Atom & Jerry show

At first sight, there is nothing extraordinary about US Ambassador David Mulford?s comments that an Indian decision not to vote for the referral of Iran to the UN Security Council will have ?devastating? results.

At first sight, there is nothing extraordinary about US Ambassador David Mulford’s comments that an Indian decision not to vote for the referral of Iran to the UN Security Council will have ‘devastating’ results. And so it would have been in September 2005 when India did vote to haul up Teheran. Since then, nothing has happened to change the situation in Iran’s favour. Instead, there has been a series of negative developments. First, Iran admitted that it had received information on casting and machining parts of nuclear weapons, allegedly unsolicited. Earlier this month, it broke the IAEA seals in its pilot nuclear enrichment plant. In these circumstances, an Indian turnabout — even through abstention — would be seen as, at best, a loss of nerve, and at worst, an effort to cock a snook at the issue of non-proliferation.

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However, diplomacy is often a matter of timing and in this, Mr Mulford has got it all wrong. This was the time for unobtrusive, quiet lobbying and negotiation. Instead, there is a feeling that the US is determined to extract its pound of flesh on the India-US nuclear deal by pressuring India to vote against Iran. As it is, there is a perception in India that the US is shifting the goalposts by ignoring vital points in the July 18 agreement and dumping its stated obligation of persuading the Congress to approve the legislation on New Delhi. Mr Mulford’s frustration is understandable. The ambassador and the administration are keen to have a Congressional approval on hand, before the US president lands in South Asia and makes it the capstone of the visit. Unfortunately, New Delhi wasted six months in offering a plan to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities because it needlessly humoured naysayers in the Department of Atomic Energy. The result was a plan so patently unrealistic that American officials felt the Congress would laugh it out of court.

Diplomats, Indian or American, have the legitimate goal of obtaining the best outcome for their respective side. Both must resist the temptations of over-reaching and stick, instead, to the target of implementing the letter and spirit of what was agreed to on July 18, 2005.