Next round of talks may be critical

The first round of talks between Lankan Govt and the LTTE was admittedly tough, writes PK Balachandran.

The first round of talks between the Mahinda Rajapaksa government and the LTTE, held in Geneva on February 22 and 23, was admittedly tough.

But the next round, to be held from April 19 to 21, could be tougher.

Firstly, some of the most ticklish issues in the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), such as those relating to "normalisation of life" in the war-affected North Eastern Province (NEP), will be coming for discussion.

The attitude that the two sides show during the April talks may have an impact on the entire talks process or the peace process.

Secondly, there is the implementation of the CFA as per the agreement reached at Geneva.

Events between now and mid-April in regard to the implementation of the CFA are going to shape the future course, even determine if the April round will be held at all.

Thirdly, what happens in the political field in the Sinhala South as well as the Tamil-speaking North East in the coming month-and-a-half, will impinge on the talks.

The LTTE would expect the government to implement its February 23 undertaking to disarm the "Tamil paramilitary groups" including the Karuna group, a breakaway group of the LTTE which is the most troublesome of the lot.

The LTTE would expect attacks on its cadres and Tamil civilians to stop.

The government, on its part, would expect the LTTE to carry out its promise not to attack personnel of the armed forces and the police.

The killing and abduction of civilians, and the recruitment of children, would also have to end, or be drastically reduced.

The government as well as the LTTE would have to keep the people, who they are in charge of, and the personnel they command, on the peace track.

If a mood of confrontation is built up and the stress is on contentious issues rather than finding common ground, the April talks would be bumpy and the talks process itself could get derailed.

Issues in normalisation

The LTTE's chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham, has given a clear idea of what one might expect from the LTTE in the next round.

In an interview to The Sunday Leader immediately after the Geneva talks, he said: " Second time (in the second round) we are going to take up the issue of High Security Zones. It is a very sensitive and critical issue because it is concerning the security of your country and your military in the north-east, and as far as we are concerned, it is fundamentally a humanitarian problem."

"Thousands and thousands of people were thrown out of their houses, their villages and their farmlands, and are languishing in refugee camps. So, this is a very important problem. For the last 10-15 years people are suffering."

"Time has come for the government to take some action because we will definitely come out with some proposals for the government."

"We are not asking the government to withdraw its troops from the north-east. At least there must be some re-location of these camps to enable, and facilitate, these people (the refugees) to go back."

Balasingham then referred to another key military cum humanitarian issue, namely the fishing rights of Tamil civilians in the North East.

The 2002 CFA's stipulations regarding fishing rights had not been met by the Sri Lankan government and the armed forces in their entirety.

This was partly because of continuing tension, and partly because of an inherent lack of faith in the CFA and the LTTE.

The government is bound to have difficulty in meeting the LTTE's demands as regards the High Security Zones (HSZ) in the Jaffna peninsula because strategically vital military installations like the Palaly airport and the Kankesanthurai harbour are in the HSZ.

Large areas had to be cordoned off and designated as HSZ also because the LTTE had acquired long-range artillery.

During the earlier peace process in Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's time, the government had invited a retired Indian General, Satish Nambiar, to advice on what to do about the HSZ.

Nambiar recommended that in the first phase, the HSZ in some areas could be dismantled.

In the second phase, the reduction of the HSZ around Palaly airport and Kankesanthurai harbour could be examined in the light of perimeter security.

Nambiar suggested that in return for the government forces' reducing the HSZ in these vital areas, the LTTE should dismantle some of its military positions, remove its long-range artillery further away, and put them under international monitoring.

The government had to shelve the Nambiar report because the LTTE trashed it. Any negotiations on the HSZ in April will have to tackle the same issues.

The two sides may also quarrel over the number of civilians affected by the existence of the HSZ.

The LTTE puts the figure at 30,000, while the government says that only about 10,000 are involved.

Vacation of public buildings

It has been a constant complaint from the LTTE, that government forces had not vacated public buildings as per the 2002 CFA.

But as former Defence Secretary Austin Fernando says in his paper in Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka (Foundation for Co-Existence, Colombo, 2006) there was a lack of suitable alternative accommodation.

"No private property was offered by landowners due to reprisals from the LTTE. Though the demand by the LTTE was for the purported benefit of the people, the LTTE was not helpful in sorting out the problem."

" Even if there were any attempts made to shift the camps, as was done in the Jaffna peninsula, where 152 camp sites were to be reduced to 88, the LTTE would not agree and instigated the public to protest," Fernando said.

