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Peace in Lanka?
The LTTE says that the final push to secure Tamil Eelam by force is on the cards, writes PK Balachandran.
The Norwegian peace broker Erik Solheim is to meet the LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran in Kilinochchi on Wednesday with a message from the Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa.
Sri Lankans pin high hopes on this crucial meeting because their country is now on the threshold of yet another round of hostilities, already codenamed "Eelam War IV" by veteran defence analyst Iqbal Athas.
In the Tamil-speaking North, the LTTE has been saying that the "final push" to secure an independent Tamil Eelam by force is on the cards.
Thousands of Tamils have fled to the LTTE-controlled areas from government-controlled areas in Jaffna fearing a Sri Lankan onslaught.
In the Sinhala-speaking South there is increasing anger against the LTTE's killing spree.
And President Rajapaksa keeps wondering how long he will be able to keep the armed forces from retaliating.
The Solheim visit, with its high level meetings, offers yet another opportunity to the Sri Lankans to avoid war and settle the political issues underlying the 57-year-old Tamil-Sinhala conflict.
But the million dollar question is: Will they grab the opportunity or miss it, as they had done so many times before?
Many attempts had been made in the past, by Sri Lankans as well as non-Sri Lankans, to solve the problem.
But all these had lost their way for one reason or the other. During previous peace processes, the two parties were either jockeying for better positions or were buying time. They never discovered common ground.
Milestone I: India's bid
The first genuine attempt to get the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE together was made by India through the India-Sri Lanka Accord of July 1987.
But the accord did not enjoy the full consent of any of the warring parties. The Sri Lankan government felt cheated because it believed that it was on the verge of crushing the LTTE when the Indians intervened politically and militarily.
The LTTE, on the other hand, feared that the accord was but an Indian ploy to thwart its plans to secure an independent "Tamil Eelam".
From the mid 1980s, the LTTE has believed that India is basically using Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka only to browbeat Colombo into backing its own geopolitical interests.
Soon, opportunities arose to sabotage the accord. India found that it had taken on more than it could chew. It had not anticipated the difficulties that could be posed by the two parties.
However, India did help the Tamils get a modicum of recognition and power through the unification of the Tamil-speaking North and East and the setting up of a North Eastern Provincial Council (NEPC) with some devolved power under the new 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution.
But to the LTTE, the 13th amendment was a far cry from an independent Tamil Eelam.
Also, it loathed to share power with other Tamil groups. To win over the LTTE, India tried to set up an Interim Administration giving the lion's share of places to it, including the chairmanship.
Money also changed hands to smoothen the passage. But all to no avail.
President JR Jayewardene said that he could not be seen to be dancing to the tune of a "terrorist" group.
The conflict between the President and the LTTE came to a head on the issue of appointing a chairman for the interim council.
The other issue, which rattled the accord, was the arrest of some senior LTTE cadres by the Sri Lankan navy, allegedly for smuggling weapons.
The government insisted that they be brought to Colombo to face investigations, but the LTTE appealed against it.
India did intercede with Colombo on the LTTE's behalf, but unsuccessfully. Eventually, the LTTE cadres committed suicide, triggering attacks on the Sinhala community in the East.
Anti-Indian feelings were also whipped up. President Jayewardene asked the Indians to disarm the Tigers. War had become inevitable.
The war between the LTTE and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), which began in October 1987, ended in March 1990, with India losing 1,500 men.
Over 3,000 were wounded or disabled. Billions of rupees were spent on this misadventure, the longest armed intervention outside India's borders after independence.
However, even in the midst of war, India helped hold elections to the North Eastern Provincial Council (NEPC) in 1988.
The anti-LTTE Eelam Peoples' Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), backed by the IPKF, won the elections.
A Civil Volunteer Force (CVF) was created for the protection of the beleaguered new provincial government based in Trincomalee.
But the LTTE and the new Sri Lankan government headed by President R Premadasa, were hell bent on destroying the EPRLF government. Colombo denied even the bare essentials to it.
Premadasa was dead against the Indian presence in Sri Lanka. To consolidate his power and position, he wanted to win over certain powerful South Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE, both of which wanted India to quit immediately. Premadasa unhesitatingly gave marching orders to the Indians.
The President also believed that he could talk to the LTTE and settle the Tamil question.
Therefore, he began talks with it and helped it with weapons and other material to fight the IPKF.
