‘No training, no leadership’

After nearly a year of investigation and analysis, a former Union Home secretary (Ram Pradhan) and a former intelligence officer (V. Balachandran) have declared in print what the city realised as it watched the 26/11 attack in progress: The police had neither the training nor the leadership needed to tackle a commando-style attack on Mumbai.

After nearly a year of investigation and analysis, a former Union Home secretary (Ram Pradhan) and a former intelligence officer (V. Balachandran) have declared in print what the city realised as it watched the 26/11 attack in progress: The police had neither the training nor the leadership needed to tackle a commando-style attack on Mumbai.

HT Image

There was no overt or visible leadership on the night of 26/11, states the Ram Pradhan Committee report, tabled in the state assembly on Monday.

The lack of it, the report goes on to say, led to public anger and resentment against the political and administrative establishments.

Since previous terror attacks had been limited to bomb blasts, the police were not prepared for an onslaught as elaborate and sustained as 26/11.

And this, the report goes on to state, reflects a poor handling of intelligence and infrastructure by the force.

“The police force lacked in appreciation of intelligence, handling of intelligence and maintaining high degree of efficiency in instruments specifically set up to deal with such a terror attack,” the report states.

Numerous alerts about terrorists planning a sea-borne attack to target the Taj and Oberoi hotels were not assessed properly, the report adds, and no measures were taken by the Maharashtra government to strengthen coastal security.

Meanwhile, the report points out that none of the 92 policemen trained as police commandos in the 1990s played any role during the attack.

In the wake of the serial blasts that rocked the city in 1993 — the first major terror attack in Mumbai — these men had been handpicked and trained to handle AK-47s, carbines, 9-mm pistols and hostage situations.

This unit has disintegrated since, the committee notes, with only 15 of the commandoes available for emergency duty.

Conversely, the Quick Response Team (QRT) that was available was not trained to handle a terror attack. They had had no recent target practice and control room logs show that the QRT was summoned to various locations at the same time, thus minimising their impact.