Learnings for India from its G20 journey

At a broader level, what matters is what India was able to do and what it has learned about the world in the course of its presidency.

It is tempting to focus on what hasn't happened during India's G20 presidency. Delhi hasn't been able to get all 20 leaders to the Summit; think of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin's absence this weekend. The likelihood of delivering a joint communique is bleak; think of Russia and China backtracking from even the agreed-upon language around the war in Ukraine at the last summit in Bali and the fact that all ministerials had to settle for a chair summary and outcome statement. The Summit is unlikely to reshape global order in a manner that is more representative of the concerns of the world's poorer countries; think of where power continues to reside in every single international institution or the failure of the West to move on climate finance.

For the first time, Indian diplomacy found itself at the centre of navigating every fault line that permeates the international order. (File)

Critics may say that the government is itself partially to blame for the focus on what it has been unable to achieve because it chose to convert the Summit into a political campaign fest and a part of the Prime Minister's domestic brand-building exercise. But as tempting as this may be for critics, it is analytically limiting. At a broader level, what matters is what India was able to do and what it has learned about the world in the course of its presidency. And this holds true irrespective of the nature of the final outcome this weekend.

For the first time, Indian diplomacy found itself at the centre of navigating every fault line that permeates the international order. And this has been an education in itself, from which five lessons stand out.

One, the depth of the differences between the West and Russia has become even clearer in the past year. This suggests that Ukraine is becoming an intractable conflict, the wider central and eastern European theatre will remain contested for years to come, and the G7-Russia divide will continue to cripple the functioning of every international institution, including the United Nations. For India, it also drives home the point that its skillful balancing of the West-Russia divide in its bilateral relationships is going to remain a formidable challenge. To be able to get the best of both worlds, which was the essence of non-alignment and is today the foundation of the idea of strategic autonomy, will get more difficult, not easier. Diversifying from dependence on Russia must today become a top national imperative.

Two, the extraordinarily close nexus between Moscow and Beijing at the multilateral forum has become clear. This suggests that the "no-limits" partnership announced by both countries in February 2022 has taken concrete form, including when it comes to issues where Delhi would like Moscow to exhibit flexibility. Sections of the Indian strategic community continue to believe that Russia may be aligned with China when it comes to the West, but will be neutral, maybe even supportive, when it comes to the Beijing-Delhi fault-line. The G20 experience has shown this is not the case. China has pushed Russia to take an even more obstructionist stance than expected, and this cannot but have consequences for India in the bilateral context. Recognizing the changed balance of power in continental Asia and deepening partnerships elsewhere is key.

Three, G20 has broken the myth that pervaded India's strategic thinking for the past two decades that even if there are bilateral challenges with China, in the multilateral domain, from climate to trade to reforming global institutions, the interests of Delhi and Beijing overlap against the West's dominance. Today, despite differences on specific issues, the US and its treaty allies both in Europe and Asia are far more supportive of India's multilateral leadership. There is a willingness to listen and to take into account India's priorities. And the best example of this is the recognition that India's digital public infrastructure provides a global template. This was not easy for the West to accept, given entrenched commercial interests, but it has done so. On the reform of multilateral development banks too, Washington DC has been far more supportive of India's leadership of the reform process at G20 than many had anticipated.

Four, the vacuum in the Global South has become apparent. Low-income countries are sliding back on sustainable development goals. They are crushed by the food and fuel crises and global inflation. Many have unsustainable debts. The only actor that, so far, was deepening its penetration, often in unhealthy and unscrupulous ways, in the Global South was China. But through G20, India has both recognized this vacuum and stepped in. This is not a return to the old days of G77 and South-South solidarity against an evil West. Delhi is using its seat on the high table to incorporate the voice of the south in cordial discussions with the West. And the West, particularly the US, recognizes that India has better credentials with the global south than Washington DC does, given the latter's history of interventions and the residual anti-colonial baggage that remains in much of Africa and Latin America. This also makes Delhi a more viable competitor to Beijing in these countries, despite the asymmetry in financial resources. If western capital and power and Indian experience and sensitivity fuse, it is a far more potent combination than either actor approaching the global south independently. It is instructive that the two countries where India's favorability ratings have increased in recent years, according to a recent Pew Survey, are both in Africa — Kenya and Nigeria.

Fifth, and this is ironical, the G20 presidency has revealed the limits of multilateralism. Delhi has been able to make most progress in domains with countries with which it shares a robust bilateral partnership. This means that even as it leads new international institutions, its voice is heard and respected at existing international platforms, and it seeks to find cross-border solutions to cross-border challenges, India’s foreign policy mantra has to be bilateralism. It has to improve relations with supportivepartners; recognise thecountries who have not displayed empathy for India’s position and tweak policy assumptions accordingly; and continue to closely follow and articulate asober and measured position on global fault lines. This may well be the abiding lesson from the G20 experience.