E-Paper
Expanding geography and escalating conflict in Iran
This article is authored by Col Rajeev Agarwal (rtd), senior research consultant, CRF.
The war in Iran is escalating rapidly. After a brief lull of a few days (July 22-27), the conflict has taken a very violent and dangerous turn ever since Iran launched ‘attempted surprise attacks’ on US bases in Jordan on July 28. The 14-Point MoU which had succeeded in temporarily halting the hostilities from June 16 to July 8, is completely dead and a subsequent offer by the US for a brief 10 days ceasefire was promptly dismissed by Iran. However, unlike previous rounds of conflict in the current war, the geographical spread of the conflict is rapidly expanding beyond the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Parts of Europe, the Mediterranean region and the Red Sea are getting engulfed, raising the spectre of a larger regional escalation. Plus, the nature of targets too is graduating fast from military to key infrastructure assets, signalling a clear move up on the escalation ladder. Hopes of an early end to the war are receding fast and the risks of a global economic and energy crisis looms ahead as the Houthis too have joined the war, threatening to block the Bab al-Mandeb in the Red Sea, a crucial choke point.
Even as key interlocutors from Qatar, Egypt and Pakistan continue their efforts to find a viable solution to end the war, critical questions arise from the current flare-up. Why is the conflict escalating beyond the region? Why has Saudi Arabia too joined the conflict directly, for the first time in the current conflict? Is there a visible change in the war strategy, especially of Iran and why? And most importantly, how soon can the war end?
On July 29, a combined strike by the US and Saudi air forces on at least seven bases of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in eastern Iraq resulted in the death of at least 20 fighters and 32 injured. The strikes targeted PMF bases in Nineveh, Diyala (Camp Ashraf), Basra (Al-Deir), Baghdad, Wasit, Karbala and Kirkuk. The PMF is an Iran-backed alliance of former paramilitary groups and factions now integrated into the Iraqi armed forces.
Earlier, on July 25, Ukraine struck a Russian cargo ship in the Caspian Sea that was transporting military cargo from Russia to Iran. Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi called it provocative and a violation of the UN Charter and warned that the attack “cannot go unanswered”, adding that it could “drag Europe into its war”. Bulgaria too entered the conversations in the conflict when Araghchi, in a phone call with Bulgarian counterpart Velislava Petrova, condemned Bulgaria's decision to allow the US military to use the Bezmer Air Base in support of operations against Iran, calling it "unacceptable and contrary to the friendly relations between the two countries". Bulgaria's parliament recently approved hosting up to eight KC-135 tanker aircraft and 250 US personnel at the base.
On the Red Sea axis, Saudi Aramco's Abqaiq oil processing facility, the world's largest and the eastern hub of Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline, was hit over the past few days. With the Yanbu port on the Red Sea too being hit by the Houthis, both ends of the East-West Pipeline are now damaged and burning (Abqaiq in the east and Yanbu port infrastructure in the west), effectively sabotaging Saudi Arabia's Hormuz-bypass export strategy.
The threat of conflict has even reached the Mediterranean when a drone attack caused the fire on two ships at the Mediterranean port of Damietta of Egypt on July 29. Although the source of the drone attack could not be confirmed, fingers were pointed at Iran. However, Iran was quick to deny it, claiming it to be an Israeli “false-flag operation” adding that Egypt’s security is of “utmost importance” to Tehran.
In addition to the expanding geography, the choice of targets and the damage caused is pointing towards a rapid rise up the escalatory ladder ever since the ceasefire broke off on July 8. The US initially upped the ante by targeting critical infrastructure in Iran including power stations, water plants, bridges and rail links. Iran was prompt in reciprocating and targeting similar infrastructure in the Gulf region. As a result, a critical causeway linking Bahrain to Saudi Arabia were bombed, water desalination plants in Kuwait suffered damages, oil fields in Qatar were hit, the US resupply and logistic node in Duqm Port in Oman was badly damaged and an Amazon data centre in Bahrain too was hit on July 21.
On July 29, American strikes hit nine Iranian cities across four provinces with Khuzestan province holding most of Iran's onshore oil and refining hit the most. The strikes also hit Abadan and Mahshahr, both major energy hubs, and Bushehr, Qeshm Island and Bandar Abbas along the coast of the Persian Gulf. Simultaneously, on July 29, Iran announced that three oil tankers were hit with missiles in the Strait of Hormuz even as they were being escorted by the US navy.
On July 30, Iran’s IRGC claimed complete destruction of three F-35 fighter jets of the US at the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, adding that several US officers and maintenance personnel were severely injured and killed at the base. These strikes, Iran claimed, were in response to a US strike on residential homes on Qeshm Island, killing a family of four including a two-year-old child.
In the early hours of July 31, Iran claimed that its suicide drones struck fighter jet shelters, satellite communication systems, and equipment depots at Kuwait's Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base. Plus, its IRGC claimed that it struck the American Sheikh Isa air base in Bahrain with attack drones targeting power generators, navigation systems and support buildings.
The US and Israel are getting desperate in search of the elusive and decisive victory. There are reports that the US is contemplating two weeks of intense strikes on critical energy, electricity and power infrastructure in Iran, in the hope that this would at least bring down the intensity of strikes by Iran and help the US recuperate the depleting inventory of interceptor missiles. Iran, in turn, has announced that if its critical infrastructure is struck, it will respond through strikes on some of the important energy facilities located in Arab countries and Israel, all within range of Iran's precision missiles. These may include Ghawar oilfield, the backbone of Saudi production, Abqaiq and Khurais, Saudi Arabia, world's largest oil stabilisation plant, Zakum Oil Field in the UAE, North Ghadir gas field and Ras Laffan LNG, Qatar, world's largest gas field, Burgan oil field, Kuwait, Sitrah refinery in Bahrain and even the Leviathan and Tamar gas fields in Israel.
Reports suggest that one of the operational plans presented is for the US and Israel to enforce a land blockade of Iran of around 6,000 km, which will require cooperation and active participation from Iran's seven neighbouring countries; Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan. With some of these nations very closely integrated into the trade, connectivity and economic linkages with Iran, this option is easier said than done and could eventually backfire.
On the Red Sea Front, Saudi Arabia along with support from the US is planning a massive air campaign as well as a possible ground invasion to tackle the Houthi problem. However, the history and experience of the six-year war in Yemen, launched in March 2015 by the Saudi-led coalition, ‘Operation Decisive Storm’, does not give much hope of success. In addition, to overcome the naval blockade in the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia has formed a coalition with 14 nations to open the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. These include Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Yemen (Saudi recognised government), Jordan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia and the US.
A war that was started on the pretext of threat from Iran’s nuclear programme and the ballistic missiles, finds itself facing challenges that never existed at the beginning. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb are choking not only the region but the entire global trade. With the 14-point MoU dead, it will require a brave and perhaps an ‘out of the box’ solution to bring this conflict to an end.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Col Rajeev Agarwal (rtd), senior research consultant, CRF.
