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Aligned movement
The idea of a nuclear bargain, or ?half-way house?, involving India?s civil and nuclear weapons programmes is at least 20 years old, writes Stephen Philip Cohen.
The idea of a nuclear bargain, or ‘half-way house’, involving India’s civil and nuclear weapons programmes is at least 20 years old. It was for many years dismissed out of hand by policy-makers and strategists in both the US and India. For India’s nuclear establishment, such an arrangement was characterised as the thin edge of a wedge allowing the Americans to first cap, then roll back, and finally eliminate the Indian weapons programme. On the American side such a compromise has usually been viewed as unacceptable in terms of larger American non-proliferation goals, as it would ‘reward’ India for its covert weapons programme and serve as a bad example for other States. Here, too, there was a wedge: in this case, the Indians would be undercutting the entire non-proliferation regime, centred on the 1978 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
President Bill Clinton had admired India, but he could never overcome the opposition of his arms control and policy advisors to such a grand nuclear bargain; they never even considered it, but focused on the indefinite extension of the NPT and getting India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) — two policies that actually strengthened the hand of the pro-bomb factions in India.
George W. Bush came to office with the perspective that India was more an opportunity than a problem, and he set about creating a comprehensive economic, political and even military-strategic relationship with New Delhi. His motives were complex: India was a potential balancer of a rising and potentially threatening China. India was also, as he learned while he was governor of Texas, a rising technological power, and it was undoubtedly a democracy in a region where one of the world’s great problems was establishing order in chaotic States. The attacks of September 11, 2001 deferred, but did not deflect, implementation of the Bush vision of India. While some strategic accommodation with Pakistan was necessary, Bush, through his ambassador, Robert Blackwill, made it clear he envisioned a long-term relationship with New Delhi.
One participant in the July 2005 talks has suggested that the idea of taking on the nuclear issue was raised by America after the successful completion of an India-US defence agreement in early 2005. Another view maintains this was an Indian initiative around the same time. In either case, the successful negotiations over defence and other issues (notably expanded cooperation on hi-tech, a CEO forum, and the revival of American agricultural technology assistance) gave both sides the confidence that they could attempt to deal with the nuclear issue. No matter who took the first step — or perhaps it was a simultaneous realisation that the two sides could take this very large step forward — the negotiations were protracted and difficult, only concluded at the final moment by the two principals during Manmohan Singh’s July visit to Washington.
Whichever version is correct, it is clear that Bush and Singh were consistently ahead of most of their observers, let alone the communities of experts in both Washington and New Delhi. While there had been pockets of support for greater US-India cooperation in both States, many of the bureaucrats were unenthusiastic, and, if asked, might have replied that further study was necessary, confirming the axiom that government bureaucrats are a group of people who individually can do nothing, and who collectively decide that nothing can be done. The two exceptions seem to be Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, and some in the Ministry of External Affairs, and Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.
This was from the start, a top-down exercise. As negotiations dragged on, both sides were aware that a comprehensive nuclear agreement would come as a surprise in both countries. There was some consideration of an incremental agreement, which might have allowed time to build political consensus, but in the end the two principals concluded that they could win over, or neutralise, the recalcitrant on both sides. They took a calculated risk by bundling the nuclear deal with several other major agreements, the judgment being that any opposition would be reluctant to challenge one part of what was on the whole a very favourable and welcome package.
American supporters of this agreement have not been as vocal as the opponents, but represent a formidable cross-section of American political and corporate life. Privately, many American businesses favour the agreement, as it is seen as promoting a more favourable atmosphere for US investment in India. It is possible that American companies might play some role in an expanded Indian civilian nuclear enterprise, and if strategic-military cooperation between the two States increases, then the prospects for major military sales to India become stronger. Indeed, the US-India Business Council (USIBC) took the unusual step of hiring a lobbying firm to assure passage of the necessary legislation.
It is curious that some elements of India’s small but feisty strategic community cannot accept ‘yes’ for an answer, and still do not comprehend the historic shift in American policy, nor understand that this agreement is part of a larger adjustment in America’s vision of India, one that conforms closely to historical Indian views. On the American side one unforeseen complication has been the steady weakening of Bush’s domestic political position. Not only have there been new scandals in his administration (over spying on American citizens and lobbying), his potential successors are already out raising funds and support, and the nation’s attention is diverted to the forthcoming Congressional campaign and the 2008 presidential campaign. However, this is unlikely to be a major factor when legislation is finally brought to Congress. Bush’s critics are not likely to oppose an amendment to legislation which strengthens American ties to a rising (and politically popular) India. The India lobby, notably the almost 2 million Indian-Americans, will support such legislation, as will the lobbying arms of several major US corporations who see India as a business and trade partner and a customer. Yet, Bush didn’t strengthen the chances that this agreement will get through Congress by failing to include significant Congressional leaders on this trip.
Three broad lessons can be drawn from this brief survey of the nuclear agreement. First, there are still generational problems regarding perceptions, and these exist as much in India as in the US. There is no systemic opposition to India in the US, even though the Indian Left and a generation of former Indian officials and intellectuals cannot believe that American hostility has abated, let alone that the US actually wants to see a strong and vibrant India play a role in the global balance of influence.
Second, there will always be real strategic differences between India and the US. These have been accentuated in part by the forceful Bush policies in West Asia, but clearly terrorism is not interpreted in exactly the same way by both sides, and ‘democracy’ is not a common agenda for a strategic vision. The agreement, if buttressed by stronger institutional and political ties, will do much to provide a workaround in cases where there are different interests.
Finally, this agreement does little to address two important issues. The first is the structure and nature of India’s weapons programme, and whether it will trigger a new nuclear arms race in Asia. The second is the problem of developing a new comprehensive non-proliferation regime, one that would include elements of the existing NPT, and Bush’s new Proliferation Security Initiative. It is unlikely that the deal offered to India could be extended to two States in a similar position, Israel and Pakistan.
What the Indian agreement does is to modify the grand bargain of the NPT on a case-by-case basis, with the calculation that non-proliferation goals will be better achieved with India in the non-proliferation tent than outside it. It is too soon to offer a judgment, but there is no doubt that this agreement will be at best a minor calculation for other States who are contemplating ‘going nuclear’.
This is an edited extract of an Observer Research Foundation-Brookings Institution paper. The writer is a Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, Washington DC.
