‘Indian Supreme Court's workload unsustainable in long run’: UK judge Lord George Leggatt

The UK Supreme Court judge spoke to HT on the mounting docket of the Indian Supreme Court, judicial appointments, and confidence in courts in social media age.

Visiting India for the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) annual conference, UK Supreme Court judge Lord George Leggatt spoke to Utkarsh Anand on the mounting docket of the Indian Supreme Court, judicial appointments, public confidence in courts in the social media age, live-streaming of proceedings, and the future of international arbitration. Edited excerpts:

UK Supreme Court judge Lord George Leggatt spoke to HT.

The UK Supreme Court hears fewer than 100 appeals annually, while the Indian Supreme Court functions both as a constitutional court and as the country’s final court of appeal, hearing tens of thousands of cases every year. If you were redesigning the institution today, would you separate its constitutional and appellate jurisdictions?

Let me first say that I have nothing but admiration, and in fact awe, for how hard the judges in India work. During this visit, I have been struck by the extraordinary workload they shoulder. I find it difficult to imagine having 60 cases listed in a day and having to prepare for all of them the previous night. Equally remarkable is a court that receives something like 90,000 cases in a single year.

By comparison, the UK Supreme Court, with about one-third the number of judges, deals with roughly 300 applications for permission to appeal annually and hears around 60 appeals, besides a similar number in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The scale is simply incomparable.

It would be impertinent of me to tell India how it should organise its courts. But, speaking as a friend of the Indian judicial system, I think one observation is uncontroversial — the present position appears unsustainable in the longer term. India’s economy is growing, people are becoming more aware of their rights and litigation is only likely to increase. You cannot simply solve the problem by appointing more judges to the Supreme Court. At some point there will have to be some form of reorganisation of the system. What that should look like is for India to decide, but it is notable that most other leading legal systems have a three-tier court structure, whereas the Indian Supreme Court also exercises original jurisdiction in addition to hearing appeals.

India and the UK follow very different systems for appointing judges. What, in your view, is the most important principle in preserving judicial independence while maintaining public confidence in the process?

I don’t think there is a single ideal model because different constitutional systems evolve according to different national traditions. A process that works well in one country may not necessarily be appropriate in another, so I would not suggest that the UK’s system should be replicated elsewhere.

The one principle I regard as fundamental is that political appointment of judges must be avoided. Judicial independence depends upon the judiciary remaining free from influence by the elected branches of government. That is essential to the rule of law.

In the UK, an independent appointments process is itself a relatively recent development and even that has, at times, faced possible political pressures. I also think judges should have a significant role in selecting judges for the higher courts because they read the judgments of judges serving below them and are often in the best position to assess their ability and temperament. Beyond that, I would not presume to comment on how the Indian system ought to function.

Courts across the world are increasingly operating in an age of social media, instant commentary and political polarisation. What do you see as the biggest challenge to maintaining public confidence in the judiciary?

The challenge is that we now live in an age of instant messaging, sound bites and very short attention spans. Judicial decisions are often complex, but reporting increasingly seeks to reduce them to a single takeaway. Inevitably, that can oversimplify and sometimes even distort what the court has actually decided.

This is not an Indian problem; it is something judges in many countries discuss. We cannot ignore it or pretend it doesn’t exist. Courts need to engage with the public as effectively as they can.

In the UK Supreme Court, every judgment is accompanied by a short press summary written in plain language explaining the issues and the decision. The judge who authors the judgment also records a brief video explanation, which is made publicly available and is often used by broadcasters. We also have a press office that assists journalists seeking to understand judgments. These are all ways in which courts can help ensure that reporting is accurate and balanced, particularly when journalists may not have had sufficient time to read lengthy judgments in full.

In your dissent in Shvidler Vs Secretary of State (2025), you held that sanctions against Eugene Shvidler disproportionately interfered with his rights. At a time when national security increasingly shapes public law, where should courts draw the line between judicial deference and meaningful scrutiny of executive action?

There is no formula or easy rule for drawing that line, otherwise judges would not disagree. To my mind, the starting point is that judgments about national security and matters of national importance are principally the province of the elected branches of government. But the judicial function is to protect the fundamental rights of individuals.

When the collective will comes into conflict with individual rights, you need an independent and impartial arbiter. At what point those rights are being encroached upon disproportionately is an evaluative judgment each judge must make according to their own conscience. In Shvidler I dissented because — unlike the majority of the court — I thought that the reasons given by the government did not begin to justify the drastic curtailment of Mr Shvidler’s liberty involved in freezing all his assets indefinitely.

As someone who has worked extensively in arbitration before joining the bench, what do you think is the biggest challenge facing international arbitration today?

I should begin by saying that my experience of arbitration has changed. Before becoming a judge in 2012, I regularly appeared as counsel and also sat as an arbitrator. Since joining the bench, my involvement has been indirect, dealing only with court challenges arising out of arbitral proceedings.

Even so, one concern has remained with me. Arbitration is supposed to offer a process that is quicker, simpler and cheaper than litigation. Too often, however, it ends up replicating the very defects of court proceedings. Arbitrations can become highly complex, extremely expensive and almost as slow as litigation itself.

If arbitration is to retain the confidence of the business community and fulfil its promise as an effective alternative to court litigation, it must find ways of delivering the efficiency that parties expect when they choose arbitration in the first place.