In Karnataka HC, Centre defends use of IT Act for takedown notices
The Centre rebuffed X's challenge on Section 79(3)(b) notices, asserting it's essential for due diligence and distinct from Section 69A's blocking process.
Rebuffing X’s challenge against takedown notices issued under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, the Centre on Thursday submitted that this mechanism complements rather than “eviscerates” the Section 69A blocking process. The government called X’s conflation of these processes an attempt to evade intermediary obligations while retaining protection from liability for third-party content.
The Centre cited the Supreme Court’s recent Ranveer Allahabadia case observations to argue that even the apex court recognised problems posed by unlawful content on social media and the importance of intermediaries’ due diligence obligations.
In its statement of objections filed before the Karnataka High Court, a copy of which HT has seen, the Centre has sought dismissal of X’s petition with exemplary costs. Justice M Nagaprasanna heard the matter briefly, with solicitor general Tushar Mehta representing the Centre and senior advocate KG Raghavan appearing for X. The short hearing was adjourned for April 3.
In its written submission, the Centre argued that Section 79’s safe harbour protection is not a constitutional right but “intrinsically hedged” with intermediary duties. It characterised this as “conditional protection” available only when “due diligence is demonstrably exercised.”
The Centre distinguished between Section 69A and Section 79(3)(b), arguing they have different aims and operate on “two mutually exclusive planes.” Section 69A issues “orders” with penal consequences for non-compliance, while Section 79(3)(b) issues “notices” that, if ignored, only result in lifting the statutory protection under Section 79(1). The Centre emphasised that Section 79 only allows for “notices” informing intermediaries of their due diligence obligations.
The government noted that Section 79(3)(b) must be read with Rule 3(1)(d) of IT Rules 2021, which provides “relevant safeguards” by requiring that only “an authorised agency, as may be notified by the Appropriate Government” can issue these notices. As per the Centre, this means both central and state governments can issue Section 79(3)(b) notices, while only the Centre can issue Section 69A orders.
The Centre dismissed X’s conflation of these processes as a “strawman argument” designed to maintain safe harbour while evading due diligence obligations, calling this interpretation “frivolous, vexatious and misleading.”
In its petition, first reported by HT on March 20, X had argued that Section 79(3)(b) created a parallel content blocking process without Section 69A’s safeguards, violating the 2015 Shreya Singhal judgment that held content could only be blocked through court orders or Section 69A procedures. The Centre rejected this argument, stating the apex court’s remarks about Section 79(3)(b) were merely a “discussion,” not “binding precedent.”
The government contended that unlawful content is not constitutionally protected like free speech under Article 19. It argued that in “complex situations” involving mass communication, rights of the viewer and new technologies, “public interest” legitimately restricts free speech, as do “legitimate state interests.” The Centre maintained that Section 79 notices about “unlawful” content --- that is, any content “in breach of a law” --- comply with Article 19(2) restrictions since intermediaries “function on airways” and “prevention of crime is clearly a ‘legitimate state interest.’”
The government cited a 401% growth in cyber crime complaints on the National Crime Reporting Portal—from 452,429 in 2021 to 2,268,246 in 2024—to argue the court must balance interests of uploaders, intermediaries, and recipients against “larger interests of society and the state.” It warned that unlawful content could trigger law and order situations threatening “society at large and [posing] danger to national security.”
X had also sought protection for not onboarding an employee on Sahyog, a portal created by the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) to “streamline” Section 79(3)(b) orders, which X termed a “Censorship Portal.” The company argued no law authorised Sahyog’s creation or required appointing a nodal officer for it.
The Centre countered that the portal, operational since October 2024, was developed because both central and state governments can notify authorised agencies to issue Section 79(3)(b) notices. It claimed the system benefits both law enforcement and intermediaries by authenticating senders and recipients, allowing intermediaries to reject notices not sent by authorised officers or by a competent court.
According to the government, 38 intermediaries, including Apple, Telegram, Microsoft, Amazon, Quora, and Snapchat, have joined the portal. To enable real-time action, Meta is currently doing API-based integration, expected to be done by next week, as per the Centre.
As of March 24, 28 states, 5 union territories, and six central ministries had notified their authorised agencies or nodal officers under Section 79(3)(b) and joined the Sahyog Portal.
The Centre also challenged X’s petition on maintainability grounds, arguing that as an American company, X cannot claim Article 19 rights reserved for natural persons. As a “foreign artificial juristic entity,” the government contended X cannot approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 or any high court under Article 226.
