Challenges India faces from the Mecca pact

It embeds Pakistan in West Asia’s growing, evolving security architecture, even as the region has become a battleground for India-Pakistan competition

There was always something inevitable about the new Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Turkey mutual defence agreement. Islamabad’s security ties with longtime allies Riyadh and Ankara have intensified in recent years, culminating in last year’s Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defence pact and stepped-up Pakistan-Turkey defence cooperation that resulted in Pakistan drawing on Turkish drones in its conflict with India last year.

The agreement reflects a view among the signatories that the US’s own deterrence capacities can no longer be counted upon in West Asia: Washington has been unable to deter Iran and is unwilling to deter Israel. (AFP)

And after many years of tensions, Ankara and Riyadh have experienced a rapid rapprochement — one spearheaded by a 2023 Turkish drones deal. With the three countries further increasing cooperation during the Iran war, recent months had produced ample buzz about an imminent new trilateral arrangement.

With each country having a strong interest in deterring Iran and Israel, there was an urgent imperative to band together. And with each country bringing something unique to the table — Pakistan’s nuclear capacities, Saudi Arabia’s oil money and wider capital, and Turkey’s arms production — comparative advantage was never going to be a problem.

But it’s also important not to overlook how the Donald Trump factor gave the three countries such a strong rationale to conclude a deal, as well.

The Mecca agreement has likely been received well by the White House. The Trump administration wants to see more burden-sharing by its allies in ways that help advance US interests. The pact — a collective effort at deterrence, with an eye towards Tehran — does exactly that.

That positive response in Washington is what the pact’s signatories want, given that each is keen to ensure continued strong ties with the Trump administration. To that end, public messaging about the deal from the three signatories has been smart. It has emphasised that the pact is not meant to target any particular country. This is likely meant to pre-empt any US concern about the pact being used against Israel for offensive or other hostile purposes.

But there’s an irony here: While the deal may be acceptable to Washington, it was pursued in great part because of concerns about Washington. The agreement reflects a view among the signatories that the US’s own deterrence capacities can no longer be counted upon in West Asia: Washington has been unable to deter Iran, and it is unwilling to deter Israel. It’s also a case of hedging against the unpredictability of the Trump administration: With no clear indication of what its approach will be to Israel, Iran, or the wider region in the coming months, the three countries decided to take matters into their own hands.

Earlier this year at Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney called on the world’s middle powers to unite amid global churn and push back against superpowers — including the US. He warned that “if we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu.” The Mecca deal is a case of three key regional players taking a seat at a table where they believe the US no longer sits.

To be sure, the US remains a formidable actor in West Asia. And to its credit, it has pushed for peace in Iran. Also, US Vice President JD Vance has castigated Israel for its militaristic policies — highly rare US criticism of its close ally. But at the end of the day, Iran — through its own actions and those of its proxies — continues to threaten the region, and Israel continues to strike Gaza. And with the US having reduced its energy dependence on West Asia and the Trump administration having asserted that its most serious security and strategic threats are closer to home, it’s quite likely the US will become less present in the region whenever the war ends in Iran.

For India, these hedging tactics are quite familiar. From accelerating an ongoing modest rapprochement with China to pushing to finalise a new FTA with the EU, New Delhi has done its own share of hedging activities against US unpredictability to advance its interests. And on one level, the Mecca deal could help India as well. India stands to benefit from any stability the pact helps create. India is a big part of West Asia’s evolving geoeconomic architecture, from the I2U2 Quad to IMEEC. India also has deep ties with Israel, is the world’s fastest-growing major economy, and is an attractive investment space — all major advantages in today’s West Asia, and, incidentally, none of which apply to Pakistan.

But the Mecca deal also presents new challenges for India. It institutionalises security partnership between Pakistan and Turkey — one an Indian rival, the other a country with shaky ties with New Delhi — and Saudi Arabia, one of India’s closest partners in West Asia.

Second, it further embeds Pakistan in West Asia’s growing, evolving security architecture. This is significant, because the region has become a battleground for India-Pakistan competition. India and Pakistan view West Asia as a highly strategically significant space for the same reason: It is home to many of their closest partners, to the majority of their hydrocarbon imports, and to large expatriate communities. Both countries are active there, and the Mecca deal — at least for now — puts India on the back foot.

Ultimately, however, the main takeaway from the deal is that it reflects the willingness of global players to go their own way and form new arrangements to hedge against the Trump administration’s unpredictability. Such efforts bolster the causes of multilateralism and multipolarity — outcomes that will be welcomed in New Delhi, even if several key actors involved aren’t on its friend list.

Michael Kugelman is resident senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. The views are personal