This was much more than what India had bargained for. With pressure building up against the intervention in India also, the IPKF was withdrawn in March 1990. India went into a shell thereafter.
Milestone II: Premadasa's bid
President Premadasa's bid to negotiate with the LTTE was shortlived. The LTTE asked him to dissolve the North Eastern Provincial Council and order fresh elections.
But the President pointed out to constitutional difficulties. The LTTE also wanted him to repeal the 6th.amendment outlawing secessionist talk.
For Premadasa, agreeing to this seemed suicidal. Soon, he began to fear, and very rightly so, that an LTTE government in the North East would go for full independence.
The talks broke when the President asked the LTTE to de-commission its weapons before any fresh elections to the NEP.
The LTTE flatly refused. By then, it had also seen that Colombo was encouraging some anti-LTTE Tamil groups to counter its influence.
Its sense of insecurity shot up. One thing led to another rapidly, and in June 1990, Eelam War II began.
Milestone III: Kumaratunga's bid
The Premadasa era ended when the LTTE assassinated him in May 1993. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, war-weary Sri Lankans threw up a new leader, Chandrika Kumaratunga of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), who had portrayed herself as a peacenik.
She became Prime Minister and then President with multi-ethnic support.
Kumaratunga's line was that the LTTE should discuss the "core issue" - a permanent political solution.
She did not believe in interim patch work. Towards that end, she started serious discussions with all parliamentary parties on a devolution package to be incorporated in a brand new constitution. Several drafts came out between 1995 and 2000.
But the LTTE was wary about talking about a permanent solution when it was not strong enough to negotiate on such fundamental issues.
The LTTE wanted to discuss "urgent humanitarian issues" which affected the common war-affected Tamils.
These related to movement of people and goods, the embargoes, entry and exit points between government-held and rebel-held areas and coastal fishing.
But there was also an unstated aim - to consolidate itself and get greater freedom of movement and more resources for another bid to seize independence by force.
The government did relax the restrictions, but there was an underlying suspicion about the LTTE's intentions.
The LTTE suspected that the government was dragging its feet on relaxation and was insisting on discussing the final political solution only to buy time to prepare for war.
The LTTE rejected the devolution packages brought out by the government from time to time saying that they did not address the core concerns of the Tamils.
Because of her determination to bring peace, her bid to bring out a devolution package, Kumaratunga enjoyed the support of the international community and also India.
India shed its reserve vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan state and actively encouraged the Kumaratunga government to pursue peace and economic development.
The talks with the LTTE broke down in six months after four meetings and exchange of many letters.
The LTTE went to war. The world, including India, supported the Kumaratunga government.
India went ahead with training programmes for the Sri Lankan armed forces. China, Pakistan and Israel sold weapons to the government.
However, Kumaratunga's strategy of waging war for peace, did not work. The war went on for too long, draining the resources of the government and testing the patience of the people.
The LTTE was hitting where it hurt most - the capital city of Colombo.
In 2000, the military camps along the Vavuniya-Jaffna road fell like nine pins under a multi-pronged LTTE onslaught code named "Unceasing Waves".
Soon, the LTTE was knocking at the gates of Jaffna and asking the 30,000 Sri Lankan troops there to surrender.
The attack on Sri Lanka's only international airport in Katunayake near Colombo on July 24, 2001 broke the country's back.
The heavy military and civilian losses, coupled with a hike in shipping insurance rates, brought down the growth rate to minus 1.4 per cent.
Milestone IV: Wickremesinghe's bid
In the December 2001 parliamentary election, a war weary people voted to power the United National Front (UNF) led by peacenik Ranil Wickremesinghe.
Norwegian facilitation, lying dormant for long, was re-activated, with the blessings of the United States, European Union, Japan and India.
In February 2002, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and the LTTE chief, Prabhakaran, signed a Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and a MOU.
But the CFA and the MOU soon came under heavy flak from Sinhala nationalists and President Kumaratunga.
They were dubbed a "sell out" to the LTTE. Norway was accused of scripting the inequity.
The LTTE contributed to the wrath by violating the CFA many times, sometimes brazenly.
It seemed to be expanding and consolidating its political, strategic and economic position in the North East, while the government seemed to be losing control.
Six rounds of talks were held, but they ended in failure. The LTTE withdrew from the talks process "temporarily", in April 2003.
The Wickremesinghe government lacked constitutional authority to make meaningful moves because all executive power lay in the hands of the President (Kumaratunga), who was hostile to him.
