Rana case underscores need for intelligence coordination
It is simply not in the nature of intelligence to share. There are no permanent friends or enemies in the intelligence world
The die is cast. The US Supreme Court has refused the final appeal of 26/11 accused Tahawwur Rana for a stay on his extradition to India. It has been more than 23 years, keeping in mind that he was possibly being tracked since 2002. It is the case of a man who stayed in the shadows, even while being linked closely to David Headley who was working directly under the Lashkar-e-Tayyba (LeT) towards giving effect to 26/11. Neither were arrested till well after 26/11.
These are the bare facts. Rana studied in the Pakistan army’s elite Hassan Abdal Cadet School together with Headley and eventually became a military doctor. Both were involved in narcotics trafficking from the tribal areas, where Rana’s military documents enabled easy movement. Why he left Pakistan for Canada in 1997 is unclear and opens the possibility that he was working undercover for Pakistan’s intelligence from the outset. Court documents show that Headley was comfortably ensconced in his house, even when he was an informant for the US Drug Enforcement Authority (DEA) in 1997 after being twice arrested for selling drugs from Pakistan. He continued to be sent to Pakistan by the DEA for intel on drug barons, even as he met with LeT chief Hafiz Saeed and began training with them. Officially, the DEA says that he was off their rolls thereafter. By 2001, Rana got his Canadian citizenship and moved to Chicago opening another outlet of his First World immigration Services. In mid-2006, he was preparing false documents for Headley, and for an office in Mumbai, and later in Delhi. This whole process was funded among others by a Major Abdur Rehman — apparently retired, which India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) doesn’t record. The court indictment also notes that all communications with Headley was passed through Rana to avoid interception. So, that’s two offences under Indian law — provision of false documents and absolute knowledge of the whole attack.
Critically, Rana himself visited Mumbai and Delhi — among other cities — with his wife a week before the Mumbai attacks. That indicates a far stronger role than previously thought. Even as the Mumbai plot unfolded, both Rana and Headley were discussing attacks on Jyllands Posten, a Danish newspaper that had published cartoons of the Prophet in 2005. This planning began “in the fall” of 2008, weeks before Mumbai, on the instructions of Sajid Mir, a key LeT handler of the duo. While the NIA records Mir’s visits to India under the pretext of watching a cricket match, none of this is mentioned in US documents. Again, US documents note “recorded conversations” on the Denmark plans, but record nothing on 26/11 even though conversations stretched from 2003 to 2008. The Denmark attack plans were of less than a year, with both arrested in October 2009. NIA’s charge sheet is dated November 11, 2009, and limited access was given in 2021 to Headley. In sum, while the Danish attack was foiled, years of intel-gathering did not deliver on Mumbai.
US authorities have, however, been most cooperative. Rana based his plea on the principle of “double jeopardy”, arguing that he could not be tried for the same crime twice. However, US prosecutors argued that not all the charges levied by Indian authorities were covered in the US case against him, such as forged documents for Headley, including documents submitted to the Reserve Bank of India. The final decision reasoned that under the Indo-US Extradition Treaty, the term “offence” referred specifically to the legally charged crime rather than the underlying acts. This meant that each element of the Indian charges had to be assessed independently before determining whether double jeopardy protections could apply. That was that.
Rana’s questioning will focus on the role of three ISI officers, Lashkar cadres, and the elusive Mir, who was first declared dead by Pakistan in 2021, and then sentenced quietly to 15 years of imprisonment. Islamabad conducted an investigation that traced the boats used, the explosive casings, and other aspects to indict seven small fry involved. The big ones continue to be free. Meanwhile, the point that intelligence was not shared despite a “global war on terrorism” remains. The UK had also tracked a Lashkar cyber expert plotting routes to Mumbai. India’s Joint Intelligence Committee did report an impending attack on a Mumbai hotel. Yet none of these came together. The tragedy is that every serious attack, including 9/11, has called for intelligence sharing of critical data within and outside the country precisely to prevent such data from falling between the cracks of institutions. Yet, it continues for a simple reason. It’s simply not in the nature of intelligence to share. There are no permanent friends or enemies in the intelligence world. And that will continue, no matter how many committees deliberate.
Tara Kartha is director (research), and Akashika Mate is a research assistant, Centre for Land Warfare Studies. The views expressed are personal
