India must defend strategic autonomy in US trade negotiations
This article is authored by Shishir Priyadarshi, president, Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi.
As the world’s economic and geopolitical centre of gravity continues to shift, India faces a new kind of pressure in its negotiations with the United States—a pressure that risks undermining decades of India's diplomatic principle of strategic autonomy. At the heart of this challenge are the so-called ‘poison pill’ clauses now appearing in American trade agreements—provisions that demand exclusive allegiances and threaten India’s longstanding ties with both Russia and China.
Recent US trade deals with Asian partners have begun including explicit “termination clauses” that allow Washington to revoke agreements should a partner State forge closer ties with a “rival” nation. What may appear to be a technical trade provision is in fact a tool of geostrategic coercion—a “loyalty test” designed to box countries entering into a trade pact with the US into a single camp and punish the diversification of international partnerships.
In this framework, economic engagement is weaponised. If included in an India-US trade deal, it would mean that any move by India to strengthen economic or defence collaborations with Russia or China could trigger a unilateral termination of trade benefits painstakingly negotiated with the US. This is not routine commercial bargaining; it is an attempt to create leverage over sovereign choices.
India’s historic approach to global affairs has been defined by non-alignment and strategic autonomy. This philosophy has allowed New Delhi to balance relationships across competing powers, to maximise its options, and to prioritise its own national interests above transient blocks. Nowhere is this more visible than in the enduring India-Russia relationship. Since independence, Russia has been a supplier of military equipment, a provider of energy security, and a diplomatic ally through times of global uncertainty.
Despite periodic pressure from the West, India has maintained and deepened its engagement with Moscow. Russian hydrocarbons have buttressed India’s energy diversification strategy, while joint military programs underpin national security at a time of mounting instability. These interactions are neither ideological nor reflexive; they are grounded in clear-sighted self-interest—a principle that should not be bargained away.
Simultaneously, economic ties with China, despite strategic rivalry, have started to improve. This will help anchor India in the broader Asian value chain. Moreover, Chinese imports are essential to Indian manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and electronics, all of which support millions of jobs and advance critical ambitions like Make in India. Simply severing or diminishing these links at American behest would inflict tangible harm on Indian consumers and businesses alike, while failing to deliver strategic insulation.
The inclusion of a ‘poison pill’ clause would have far-reaching and detrimental impacts. First, agreeing to such a clause would amount to a partial surrender of policymaking sovereignty. It would give the US an effective veto over India’s bilateral decisions with other powers, undermining the credibility of India’s independent foreign policy.
Second, these clauses could shatter the delicate regional equilibrium India has laboured to construct. US pressure—manifest through tariffs or market restrictions—has already escalated in response to India’s energy trade with Russia. To codify the threat in a trade deal would not simply forestall future ties; it would send chilling signals to all of India’s current and prospective partners.
Third, submitting to such provisions would ripple across Asia. Countries like Malaysia, pressed into accepting similar US terms, are already experiencing internal debates about the loss of autonomy and flexibility. For India, the stakes are higher still. A deal that curtails options is incompatible with India’s economic ambitions and strategic stature.
The rationale behind the US push is clear: Washington hopes to isolate Beijing and Moscow by imposing costs on those who engage with the two countries. Yet, in a world of fragmented multilateralism and rising bloc politics, it is precisely the capacity to hedge, pivot, and bargain that gives India its voice and leverages its strengths. Reducing options to a binary choice—America or rivals—is both ahistorical and strategically unsound for a nation that aspires to global leadership.
India’s economic future lies in agility: tapping the best available technology, capital, and energy sources, wherever they may be. The 'poison pill' forecloses such strategic opportunity in favour of a rigid and ultimately self-defeating discipline.
Trade negotiations are never just about tariffs and quotas; they are an extension of the national interest. In this moment of renewed great-power contest, New Delhi must uphold the core lesson of its post-independence foreign policy—flexibility is strength, and autonomy is non-negotiable.
No package of tariff concessions can be worth the price of sovereignty. India should make clear that any US attempt to impose conditions will not only fail but will undermine the very foundation of a real and equal partnership. As other Asian countries have learned to their cost, the time to draw this line is before the clause is signed, not after autonomy is lost.
India’s relationships with Russia and China, for all their complexities, are pivotal to its security, economy, and global clout. Diluting these ties at the urging of another country—especially under the threat of economic reprisal—would set a dangerous precedent and betray India’s deepest interests.
India does not need to choose between Washington and its other partners. Instead, by refusing the 'poison pill' clause, New Delhi reasserts its place as an independent power, capable of charting its own course in a turbulent world. Let that be the message, clear and resolute, in every negotiation that follows.
This article is authored by Shishir Priyadarshi, president, Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi.
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