She became even more powerful after she took over the Ministries of Defence, Interior and the Media in November 2003.
The institutions which Wickremesinghe created for rehabilitation lacked power.
The LTTE was scared of Wickremesinghe's International Safety Net (ISN) for Sri Lanka.
The ISN, the LTTE felt, was aimed at curbing it and smashing it. The LTTE was wary of the financial blandishments made by the international community.
It complained of "excessive internationalisation" of the peace process.
In October-November 2003, the LTTE submitted its proposal for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) in the North East.
But to the Sinhala South the ISGA looked like a confederation and a springboard for secession.
The Wickremesinghe government was ready to discuss the proposal, but President Kumaratunga, the opposition and the media, were livid.
Accused of dividing the country and giving in to "terrorists", the Wickremesinghe government was voted out in the April 2004 snap parliamentary elections called by President Kumaratunga.
The new United Peoples' Freedom Alliance (UPFA) government was based on a coalition of hard line Sinhala nationalists, including the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).
But the government did not upset the applecart by abrogating the CFA or the MOU or sacking the Norwegians.
It wanted the peace process to continue. But no concrete steps were taken towards this end.
Milestone V: Tsunami
The tsunami disaster of December 2004 provided an opportunity to the Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims of Sri Lanka to sink their differences and work together.
When the international community advised that a Joint Mechanism of the government and the LTTE be formed to use international funds for the reconstruction of the North-East, Sinhala nationalists expressed their opposition.
They felt that the Joint Mechanism would be an instrument in the hands of the LTTE to siphon off money for building up a war machine.
They also wanted to know why the LTTE should be given the lion's share of the power in the mechanism.
The JVP left the government on this issue in June 2005. An appeal to the Supreme Court led to the staying of the Joint Mechanism.
The LTTE got back to belligerence with a vengeance. It kept breaking the CFA and assassinated Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar.
Milestone VI: Rajapaksa's bid
The November 17, 2005 Presidential election brought to power the Sinhala nationalist backed Mahinda Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa started off as a hard liner saying that he would not entertain any suggestion to turn Sri Lanka into a federation.
He would find a solution only with a unitary state. He wanted the role of the Norwegians to be re-assessed and the CFA recast.
But soon, he realised that the international community wanted him to keep Norway and he agreed to do so.
But he is standing firm on his formulation that the Tamils can get "maximum devolution within a unitary Sri Lanka," and not autonomy under a federal set up.
Initially, Rajapaksa wanted the CFA to be recast, but now he is ready to discuss the implementation of the existing CFA.
Again initially, he wanted the talks on the CFA to be held only in Sri Lanka. He totally rejected the LTTE's demand that they be held in Oslo, the capital of Norway.
But step by step, he came down, and now, he is ready to talk in Oslo, provided it is not the very first venue.
To begin the talks, Rajapaksa favours an Asian or African venue like Japan or South Africa, but is also ready for any venue in Europe.
The President wants time to sort his political problems in the South relating to the peace process and complains that the LTTE has not given him time.
The LTTE has been attacking the Sri Lankan armed forces ever since December 2005, within weeks after he came to power.
The LTTE chief, Prabhakaran, promised to give him time to come up with a reasonable solution, but in fact gave no time at all, Rajapaksa complained in an interview to the Tamil dailies Sudar Oli and Uthayan on Monday.
The LTTE, however, complains that the Sri Lankan armed forces has been using its auxiliaries and the breakaway Karuna group, to attack its cadres, supporters and innocent civilians.
It also complains of restrictions on the peoples' movements and on fishing. The four-year-old undertaking by the armed forces to vacate private and public buildings has not been kept.
The international community, including the co-chairs of the Tokyo Development Conference and the United States, have thrown their weight behind the Sri Lankan government at this juncture, condemning the LTTE for its attacks on the armed forces and praising the latter for their restraint in the face of provocations.
But the world is unhappy that on some ground or the other, the two sides are not beginning talks.
And while condemning the LTTE for its killing spree, the international community has also appealed to the Sri Lankan government to rein in the Tamil paramilitaries, which also are on a killing spree.
So far, the world's appeals have fallen on deaf ears. Peace loving Sri Lankans and the international community are now hoping that the current visit of peace broker Erik Solheim will usher in peace at least for some time.
(PK Balachandran is Special Correspondent of Hindustan Times in Sri Lanka)
