In danger, even before take off

MUMBAI: Mumbai may have taken strides in bolstering security after being bloodied in the 2008 terrorist attacks but its airport is vulnerable to militants who can

MUMBAI: Mumbai may have taken strides in bolstering security after being bloodied in the 2008 terrorist attacks but its airport is vulnerable to militants who can use nearby slums and poor lighting to sneak into the premises in the heart of India’s financial capital.

HT Image

The Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport has grown from a small building to a massive complex but authorities haven’t scaled up its security apparatus adequately, exposing the premises to strikes like at the airports in Brussels in March and Istanbul last month.

“The current security apparatus is nothing but pro-forma security. The key problem is the lack of imagination to think ahead on the possible situations or contingencies that could arise in the future,” said V Balachandran, former special secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, and member of the two-member commission probing the 26/11 attacks.

A senior police officer told HT that the airport could be under threat under four different scenarios, including one involving militants entering the premises through the periphery fencing (see box).

He said, “Or storing arms and ammunition at hidden sites within airport land, or attacking a sentry post to distract attention of security forces or attacking a loading aircraft for maximum casualties including foreigners.” He said the airport was made vulnerable by the ring of slums around it, poor lighting and an absence of commandos guarding loading aircraft that are the most vulnerable.

CISF spokesperson Hemendra Singh said, “There are certain security issues with the periphery of the Mumbai airport, in particular the slums around it, which have always been a cause of concern. On many occasions, we have written to the state authorities about the issue, but it still remains unsolved. We are constantly monitoring our preparedness keeping in mind the attacks happening globally.”

Ironically, the much-hyped T2 is among the most susceptible to strikes because of lack of security checks at its arrival or departure terminals.

When HT visited T2, the road to the departure or arrival terminals was freely accessible. Only one armoured vehicle was seen under the flyover before entering the airport, four pickets on the way to the departure terminal were empty, and four Mumbai policemen chatted away at a supposed barrier right before the departure terminal.

At the terminal, 11 Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel were strategically positioned to man the outer periphery. The arrival terminal had hardly any security personnel stationed outside, and one could find easy access to the complex from at least two different locations. There were no security personnel in the parking areas. The authorities formed a new standard operating procedure for terror strikes after 2008, including a clear chain-of-command and deputing specific tasks to senior officials.

The guidelines call for an inner and outer cordon to deal with militants and crisis management groups for hostage situations. But many of the recommendations weren’t enforced fully.

Experts said the Mumbai Police’s strength had increased from 17,000 to more than 45,000 in recent years but their mindset was stuck in the British era with little imagination to tackle the constantly evolving dynamics during a terrorist strike.

THE SECURITY RINGS

QUICK REACTION TEAM (QRT): Mumbai Police has battled numerous attacks and more than doubled its strength. It has a quick reaction team (QRT) across five regional additional commissioner’s office to respond first to a crisis. But the QRT is too small to counter terrorists – who are often trained with military precision. Also, the QRT is still to be tried out in a real-life situation. FORCE 1: The state’s commando force has also not tackled any realtime situation. When formed, security experts said the squad should be embedded in army or paramilitary operations in Jammu and Kashmir because till the time a bullet does not fly past one’s ear, one will never overcome the fear of being shot at.

But that didn’t happen. Secondly, the force is not officer led, unlike the army, and can be helmed by anyone, including a constable. An officer-led force means little scope of decisions being delayed. It also ensures that the morale of the men is high. NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD (NSG): Mumbai houses an NSG hub at Marol with 250 commandos to ensure faster response than what happened during the 26/11 attacks.

But with NSG hubs spread across India, the number of actual combatants has decreased. Of the 250, only 75 to 100 are trained to undertake a building intervention, combat at close quarters or an anti-hijack operation.