Why defence industry needs an urgent rehaul
A ministry of defence tech and production, that will subsume the departments of defence production and R&D and implement a strategy for production, is needed
The commissioning of three frontline naval platforms on January 15 — the first Project-17A frigate, Nilgiri; the last of four Project-15B destroyers, Surat; and the sixth and last Scorpene-class submarine Vagsheer — is of considerable consequence for the Navy and the nation. While these long-awaited accretions will bolster India’s maritime warfare capabilities, they are also, a reassuring demonstration of the diverse competencies acquired by our warship building industry in the 53 years since the first Indian-built warship (also named Nilgiri) was delivered in 1972.
Amidst the euphoria, it is important to take note of a recent reality check, provided by China. On December 27, 2024, Shanghai’s Hudong Shipyard launched a 40,000-tonne warship of radical design, described as China’s first “super-sized amphibious assault ship”. Built in just four years, this vessel features an electromagnetic catapult as well as arresting gear to enable fixed-wing aircraft operations and carries a complement of unmanned combat air vehicles. A day earlier, China displayed two new aircraft acclaimed by aviation experts as the world’s first and second “sixth generation” fighters, designated the Chengdu J-36 and Shenyang J-50. Both are powered by Chinese-designed and manufactured WS-15 jet engines.
Comparisons may seem odious, but many in India are not aware, that in 1949, when the People’s Republic of China came into being, India was industrially ahead of it. The World War II had spawned of a vast defence-industrial complex to supply to the Allied war effort. Apart from numerous government ordnance factories, it included the privately-owned Hindustan Aircraft Ltd and Scindia Shipyard. China, however, launched a national campaign to undertake reverse engineering of Soviet weapon systems in the mid-1960s. Six decades later, this resolute quest for technology acquisition has made it a leading arms producing nation.
India, on the other hand, is the world’s second-largest arms importer, and herein lies deep irony because it also happens to possess one of the world’s largest defence technology and industrial bases (DTIB). Comprising 50 Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) laboratories, backed by 16 Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and 41 ordnance factories (recently “corporatised” into seven units), India’s DTIB has, so far, failed to significantly reduce import dependence.
An issue of concern is the proclivity to declare premature attainment of atmanirbharta, and to specify the “percentage of indigenisation” achieved in platforms/systems. While good for public morale, such pronouncements are misleading and engender a sense of complacency that can impede the march to self-reliance. The attainment of 70-80% indigenisation in a platform should remind us that the remaining 20-30%, constituting vital systems like engines, machinery, weapons and sensors, are still imported from the United States, Russia, Ukraine, France, Israel, Italy, Finland, and Germany. Aiming for 100% technological autonomy is a Utopian quest, but atmanirbharta must be claimed only when our scientists have indigenised key components at the heart of weapon systems.
India’s dismal performance in the defence-industrial sphere can be attributed to acts of omission and commission by institutional stakeholders. At the political level, unlike nuclear power and space, there has never been a vision for self-reliance in defence-production. Lacking comprehension of military-technology, both politicians and bureaucrats have failed to provide direction to, and exercise oversight over, vital indigenisation projects.
The armed forces (with exception of the Navy) have resented the blunting of their combat capability by unending delays and performance shortfalls and kept a distance from the DRDO. There is a feeling that scientists focus on “technology demonstrators” and self-assigned projects, while the soldier waits in vain for weapon systems that would bolster combat capabilities. The scientists blame the military for setting “unrealistic staff requirements”, “shifting goalposts”, and favouring imports.
Against this backdrop, vital defence projects have suffered from indecision, drift and delay. Two examples best illustrate such gridlocks. The saga of the indigenously designed Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas — now under production at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) — is best summed up by a 2015 report of the Comptroller and Auditor General that reads: “LCA was required to be inducted into IAF by 1994 ... the programme was riddled with delays right from the sanction of 1983, and even after three decades, it is yet to be inducted into IAF.” It adds, “Though ADA claimed achievement of 70% indigenisation, half of these sub-systems are developed with imported electronic components and accessories etc.” Tejas was notionally inducted into IAF service in 2016, but the Air chief’s recent remark, “Today, we are in 2024, and I do not have even the first 40 aircraft … so this is the production capability,” tells a sad story about HAL.
A bold decision was taken in 1986 to assign the development of an indigenous power plant for the LCA to the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE). A turbofan design, designated GTX-35VS or Kaveri, was taken up for full-scale development at a cost of $55 million in 1989. The first prototype Kaveri began tests in 1996, and over the past 39 years, it has made halting progress, as GTRE struggles with serious technological challenges. The DRDO has discussed consultancy options with numerous foreign aero-engine manufacturers for the development of Kaveri, but the negotiations have reportedly stalled on cost considerations. In 2014, it was reported that this project was shut down by DRDO, only to be subsequently revived. The fate of Kaveri is known neither to Parliament nor to the taxpayer.
Given the parlous state of India’s national security, the inertia of its DTIB is most worrisome. Seeing the financial profligacy on display in other domains, it is hard to believe that funds are a constraint for defence R&D and production. The prevailing stasis can, therefore, be ascribed only to indifference and/or indecisiveness. Making a clean break with the past, it is imperative to constitute a new ministry of defence technology and production, which will subsume the departments of defence production and defence R&D and implement a time-bound strategy for the rejuvenation of India’s DTIB.
Admiral Arun Prakash (retd) is a former chief of Naval Staff of India. The views expressed are personal