Irrespective of whether the US or Israel or both decide to use the military option, it may not stop Iranian proliferation while also possibly resulting in a war
Even as the world is fixated on the Russia-Ukraine crisis, one should not lose sight of the ongoing talks in Vienna to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the Iranian nuclear deal. As of now, Iran is only talking to P4+1 (the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany). However, as the talks reach a critical phase, direct contact between the United States (US) and Iran is likely. Given the stakes involved and the distrust built up over the years, the talks can break down at any moment. A peaceful resolution would indeed be welcome but the question remains: Would either the US or Israel be attempting a preventive strike to stop Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons if talks don’t succeed?
The decision to use the military option will be tough. One hopes that diplomacy will succeed and tough decisions will not have to be taken. (REUTERS)
There are two factors in determining the probability of a preventive strike: Motivation and opportunity. First, a State might be driven to use physical force if the bomb in the hands of a new proliferator poses an existential threat to it. The US, a distant superpower, is better placed on this count. Israel, located in the near-neighbourhood, is at a greater threat from a nuclear Iran. Moreover, it can be argued that Israel cannot live in a state of mutually assured destruction vis-à-vis any of its main rivals. The reason is its size: At just above 20,000 sq km, Israel is the smallest among the nuclear powers — the next (North Korea) is six times bigger. This lack of “strategic depth” means that Israel is the most vulnerable among the nuclear powers in the case of a first strike. This explains Israel’s aggressive response to the weapons’ pursuit of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Iran.
Second, nuclear weapons might embolden a new proliferator to initiate wars and acquire territory. Fortunately, nuclear weapons are not good at acquiring territory. However, if States can use surprise and offensive advantages to acquire territory through conventional means, they can use their nuclear weapons to preserve their gains. Former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had contemplated how a nuclear-capable Baghdad could make Israel more vulnerable to conventional onslaughts. Pakistan tried the same in Kargil in 1999. Again, Israel is more vulnerable than the US on this count, and hence more motivated to stop Iran.
Third, nuclear weapons can enable a new proliferator to exercise greater control in its region. It can, with greater abandon, coerce its rivals, reduce the ability of rivals to project power in the region, use irregular means of warfare like terrorism (like Pakistan) and enforce trade blockades. This will have an impact on both Israel and the US. For example, in a 2008 paper, Caitlin Talmadge concluded that any US operation in response to Iran blockading the Strait of Hormuz will not be short and simple. One can imagine that the complexities of such an operation will only further increase with Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.
Fourth, the addition of another nuclear weapons’ State might create a domino effect, which results in several more nuclear powers. A domino might come into existence, as Nicholas L Miller has outlined, because the emergence of a new proliferator might a) threaten the security of others, which will then seek the bomb (think Saudi Arabia in response to Iran), b) add another potential supplier of sensitive nuclear material, c) demonstrate that building the bomb is feasible (both politically and technically), d) strengthen the pro-bomb lobby in non-nuclear weapon states, and e) put sensitive nuclear material in the hands of non-state actors. As a superpower committed to non-proliferation, the US would have a greater motivation than Israel to stop this eventuality.
Now, let’s get to the other side of the ledger: Opportunities. Just on account of its greater capability — including the key ability to drop bunker-buster bombs on Iranian nuclear facilities — the US has a greater opportunity to strike than Israel. The latter, though, has greater motivation on account of the above factors. This mismatch between motivation and opportunity explains why Iran has come this close to developing the bomb and Israel has not been able to inflict much damage on it. In fact, the Obama administration had, reportedly, stopped Israel from striking Iranian nuclear facilities and opted for a diplomatic path with Tehran instead.
Irrespective of whether the US or Israel or both together decide to use the military option, it may not stop Iranian proliferation while also possibly resulting in a full-scale war. At best, the military option will set the Iranian weapons programme back by a few years, but leave its leadership more motivated to get the bomb. At worst, it might not alter Iran’s ability to go nuclear and even convince its leadership to break out sooner than it planned. If at the end of it, the US finds itself mired in another war, many of the reasons offered to exit Afghanistan or stay away from Ukraine will be exposed as dubious.
The decision to use the military option will be tough. One hopes that diplomacy will succeed and tough decisions will not have to be taken. The stakes are indeed high in Vienna but, equally important, they are different for the two partners: The US and Israel.
Kunal Singh is a PhD candidate at the Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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