Treading limits

Important in itself, the nuclear part of the July 18 Indo-US agreement will also shape the nature and consequences of the March summit. There was life before July 18; there will be life after March 3.

Important in itself, the nuclear part of the July 18 Indo-US agreement will also shape the nature and consequences of the March summit. There was life before July 18; there will be life after March 3. Both sides may be right to stress that relations have become strong enough to keep developing regardless of any nuclear 'deal'. Still, a positive outcome would impart momentum, a failed effort would become a drag. Whatever happens, the way things have gone carries important lessons that are in danger of being overlooked in the sound and fury of what has passed for debate on the relevant issues.

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Those issues involve dangers and possibilities that need careful assessment — and the education of the public consistent with the confidentiality essential to effective negotiation. As always, the endlessly baffling blindness of our governments to the elementary needs of persuasive PR has done this issue no less harm than the criticisms hurled at it. The perspectives in which the whole possibility ought to be seen have virtually disappeared. As a great historian said, we are in danger not only of doing our sums wrong but of doing the wrong sums.

We must start with one stark fact: the whole world, barring three countries, has erected an international regime imposing heavy constraints and penalties on any State (other than the privileged five 'original' nuclear weapon powers) that attempts to develop such weapons.

Unfair. Discriminatory. Harming a responsible, non-signatory India while signatories get away with mischief. Rail as we may, nobody is willing to breach this NPT regime for India's benefit — not our quondam best friend, the former Soviet Union, not that normally ready-supplier-of-anything-for-cash, France — nobody. Even the extensive nuclear cooperation agreement just signed with France is subject to American approval.

So far, all credit goes to our techno-scientific community for achieving our nuclear capabilities, civilian and military. But pride in self-reliance can become an unnecessary obstacle to necessary progress. We can certainly carry on as we have till now, with a heavy cost of time and money, and a continuing denial of what ought to be available to us — the world is not going to let us out of our present isolation — as the sixth addition to the privileged five.

While everyone has been telling us to like the NPT regime or lump it — some countries, like Sweden or Japan, are far harder with us than the US — the Bush administration has provided a potential alternative. Translating that into reality involves tremendous obstacles, but why condemn the effort?

Our exploding energy demands alone justified our government exploring the means of developing nuclear power in less time and at less cost. The July 18 framework envisages accepting India as a legitimate nuclear power within the ambit of the international regime that had so far outlawed us. The country that had led the fight against us expressed readiness to change its laws, thus enabling other States to cooperate too. And observing that the greatest existing power was trying to work with India, other States have perked up their interest in working with us — not least China, which prefers some distance between India and the US.

The proposed nuclear deal needs viewing in three perspectives. Does it enhance our civilian capabilities? Does it help legitimise our nuclear-weapons status? Does it contribute to our wider strategic interests?

All have been obscured in a poisonous diffusion of personal, narrow-minded and downright perverse distortion and distraction, coming down to even attacking the integrity of sensible people on either side. Favour the deal and you are an American stooge selling out national interest. Oppose it and you are avoiding exposure of your own techno-scientific weaknesses. Given the levels to which our public discourse has sunk, dismay must seem naïve. But surely, in a matter of such consequence, sane, dispassionate review is not too much to seek.

The NPT regime recognises only two categories of States — the favoured five haves and the remaining have-nots. Last July's framework, in effect, creates a third category, foreseeably limited to India alone, giving us some of the rights of the 'favoured five' not enjoyed by the rest, accepting us as a self-limited N-weapons power. The controversy that has dogged the initiative is essentially how much self-limitation is acceptable.

Both the previous government and this one have supported a 'credible minimum deterrent'. We have no desire, even if we had the capability, of making endless nuclear weapons that the 'favoured five' have the right to. Neither present prudence nor future uncertainty allow us to commit ourselves to any figures, but most serious policy makers would accept to work within a broad range.

The July 18 agreement acknowledges India's right to determine this range. Howls of protest greet Washington's attempt to negotiate on this — 'how dare they infringe on our sovereign rights', 'they are changing the goalposts', 'this is not in the July agreement', and so on and so forth.

If things were to be reversed, that India had to change its laws to accommodate the US, would we simply accept a unilateral American decision that said 'this is our limit, now you make it your law'? It was inherent in July — as it is in any agreement with the US — that their Executive must sell an agreement to the Congress, which means persuading the Executive to plead our case. Certainly we can stick to a case which will not sell, which brings back the question: what self-limitation?

Naturally, different limits are arguable. Several other problems involve vital points so esoteric they are hard to discuss — spent fuel, perpetuity of safeguards, research rights. The objections raised, mainly by scientists-who-know-better, need to be answered.

For instance, it has not been made clear to our people that in the nuclear establishments we keep for military purposes, we can do what we like, including enlarging their capacity to produce more of what we need. (It would not be unfair either to ask our scientists just how long it will take to accumulate the fissile material which ought to already be much more than it is). There is also the hugely difficult issue of an impending Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which the NPT establishment would use to cap our fuel store.

The US has added to our difficulties by letting the debate in their country be dominated by NPT hardliners, to say nothing of intemperate voices raising side-issues such as Iran which only fuel more suspicion among the doubters. But opponents here would do well to study the vociferous opponents in the US, echoed by liberal England even, vide the Economist and The Guardian. Their denunciations of the deal bring out just why it would be good for us. But certainly, it depends on just how much self-limitation is worth it.

An agreement must stand or fall on just one criterion: does it help strengthen India? It is indeed an oddity that the American president, whose other policies arouse our strongest misgivings, is the one most willing to help India. A handful of his advisors have concluded that a strong India will, in its own interests, pursue policies congruent with US interests. It is a pity we are still so short of self-confidence that that itself horrifies us: beware the US, malignant and perfidious. We need to understand that cooperation can be beneficial even with someone you disapprove of.

What if American cooperation is driven by, say, worries about China? Surely, we are sophisticated enough to benefit without abandoning our search for better relations with China? As it is, China is already taking more notice of us because of the US interest in India. Equally, if it sees our strength as helpful, the US must accept our relevant nuclear capability.

Ultimately, if we are asked to give up more than is safe or wise, the government will have to defer the issue. But let us not hamstring it by super-patriotic or super-scientific obfuscation of what has to be decided upon.

The writer is former ambassador to Pakistan, China and the US