Bangladesh’s many fault lines explain its turmoil
Bangladesh has also not been able to institutionalise stable civil-military relations despite so many years of democracy.
While there are various reasons explaining the events in Bangladesh over the past few weeks, the central narrative forwarded is the autocratic governance style of the deposed Prime Minister (PM), Sheikh Hasina. However, this narrow prism blurs the fault lines and contradictions that have existed in the society and polity of Bangladesh since its creation.
There has been an ongoing conflict between the country’s Bengali culture and an Islamist resurgence, spearheaded in the mainstream by the likes of the Jamaat-e-Islami, on which a Hasina-era ban has just been revoked by the interim government headed by Muhammad Yunus. Three main identities have been vying with each other for pre-eminence in the country: One, of secularist nationalism, two, of Islamism and an Islam-led State, and three, of the popular Bengali culture that is more accommodating and syncretic.
Approximately 90% of the population of Bangladesh practises Islam as a religion. While the amended Constitution of Bangladesh enshrines Islam as the State religion, it has also restored the Article that provides for freedom of religion and secularism.
I had the opportunity to interact with senior defence and civil services officers while attending the National Defence Course in Dhaka. Surprisingly, even some of the army officers were vocal about the paramount importance of Islam in the functioning of the State and questioned the restoration of the word “secularism” in the Constitution.
Another major fault line is rooted in how the country’s history is viewed. Bangladesh is polarised into groups that either took part in the War of Liberation or stayed out of it, according to their political values, beliefs and ideology. Since India played a predominant role in creating Bangladesh, its role is central in the narratives of these groups. The nationalists felt that India’s role was limited to bringing Bangladesh under its sphere of influence to further its economic interests and gain better access to Northeastern India. The pro-Chinese Left believed that India’s intention was to make Bangladesh a colony for importing raw materials to cater to the jute industry in West Bengal. The radical Left perceived India as an expansionist power and believed that Bangladesh’s liberation was an unfinished revolution. The Islamists propagated that India’s real motive was to break up Pakistan, the Muslim homeland, as the Hindus had never reconciled to the idea of an independent Islamic State.
However, what is not well known in India is that the Mukti Bahini, consisting of diverse ideological entities, also resented India’s role. It had reluctantly fought under the overall command of India and could not reconcile to its predominant role. The surrender ceremony was perceived more as an Indian show than a Bangladeshi one despite the fact that Group Captain AK Khandker, who later became Bangladesh’s chief of air force, was present at the surrender. In fact, in Bangladesh, it is politically incorrect to mention the 1971 conflict as an Indo-Pak war. Furthermore, in the national museum at Dhaka, very few displayed items reflect India’s role in Bangladesh’s Liberation War.
Thus, the propaganda that India’s help in the liberation struggle came with a price has gained wide currency. It then became politically expedient to blame India for all the problems Bangladesh has been facing ever since. Distrust of India also has a communal dimension shaped by history. The narrative of India being hegemonic has become the dominant narrative.
Bangladesh’s perceptions of India are also shaped by the media there. Minor irritants like delays in getting visas for travel to India and border incidents are amplified, overshadowing the co-operational benefits. Misperceptions among the public are also in abundance, such as India carrying out a cultural invasion by beaming its TV channels to Bangladesh while blocking the Bangladeshi channels, especially in West Bengal. Despite periodic explanations that it is merely due to commercial reasons wherein Bangladeshi broadcasters are not ready to pay any carry fee to Indian cable TV service providers, the issue is flogged periodically. Thus, the average Bangladeshi views China favourably compared to India, which is seen as antagonistic.
Bangladesh has also not been able to institutionalise stable civil-military relations despite so many years of democracy. The principal reason lies in the nature of its politics, which is characterised by deadly confrontations, revenge, and struggle for power by the two major political parties, giving rise to a dysfunctional democratic order with an abysmal record of institution-building. Due to mutual antagonism, successive regimes have wanted to keep the military on their respective sides. There is a widely-held perception that to win the elections, they need the tacit support of the army. Bifurcation of the defence ministry and placing of the armed forces division under the PM has blocked the traditional command channel under the armed forces function in other democracies. This has accelerated the politicisation of the institution.
The Bangladeshi army, in particular, and the country’s defence forces, in general, quite like Pakistan’s, are deeply involved in controlling commercial activities. Evidence of the army’s wealth and influence is not hard to find. The army’s interface with civilian life is also much more than usual, to the detriment of its role as a purely militaristic institution. It is often called to perform routine civil administration tasks such as traffic control in Dhaka, and preparation of national ID cards and voter lists.
These systemic incongruities make Bangladesh more vulnerable to divisions than any external factors that may be at play in the current turmoil. They also provide context to the recent turbulence leading to attacks on minorities and the army’s refusal to quell the anti-Hasina protests initially. Unless these fault lines are recognised, there is little that can be done to change Bangladesh’s course over the long term.
SK Saini is a former vice chief of the Indian Army and former commander, Southern Army.The views expressed are personal