E-Paper
Changing power equation in the Indo-Pacific
This article is authored by Sanjay Turi and Bhimmaya Tamang.
In the last few decades, India has witnessed a transformational change in its foreign policy-making. Ever since India moved away from bloc politics during the Cold War era and opened a new front of diplomatic engagement with the like-minded newly independent countries of the Global South, many realist and neo-realist scholars such as Leo E Rose and Baldev Raj Nayar termed India a ‘pragmatic State’ for choosing ‘strategic autonomy’ in foreign policy-making. Since India emerged from colonial suppression after several years of struggle against British imperialism, it could not afford to become a victim of another great-power politics; therefore, it decided to stay away from it. The formation of NAM under the leadership of then Prime Minister (PM) Jawaharlal Nehru was purely based on a strategic and political framework; its establishment was mainly oriented towards collectively opposing the prevailing imperialism, colonialism and Cold War politics. Therefore, the then-Indian leadership chose peace over conflict. Since the internal challenges of newly independent India were not that favourable to taking any sides, China, on the other hand, taking its side with the Soviet bloc, remarkably strengthened itself and positioned itself very well in Asia. With China’s exponential rise in Asia in the late 1990s and early 2000s, challenges to American hegemony in the region gradually shifted India more into the category of a swing State, as the US always sought to play the India card to balance China to maintain its hegemonic image in Asia as well as the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, many international scholars, such as John Mearsheimer and Christopher Layne, argue that India’s growing ties with the US in the early 2000s were a well-planned offshore balancing strategy by the US to diplomatically position India against the rising China.
Today, the transformational shift in India’s foreign policy has pushed India towards becoming a leading power or system shaper in Asia. It is argued in several scholarly works that in the early first quarter of the 21st century, India, after years of regional challenges, now somehow managed to become a leading power in Asia. However, scholars such as Ashley J Tellis write in his book “Grasping Greatness: Making India a Leading Power” that India still has a long way to go. Although India has become a leading power in recent times, it still does not belong to the category of great power that it seems destined for. A leading power can best be called a system shaper. It means a leading power cannot write the new rules of the world order; at best, such a power can only change some rules, since it is not a genuine pole of international politics. However, the rapidly changing power dynamic in the Indo-Pacific is an opportunity for India to achieve what it is destined for. Foreign minister S Jaishankar argues that in recent times, the changes in globalisation, rebalancing in the international order and rising multipolarity have left India with no other option but to maintain a transactional relationship with the international community. Since economic diplomacy has become a defining feature of India’s foreign policy in recent times, energy diplomacy is one of the most important aspects of it, where India aggressively follows its strategic autonomy, keeping national interest a top priority of diplomatic engagements.
For example, since the focus of India’s foreign policy objectives has shifted significantly from political to economic diplomacy, Indian foreign policymakers are still not giving up on Russia in the Ukraine war crisis and Iran in the Hormuz crisis; Now the question arises: How will India fill the gap left by the US’s partial withdrawal from the Indo-Pacific region?
The US has recently reversed its near-decade-old decision to rename the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) to its original name, US Pacific Command (USPACOM), which President Trump himself renamed during his first presidential term as part of the Asia Pivot policy. The then defence secretary, Jim Mattis, said that renaming the Asia Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command was aimed at recognising the growing importance of the Indian Ocean and the Indian subcontinent, thereby also acknowledging India’s emerging role in the region. Though it is not officially stated, it can be interpreted that reversing its name by dropping the word Indo itself suggests that its significance in the US may have declined, as its addition signified its greater importance in 2018. However, the US military has clearly denied any hidden intention behind reversing its decision to rename the Pacific Command. It has re-emphasised that reverting to the old name of the Pacific Command does not alter the US Navy’s function in the Indo-Pacific. But the question arises: If its addition had meaning and was made with the growing influence of the Indian Ocean region in mind, then how can it be possible that its deletion has no meaning? Nevertheless, its hidden message possibly lies in the fact that the expression Indo-Pacific did not find even a single mention during the US secretary of war, Pete Hegseth’s recent address to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
Since the US is already exhausted from the Iran and Ukraine wars, where China is often alleged to have indirectly played a significant role in backing these parties, President Trump seems to be looking for a viable solution, which is obviously not possible without taking China into confidence. It is being speculated that, ahead of Chinese President Xi’s visit to the US on September 24, President Trump may be setting the stage for him in an effort to reach a concrete solution to the ongoing conflicts between the two countries. Since it has recently been observed that President Trump has already kept his tone down in the matter of the Taiwan issue, he may have given another full toss to China by indicating his partial withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. The way things are rapidly changing in Asian geopolitics reminds us of Trump’s recent reiteration, referring to China, of a somewhat surprising remark, ‘G2 will be convening shortly’. After years of tariff war and rivalry, the US and China seem to be coming closer. It may be because the US has realised that tackling the China challenge is not possible through enmity or animosity, but rather through cooperation and friendship. Therefore, given China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean region, President Trump may be trying to appease his counterpart ahead of Xi’s diplomatic visit to the US in September, with the intention of preventing their differences from undermining their bilateral relationships.
Although it is not sure whether this could be a strategic move of the Trump administration to deal with the China challenge, it can be said with certainty that the US’s so-called partial withdrawal from the Indian Ocean (removal of INDO from USINDOPACOM) has created a sense of geopolitical vacuum in the region which is immediately filled by India.
In the wake of this episode, the Indian PM paid a strategic state visit to Seychelles and signed several agreements ranging from maritime security to defence cooperation. Within a week, PM Modi hosted the Japanese PM and signed over a hundred agreements, including a joint defence hardware co-development project and several other frameworks for supply chain resilience in critical minerals and semiconductors. After concluding a historic meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Modi made another strategic visit to the three littoral countries of the Indian Ocean: Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. This is possibly the first time any Indian PM has paid a series of State visits to countries located in the Indian Ocean. Given that Quad, established by the Trump administration during his previous term to counter China, does not find its mention in the US’s newly-released National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025, it again gives a clear hint that the US’s foreign policy priorities may be shifting away from the Indian Ocean. In this context, India’s recent strategic engagement with the above-mentioned littoral countries of the Indian Ocean hopes to form an alternative maritime coalition. Since China’s debt-trap diplomacy is gradually spreading throughout Asia and Central Asia, it continues to extend its reach into the Indian Ocean region as well. In this context, it would not be wrong to assume that, following the US’ partial withdrawal from the region, there may be a contest between India and China to establish a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific.
It is widely argued by scholars that in the context of the Indus Water Treaty, China plays a balancing role for Pakistan against India by weaponising the Brahmaputra River water. Therefore, China’s increasing footprint in the Indian Ocean can only be countered by India’s strategic presence in the Strait of Malacca, through which more than 60% of China’s total maritime trade volume and over 80% of its crude oil pass. Additionally, India’s strategic presence in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands and its recent proactive diplomatic engagement with Indonesia are very important for counterbalancing China’s Malacca dilemma. Given that the US appears to be losing interest in Quad and may be departing from the Indo-Pacific region, India will now have to look for alternatives to counterbalance China through various diplomatic engagements with like-minded countries in the Indian Ocean. Hence, Modi’s recent diplomatic engagement with some littoral countries of the Indian Ocean is a step towards filling the gap left by the US’s partial departure from the region. While the status of becoming a shaping power will remain a challenging task for India in the Indo-Pacific, India, widely recognised as a balancing power in Asia, now seems to be becoming a shaping power not just in Asia but also in the Indo-Pacific region.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Sanjay Turi, doctoral candidate, Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Bhimmaya Tamang, independent researcher, IR, Sikkim Manipal University, Sikkim.
