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Dialogue alone can draw the state out of a 1990s-like abyss
NEW DELHI: The Kashmir imbroglio poses a multi-faceted challenge to our polity trapped in an increasingly polarised discourse that’s oxygen for separatists. In turn,
NEW DELHI: The Kashmir imbroglio poses a multi-faceted challenge to our polity trapped in an increasingly polarised discourse that’s oxygen for separatists. In turn, the religio-cultural nationalism that’s echoing elsewhere — including Jammu — feeds just as much on the Kashmiri chants for azadi.
If not politically doused, the indigenous nature of the Kashmiri rebellion could outshout pro-India voices in the border state. The consequences would be deleterious to India’s Kashmir diplomacy and parties such as the Peoples Democratic Party, the National Conference and the Congress that contest separatists on the turf now in ferment.
It’s déjà vu in many ways on the diplomatic front. The events are a throwback to the 1990s, when New Delhi had its back against the wall while Islamabad sermonised it to create a “climate that’s propitious for talks”. Another oft-repeated Pakistani argument those days was: There can’t be business as usual with India as long as human rights violations occur in Kashmir.
Against this backdrop, the 1994 foreign secretary- level talks ran into unprecedented Pakistani intransigence. The newly-elected Benazir Bhutto regime refused to sign up for the next round of talks despite New Delhi making a break from the past to flag Kashmir among the issues on the table.
“I think it has become something like those days,” says SK Lambah, India’s envoy to Pakistan during the period. “Then it (the militancy) was Pak-sponsored; now it’s Pak-supported.”
If the ostensibly homegrown upsurge strikes deeper roots, Islamabad’s artful “moral, political and diplomatic” formulation that camouflages its support of cross-border terror could gain credence with the international community.
“We can’t afford not to communicate with an entire generation of youth in the Valley,” notes another Pakistan expert on the condition of anonymity. “It’s Kashmir’s intifada (a term used for the Palestinian uprising against Israel). Qualitatively, it’s worse. Unlike the 1990s, we cannot entirely blame it on Pakistan.”
The Centre has done well by reaching out to Opposition parties that have legislative presence in the state. But the dialogue has to be taken forward in a structured manner, bringing as many disaffected stakeholders in its ambit as possible.
In fact, the talks — if and when they happen — could draw from the ideologically-divergent two-party coalition’s Common Minimum Programme. There should be no dispute over its text, which commits the BJP to Jammu and Kashmir’s special status in the Constitution, or the preamble that reads: “The PDP and BJP have entered into a governance alliance based on an agreement and agenda which is an effort towards seeking a national reconciliation on Kashmir…”
A pre-requisite for ‘reconciliation’ to become even fleetingly real would be an all-party consensus on a restrained discourse in the upcoming assembly polls. If the BJP reworks its political idiom, it can — in tandem with other pro-India parties — calm down the Kashmiri youth. The choices before the party run counter to its majoritarian appeal very much dovetailed to its historical position on Kashmir.
However, amid the crisis lies an opportunity to prevent Kashmir from sliding into another abyss. A sincere peace overture can probably also win the trust of its estranged youth, who do not see the same allure in Pakistan as they did in Benazir’s 1990s.
