On Modi’s foreign policy, here is what the Opposition gets it wrong

Political prejudices should not come in the way of appreciating India’s success on world stage. It diminishes the credibility of critics, not of the government

The shifting goalposts of Indian foreign policy’s critics are striking.

PM Modi’s use of foreign policy for domestic political ends has created both excitement among citizens around India’s role in the world and deeper awareness about it. (PTI file photo)

Sample one: India will be the first presidency to fail in getting a G20 declaration. But if India did end up getting a declaration, neither the substance of the text nor India’s ability to craft a consensus deserves a pat.

Sample two: The United States (US) won’t treat Narendra Modi’s government as a close partner and the issue of India’s human rights record will undermine ties. But if the US is investing in India as a strategic partner, it has got it wrong. India will never do what the US wants and Indians won’t benefit, only the current regime will. How convenient is it to ignore the real security and economic benefits accrued from the partnership.

Sample three: India has surrendered to China on the border. But if India did manage to force a compromise on a majority of the friction points, it has done so entirely on Beijing’s terms and deserves no credit for its military posture and tough diplomacy despite the clear asymmetry in power.

Sample four: India must talk to Beijing. But if India has talked to China, it means that Delhi has given up its claims on the border, legitimised Xi Jinping’s actions and allowed bilateral relations to go back to normal; the substance of the conversations where India holds the line merit no examination.

Sample five: India has lost the neighbourhood. But if India has a friendly government in Kathmandu, Dhaka and Malé, they are all domestically compromised. Or if Delhi has rescued Colombo from an economic catastrophe, it deserves no acknowledgement.

Sample six: India’s project implementation is abysmal. But if India has managed to push connectivity in the neighbourhood across the rail, road, digital, and energy dimensions, it doesn’t matter; it can never match China.

Sample seven: India will never be able to emerge as a champion of the Global South given Chinese penetration across developing countries. But if it got the African Union (AU) into G20, it’s no credit to Delhi, for AU would have got in anyway. If India did manage to include the principle of common but differentiated responsibility on climate, launch a green development pact, and lay out the finances required for emission cuts and energy transition, it is useless for who is going to pay anyway? If India has delivered more on reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs) with an eye on the world’s poorest countries in a single G20 presidency than any other country, how does it matter, for the US controls MDBs anyway?

Sample eight: India’s position on Ukraine will devastate its ties with the West or Russia. But if the West has been remarkably sensitive to India’s position, it isn’t aware how close Delhi actually is to Moscow and is getting duped. Or if Moscow hasn’t demanded more from India, it shows that Russia is being taken for a ride. The remotest criticism from either end of Delhi’s stance deserves to be amplified, the convergences must be airbrushed from commentary.

Sample nine: India’s push for digital public infrastructure (DPI) will never work, for which private sector financial services firm or other sovereign jurisdictions will allow it? But even if Washington has accepted DPI in both a bilateral and now the G20 statement, what’s the point, for China is way ahead with physical infrastructure and resources?

Sample ten: India has given up on regionalism by dumping the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). But if it has given a new lease of life to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative (BBIN), it doesn’t merit any recognition that sub-regionalism, with willing partners, is alive and kicking.

There is good reason for the political Opposition to do its job of challenging the government. There is good reason to be disturbed by the rampant spread of anti-Muslim hatred enabled by the regime’s discourse. There are enough reasons to critique the personality cult that is enveloping Indian politics. There is good reason to oppose the government’s seeming crackdown on independent civil society organisations, including respected think tanks. And there is even good reason to lay out what India will achieve, and what it will not achieve, with any foreign policy engagement, or criticise the excessive focus on theatre and form.

But when the opposition to Indian foreign policy emanates from a refusal to recognise that Prime Minister Narendra Modi can do any good; when it emerges from blind political prejudice; when it even extends to almost wishing that the Indian State fails because it would dent the government’s domestic image; and when it emerges from political and intellectual dishonesty, it is wrong.

And it is not just wrong but counterproductive for the critics themselves, for whether one likes it or not, Modi’s use of foreign policy for domestic political ends has created both excitement among citizens around India’s role in the world and deeper awareness about it. If citizens see tangible achievements and sense that the criticism is unfair, the credibility of the critics diminishes, not of Modi. In fact, the Opposition would do well to learn from former PM Manmohan Singh, who showed remarkable statesmanship in his interview with The Indian Express on G20.

On the ghats of the Ganga in a village in Mirzapur, one afternoon close to the 2019 elections, a group of young men were playing cards. The conversation veered towards politics. The men were unemployed but they didn’t complain about the lack of jobs, and they didn’t hold the government responsible for it. Instead, they spoke of the pride they felt in what they thought was the rise in India’s influence in the world. Feel free to rubbish that viewpoint with seemingly sophisticated but often dishonest foreign policy analysis emanating from central Delhi. But don’t expect to be taken seriously by a majority of Indian voters.

The views expressed are personal