E-Paper
Dealing with the neighbour
As evidence in favour of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba’s (LeT) involvement piles up, New Delhi has to sternly ask Islamabad to put this terrorist organisation out of action once and for all.
There is little doubt that the origins of the Mumbai terror attack lie within the borders of Pakistan. The only question now is: how does India now proceed to ensure that the source of terror — at least the one against which India went to a protracted urban war last week — is taken out permanently? As evidence in favour of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba’s (LeT) involvement piles up, New Delhi has to sternly ask Islamabad to put this terrorist organisation out of action once and for all. But is the Pakistani political establishment willing or capable of destroying LeT terror camps? Even the supposedly India-friendly civilian leadership of Pakistan has come up with the verbal tripe that the LeT has long been banned — even as the terror group exists openly under other names like Jamaat-ud-Dawa. This only signals how difficult it will be to coerce the real rulers of Pakistan, the military, into taking action against a militant group that it sees as its best leverage against a rising India.
The world is increasingly sympathetic and, at least privately, accepts that the LeT is guilty. It also strongly believes that Islamabad needs to take action against the militants involved. If India plays its cards right, it will have a broad international acceptance that it is entitled to compensation, and, perhaps, the right of retaliation. The coercive diplomacy of 2002 will be difficult when US President George W. Bush, strongly supportive during the earlier crisis, is president only in name. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Manmohan Singh government, already weak on credibility in the security field, has only months left in office. Finally, since Pervez Musharraf’s departure, it is difficult to pinpoint any single person who can be said to be in charge in Pakistan and with whom New Delhi can ‘do business’.
India could consider severing the peace process and rolling up the trans-border links painfully built up over the past several years. However, it is important to recognise these connections were backed by New Delhi with an eye to slowly chipping away at the military-militant mindset in Pakistan. The Lashkar would actually cheer such a move. If these are to be sacrificed, it must be part of a larger and harder endgame.
With so little in the diplomatic kitty, more forceful options should be considered. A full-scale war is pointless in a nuclear environment. New Delhi needs to look harder at the idea of limited military action, perhaps striking only LeT camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Islamabad may well strike back. But, to be hard-nosed about things, the body count is less important than the need to send a message: as long as the Pakistani State tolerates terrorists within its border, it should expect to pay a price for the acts of such terrorists. A deterrence against the Pakistani practice of cherry-picking which terrorist groups are kosher and which aren’t must be established.
