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Watch those knees jerk
A.B. Vajpayee successfully thwarted I.K. Gujral?s moves for a substantive dialogue with Pakistan in 1997. Gujral caved in because of his weak fibre and lack of conviction in a hawk dressed in the plumage of a dove.
‘I am not making stopping of cross-border terrorism a pre-condition for dialogue with Pakistan. It is not stopping anywhere in the world,’ K. Natwar Singh said at his first press conference as Minister for External Affairs on June 1, 2004. He was but right and candid. He reminded Karan Thapar on June 10, 2004: “Even when there was maximum amount of cross-border terrorism — and we know more about terrorism than anybody else does — we always said ‘please keep the diplomatic door open’. That does not mean there is going to be a sell-out.”
No country has been louder than Britain in proclaiming the mantra “No talks, unless violence ceases.” John Major said that talking to the IRA would “turn my stomach. We will not do it”. The Observer revealed on November 28, 1993, that his government was engaged in doing just that; apparently, without any serious damage to that vital organ. The next day, Patrick May New, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, admitted in the House of Commons exchange of messages “between the government and the IRA leadership”. He placed the texts of the messages, from February to November 1993, in the Library of the House. They make instructive reading. The Labour opposition, far from exploiting the situation, supported the communication.
A.B. Vajpayee successfully thwarted I.K. Gujral’s moves for a substantive dialogue with Pakistan in 1997. Gujral caved in because of his weak fibre and lack of conviction in a hawk dressed in the plumage of a dove. Vajpayee & Co. are now at the same game, having made a hash of the opportunities that came their way. The BJP will wreck any accord — as the Jan Sangh tried to wreck the Simla pact in 1972 — unless it receives credit for it.
On March 13, 2004, during the election campaign, L.K. Advani was asked, “Do you foresee a real solution to the India-Pakistan issue?” His answer was stunning: “A solution is possible, but not easy. There is a change in the attitude of Pakistan. I would not say why. The BJP alone can find a solution to our problems with Pakistan because Hindus will never think that whatever we have done can be a sell-off. The Congress can never do this because Hindus will never trust it.” But they did; to his dismay, which refuses to desert him. Advani can never touch any topic without ‘communalising’ it, foreign policy included.
He cited Nixon’s trip to China. Republicans silenced dissent on the Iraq war because Democrats were afraid of challenging their monopoly on patriotism. The BJP plays the same game. Vajpayee tried the trick by his letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on June 15, 2005 when he found the peace process with Pakistan “disturbing” (read: progressing). Throwing civilities to the winds, he leaked the letter to the press.
Since militancy in Kashmir began on July 31, 1998, when three buildings in Srinagar belonging to the Government of India were blasted, every government at the Centre has held parleys with Pakistan. The Narasimha Rao government held talks with the Benazir government in January 2004, when non-papers were exchanged. The Gujral government signed a path-breaking joint statement with the Nawaz Sharif government on June 23, 1997, on a composite dialogue. ‘Jammu and Kashmir’ was to be discussed by the foreign secretaries. ‘Terrorism and drug-trafficking’ were to be discussed separately at a lower level. Prodded by Vajpayee, Gujral reneged on it.
But on September 24, 1998, Vajpayee and Sharif agreed to make it “operational”. The dialogue held in November 1998 failed. Vajpayee went to Lahore with much fanfare and signed the Lahore Declaration with Sharif on February 21, 1999. It bound them to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including Jammu and Kashmir”. They condemned sin —“reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestation of their determination to combat this menace”. This was the 1997 phraseology.
Together with Sharif, Vajpayee even launched a R.K. Mishra Niaz Naik “back channel”. Compared to its functioning, the Madhatter’s tea party was an exercise in solemnity.
On June 27, 1999, after Kargil, Jaswant Singh, the External Affairs Minister, sensibly demanded, “Restore the status quo ante of the LoC, permit de-escalation to take place by going back and we can then resume the composite dialogue process.” Vajpayee had said the same thing on June 13 and 14. But on July 12, the day after Pakistan’s troops left Kargil, the ante was upped: “Show action on the ground that cross-border terrorism will cease.”
It did not. But that did not inhibit Vajpayee from inviting President Pervez Musharraf to the Agra-Summit in July 2001. The draft Agra Declaration, published last year, mentioned “Jammu and Kashmir” in para 3 (c) and “terrorism and drug-trafficking” in sub-para (c) as matters to be discussed “at the political level”. Disagreement on para 1 was ironed out. Advani sabotaged the summit for his own reasons — not without aid by a few others — though terrorism was in the draft. “Cross-border terrorism” implies acceptance of guilt.
September 11 induced bright ideas. Operation Parakram was launched to get the Americans to pressurise Pakistan. To use an Americanism, the Americans played ball till they secured their aims vis a vis Pakistan and dropped us. On October 16, 2002, the National Security Advisory Board met to tell the government what it desperately wanted to hear — call off the operation. It had cost over Rs 8,000 crore.
The Colin Powell-Jack Straw joint statement of March 27, 2003 was, in truth, a Bush-Blair message. It laid down a road map that the Vajpayee government followed — “a ceasefire and … active steps to reduce tension, including moves within the Saarc context”. Since Saarc cannot mediate, the message was clear. Vajpayee would attend the Saarc summit in Pakistan, which he did.
The Vajpayee-Musharraf Joint Statement of January 6, 2004, after the Saarc summit and following a ceasefire, revived the composite dialogue and recorded Musharraf’s assurance not to “permit” Pakistan’s territory “to be used to support terrorism in any manner”, a formulation Musharraf had offered two years earlier.
In May 2004, Manmohan Singh indicated precisely and publicly the criteria for an accord India can accept. Musharraf reciprocated by indicating his criteria. The two are reconcilable. The BJP should be patriotic enough to welcome this. After all, in June 1998, Jaswant Singh hinted on TV that the BJP regime was prepared to make the LoC an international border. He proposed as much, not to Pakistanis but to the American tribe — Secretary of State Madeleine Albright — at Manila on July 26, 1998 and to her deputy, Strobe Talbott, at the Frankfurt airport on July 9, 1998 and in Washington DC in August 1998.
Every military officer in the know has declared that there is no alternative to a political solution — former COAs Gen V.P. Malik on September 11, 2000; his successor Gen S. Padmanabhan on October 5, 2000; Corps Commanders Lt. Gen. Krishan Pal on March 8, 1998 and Lt. Gen. J.R. Mukherjee on July 20, 2000.
