Nuclear, in no unclear terms

For a fair deal, the terms of the Indo-US agreement should be based on the principle that India has always adopted, writes KC Pant.

For a fair deal, the terms of the Indo-US agreement should be based on the principle that India has always adopted — of maintaining scrupulous autonomy in nuclear decision-making

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The Indo-US nuclear agreement of July 18, 2005, stated that India will acquire ‘the same benefits and advantage as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the US’. This was reinforced by the PM in Parliament and re-confirmed by the foreign secretary’s statement, who said that India was assuming the same rights and duties as other nuclear-weapons states — ‘no more no less’. This embodied the principle of non-discrimination which has all along governed India’s approach to international nuclear relations.

India’s nuclear programme was unique in that it was broad-based and not weapon-centred. Even after China carried out its first nuclear weapon test in 1964, India didn’t change course. It continued to favour disarmament and non-proliferation, but was clear that it would neither endorse discriminatory international arrangement nor enter into any commitment that would compromise its sovereignty of judgement or freedom of action.

Although India never violated any international commitments when it exploded a nuclear device at Pokhran in 1974, it has been subjected to pressures and sanctions by countries with stockpiles of nuclear weapons. From 1974 to 1988, India didn’t carry out any tests. It also didn’t sign the NPT, the CTBT or the MTCR because they were discriminatory. It refused to buckle under pressure or give up the nuclear weapon option. When it was obvious that the nuclear weapons States had no intention of keeping their side of the bargain with non-nuclear weapons ones, as set out in the NPT, and aware of Pakistan’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, India finally exercised the weapon option in 1988.

It does not lie in the mouth of those who have found it convenient to ignore the proliferation in India’s neighbourhood to lecture India on the need to check proliferation. Rather, they should honestly assess why the NPT has failed to prevent proliferation by certain signatory nuclear weapon powers.

These aspects in the evolution of India’s nuclear policy provide perspective to the current Indo-US deal. There would have been no Pokhran-1 if India had not had the courage to act. There would have been no Pokhran-II had our scientists not accepted the challenge posed by sanctions. Finally, there would’ve been no Indo-US nuclear agreement had there been no Pokhran-II.

Successive governments have been steadfast in extending unstinted support to India’s scientists in their pursuit of Homi Bhabha’s vision. The firmness of purpose was very much in evidence in India’s consistent and principled opposition to the NPT and the CTBT. National interest is best served by the scrupulous preservation of autonomy in nuclear decision making. This has been the driving principle for all governments. This is also the message in the current debate. Will India be free to determine the contours of its minimum deterrent?

Defence preparedness has to go hand in hand with efforts to improve bilateral relations. For instance, even as China and the US are engaged in improving relations, both keep a wary eye on each other’s military capability. China’s stockpile is much larger than India’s, its missiles have a much longer range. Yet China is not putting a cap on its weapons programme. Its nuclear policy is driven by the desire to narrow the gap in capability with the US. In india, security agencies are expected to factor imbalances in nuclear strike-power in the region into defence strategy. India’s nuclear doctrine aims not at equilibrium but deterrence. The size of the deterrent is influenced by the share of the defence budget. But the moot point is that the decision on the deterrent has to be left to India. Any proposal that compromises India’s autonomy of action deserves to be rejected.

The US has a civilian nuclear agreement with China. As the energy and environment aspects are equally applicable to the Indo-US agreement, it would be instructive to compare the two agreements. China was not a signatory to the NPT in 1985 when the US Congress passed legislation enabling full nuclear co-operation with China. Moreover, when the US Congress gave its approval to the agreement, it had before it testimony that China was covertly assisting Pakistan’s nuclear programme, spurning ‘non-proliferation norms’. The agreement came into effect in 1998, when President Bill Clinton placed the reason for the delay on ‘continuing questions about contacts between Chinese entities associated with Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons programme’. This did not, ironically, affect China being recognised as a nuclear weapons state’, under an international treaty meant to prevent proliferation.

India is in much the same position, a de-facto nuclear weapons State which hasn’t signed the NPT. But for one crucial difference — its non-proliferation record is spotless. So, it’s reasonable to expect that the terms of its agreement with the US would be at least as favourable as the one with China. This means a permanent waiver, safeguards only during the pendency of the nuclear deal, provision to withdraw from the agreement, freedom to develop nuclear weapons (and delivery systems), voluntary test moratorium, and no safeguards in perpetuity. The negotiators must view the nuclear agreement, not as a make-or-break issue in Indo-US relations, but as a test for the consistency of the logic in the strategic partnership between the two nations.

(The writer is former Union Minister for Defence)