that full alignment isn’t feasible, given India’s broader regional and strategic considerations and also perhaps because Israel’s own actions are indefensible especially in Gaza. Therefore, even though India maintains a healthy relationship with Iran, there is very little sense of reciprocity in Delhi towards Tehran since Iran has not significantly aided India in meaningful ways.

Chabahar, while a useful geopolitical and economic project, benefits Iran as it does India in the current geopolitical environment. As for energy trade, an Iran reeling under American sanctions needs India to buy its energy, making the relationship mutually beneficial. More so, Iran has historically been critical of India on issues like Kashmir, which creates little sense of reciprocity in Delhi towards Tehran. In other words, India needs Iran as much as Iran needs India, maybe a little less. In any case, Israel has a far greater significance and utility in the Indian strategic imagination than Iran. Therefore, the Indian decision to (indirectly) support Israel against Iran by not condemning Israel is a function of the Indian sense of reciprocity towards Israel and the absence of that towards Iran.

Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at Jawaharlal Nehru University and is the editor of INDIA’S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal.