Grand Strategy | The Chinese tangle in India-Russia relations
High on symbolism but somewhat low on substance, the current India-Russia relationship is increasingly transactional.
While several factors drove Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s recently concluded visit to Moscow — the first in nine years and the first summit meeting in three — the predominant one may be China. Since the onset of the Ukraine war and in the context of India’s growing proximity to the United States (US), New Delhi has been trying to reassure Moscow that the relationship will continue despite the pressure on India to turn its back on Russia. While that may be true, what has been under-analysed is India’s need for assurances from Moscow on the China question.
The current Indian stance towards Russia appears to be driven by a set of interrelated beliefs. One, New Delhi believes Russia is winning the war, and being on the winning side is a good strategy from its perspective. Two, there has been negligible pressure from the US on India to alter its stance towards Russia. Three, Western and US engagement with India has only strengthened since the war began, providing no disincentives for India to change its policy.
Furthermore, Europe is currently on the back foot in the wake of the Gaza war, which has drastically eroded its moral standing. Thus, with little moral authority, Europe will not be able to exert significant normative pressure on India in relation to Russia. In that sense, there has never been a better time in the recent past to organise the India-Russia summit.
Let me now come back to the China question. First, at a broader level, China has had a paradoxical influence on India-Russia relations. Chinese aggression is, at least partly, both the reason why New Delhi sticks to Moscow (since giving up on Russia could decisively turn the two against its regional interests) and also why it seeks to diversify beyond Russia (since India needs more strategic partners who can help it address the China challenge), which amounts to a certain amount of disengagement from Moscow.
Second, PM Modi’s recent visit to Moscow took place in the shadow of the growing Russia-China strategic partnership. The growing number of bilateral visits, uptick in the trade, financial and business relationship, and increasing synergy between the two sides on a variety of strategic issues have not gone unnoticed in New Delhi. Russia has also been increasing its engagement with India’s neighbours such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Pakistan. While Russia’s engagement with India’s neighbourhood could help indirectly moderate China’s rising influence in the region, such moderation may not be possible without India’s active engagement with Russia. Put differently, if China and Russia increasingly synergise their strategies in India’s neighbourhood, it could harm India’s interests. For India, the best-case scenario is to drive a wedge between Russian and Chinese strategies in the region. But, if that proves to be too ambitious, which may indeed be the case, the second-best scenario is to ensure their strategies do not align against Indian interests.
Third, despite some recent signalling from New Delhi, Beijing has shown little enthusiasm for a rapprochement with India. Beijing’s lack of appetite for resolution worries New Delhi, thereby prompting it to seek assurances from Moscow. We do not know if there are any assurances from the Russian side to India on the China question, but it is clear that one of India’s biggest challenges when it comes to relations with Russia is to get the latter to publicly acknowledge Chinese aggression against India, let alone support India. Likewise, Moscow too will find it hard to get assurances from New Delhi on the latter’s relations with the US.
High on symbolism but somewhat low on substance, the current India-Russia relationship is increasingly transactional. Both sides are hedging their bets and subtly signalling redlines, expectations and limitations. New Delhi reassures Moscow that it will not turn its back on Russia while steadfastly getting closer to the latter's rivals — the US and the West — and pursuing policies that are not in line with Moscow’s interests. New Delhi has maintained Moscow’s redlines so far, such as not openly criticising the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Russia, on the other hand, seeks to maintain its relationship with India while simultaneously strengthening its partnership with China. Moscow faces long-term challenges from Beijing, but they are overlooked given the weight of the short-term benefits of a deeper strategic partnership with China. For India, the long-term interests lie with the US, but in the short-term, Russia brings benefits. Both sides recognise the utility and limits of their bilateral strategic partnership. They also acknowledge that the other side will continue to make strategic choices that are contradictory to their own and that they have little power to influence those choices.
Modi’s visit to Moscow and the symbolism around it also underscores the fact that New Delhi realises that trying to align the interests of the two sides which are growing more divergent than ever is a futile exercise. In that sense, it makes perfect sense for India to partner with Moscow in spaces where the fundamental interests of Moscow and Beijing diverge such as Central Asia. We may also see Delhi partnering with Moscow and Beijing when it suits its interests, especially under the ambit of the SCO — terrorism, and the Afghan situation, among others, fall in that domain. Likewise, New Delhi partners with other countries (the US and the West) in spaces where India’s interests are in direct competition with those of both Russia and China; the Indo-Pacific is an example of such a space. The test of Indian diplomacy lies in managing these competing pulls, pressures, and interests.
Happymon Jacob teaches at JNU, and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research, a New Delhi-based think tank. The views expressed are personal
Continue reading with HT Premium Subscription