Fishing rights could also be a very ticklish issue in April, because it has implication for coastal security, especially for Sri Lankan naval establishments.

LTTE's demand for Sea Lane

So far, the LTTE has not said that it will revive its demand for a "Sea Lane" to enable it to move its cadres from one part of the North Eastern coastline to another. But it could.

In the CFA, there are set procedures for movement over land, but not in the sea.

An earlier attempt by the LTTE to secure a Sea Lane and an area for firing exercises for its naval wing, the Sea Tigers, had met with stiff opposition from the Sri Lankan navy.

If raised again in April, this issue could spark off a major political controversy, especially because the Rajapaksa government is vigorously nationalistic, as are its principal allies, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU).

The government and its allies have already dubbed the 2002 CFA as an assault on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and as being unconstitutional and invalid.

The government's stand is that it has given only "de facto" recognition to the CFA in view of the ground situation.

Therefore, any further concessions with adverse implications for the sovereignty of Sri Lanka are very unlikely.

Check points in the government-controlled areas could also come up for heated discussion.

As Austin Fernando says, the LTTE in its "heart of hearts" would want all check points in government-controlled areas to be withdrawn.

In the last four years, the LTTE has tried to set up civilians against the check points with the intention of provoking the security forces to fire.

Disarming the Tamil paramilitaries

The government has said that it has the legal power to prevent any person or group, other than the armed forces and the police, from carrying weapons.

Without naming the Karuna group, the government has said that it can be controlled.

But it remains to be seen if there is a matching political will to rein in the militant auxiliaries or informal militant allies, especially the Karuna group.

This is because the Southern Sinhala polity strongly supports these Tamil "paramilitaries", particularly Karuna and his men.

Support for the Tamil paramilitaries rests on a lack of faith in the LTTE. The armed forces and the southern polity may like to keep the powder dry for any future military confrontation with the LTTE.

And the Tamil paramilitaries may have key role to play in these confrontations.

In fact, the JVP has already warned the government against lowering its guard.

In a statement after the Geneva talks, the JVP said that during peace processes in the past, the government forces were allowed to relax with disastrous consequences for the security of the country and its people.

"The readiness of national defense was minimised. As the tiger organisation is an organisation that cannot be trusted, we emphasise that the present government need not act ridiculously," the JVP statement said on Sunday.

Karuna says he will not disarm

Meanwhile, the LTTE's enemy number one, Karuna, declared that his group would not disarm.

In an e-mail interview to Reuters on Sunday, he said: " Without mincing words we wish to tell (Prabhakaran) quite categorically, that we have our resolve and moral right to hold on to our arms."

"No one can impose their will on us to take away our arms from us, which we use only for defensive purposes."

"Our people have entrusted us to defend them from the LTTE. Our people will not like us to become submissive and just hand over our weapons to satisfy the LTTE brutes."

Relevance of the political climate

If the next round of talks is to be successful, both the government and the LTTE will have see that the political climate on their respective sides is for peace and the implementation of the CFA, and not for war and the questioning of the validity of the CFA.

The LTTE may be tempted to keep the civilians under its sway, cued into the ethnic problem, by agitating on "peoples' issues" and getting the state to react sharply and violently.

There is no guarantee that the LTTE will not kill its Tamil rivals by stealth. In the past, it had reportedly killed its rivals and denied its role in such killings.

It had infiltrated the rival groups and portrayed subsequent killings as an internal matter of those groups.

The government, on its part, will have to tackle the Southern extremists, who are against any concessions being given to the LTTE and who still believe that the LTTE can be defeated militarily with international help.

Certain moves or contentions of the government could cause problems during the April parleys.

The recent talk about having "amended" the CFA in Geneva in the teeth of opposition by the LTTE, could secure a sharp reaction from the LTTE.

LTTE chief negotiator Balasingham said last week that the government had accepted the 2002 CFA "in toto".

He also said that any bid to amend the CFA would be taken as giving notice of breaking the ceasefire.

The CFA does allow amendments, but only with mutual consent.

According to former Defence Secretary Austin Fernando, having a CFA in place and having several rounds of talks are not enough.

There should be a commitment to the peace process on the part of all, from the government down to the media.

It is necessary to forge a consensus on the peace process, he urges.

He points out that sections of the government and the forces opposed to the 2002-2004 peace process had linked with a section of the media to trash the process and stall it.

Fortunately, the present President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, believes in carrying the Southern polity and the civil society with him.

He is building a consensus through regular consultations, and is approaching the LTTE with a southern consensus on key issues.

(PK Balachandran is Special Correspondent of Hindustan Times in Sri Lanka)

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