Feckless Europe accepts Trump’s Lone Ranger diplomacy

The Economist
Published on: Jun 25, 2025 07:07 AM IST

In post-war Europe, crafting elegant rationales for impotence is a prized skill

IF EUROPE CANNOT have America as a global policeman, it will settle for Donald Trump as the Lone Ranger. That, in effect, is the message from the leaders of Britain, France and Germany. All three have come close to endorsing strikes on Iran’s nuclear programme by Israel and America. Many will welcome his imposition of a ceasefire and his imperious order to Israeli warplanes to “turn around” rather than punish an apparent Iranian breach of it.

President Donald Trump arrives at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport ahead of the NATO summit, taking place in The Hague, Netherlands, Tuesday, June 24, 2025. (AP Photo/Peter Dejong)(AP) PREMIUM
President Donald Trump arrives at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport ahead of the NATO summit, taking place in The Hague, Netherlands, Tuesday, June 24, 2025. (AP Photo/Peter Dejong)(AP)

The contrast with the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 is jarring. Back then, the West was split by debates about international law. For a camp led by France and Germany, only the UN Security Council—the governing body of the post-1945 order—could authorise attacks on Saddam Hussein. American talk of preventive strikes was dismissed as cowboy justice.

Today, though, the initial response of Sir Keir Starmer, Britain’s prime minister, was as clinical as a Pentagon press release. “Iran can never be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon and the US has taken action to alleviate that threat,” declared the man who had previously made his name as a human-rights lawyer.

In post-war Europe, crafting elegant rationales for impotence is a prized skill. France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, showed mastery of the form after Israel’s initial raids on Iran. He told the Elysée press corps that an Iranian bomb would be an “existential” threat to the world, and that—though France favoured a diplomatic solution—Israel’s strikes had set back Iran’s nuclear-enrichment and ballistic-missile capabilities, and so were steps “in the right direction”. After America joined Israel in striking Iran, Mr Macron toughened his stance a bit. On June 23rd he spoke of the “legitimacy” of efforts to neutralise Iran’s nuclear structures, but added that America’s actions lack “a legal framework”. Winning the prize for bluntness, Germany’s chancellor, Friedrich Merz, told German television that Israel is doing “the dirty work” for “all of us”.

Geopolitics help explain European meekness. Western governments fear power vacuums in the Middle East. They were thus glad to hear Mr Trump forswear regime change in Iran. Selfishly, it is also a relief for Western governments to be spared Trumpian lectures about free-riding allies. Mr Trump is proud that only America’s bombs can curb Iran. Before ordering his raid, he scoffed at European offers to engage with Iranian diplomats, saying: “Iran doesn’t want to speak to Europe. They want to speak to us. Europe is not going to be able to help in this one.”

Europe’s response is rational, but revealing. In foreign policy a useful principle is: that which cannot be changed must be welcomed, says Steven Everts, the director of the EU Institute for Security Studies, an EU policy-planning agency. Even so, he concedes, Europe’s response “speaks to our weakness”.

For their part, non-Western powers have demanded that America and Israel heed international law. After Israel began bombing, China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, telephoned a counterpart to agree that: “The use of force is not a right way to resolve international disputes.” In particular, “the red line of protecting civilians in armed conflicts must not be crossed,” declared Mr Xi. His lofty words were undercut only by the civilian-killing record of the other president on the line, his friend Vladimir Putin of Russia.

China wants regional stability and fears higher energy prices, says a Chinese scholar in Beijing. As for playing a more active role, that depends on whether warring parties want China’s help and “whether China has any real leverage over the matter”. For now neither condition applies, adds the scholar. State-funded Chinese analysts signal that China, the largest buyer of Iranian oil, would be displeased if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz to shipping. Should Iran try a nuclear breakout, a prominent Chinese commentator suggested, China might allow the imposition of new sanctions on Iran, by abstaining at the UN rather than casting a veto.

Europe could come back into the picture as a diplomatic player, suggests João Vale de Almeida, a former EU ambassador to America and the UN during the gruelling years of nuclear talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the so-called P5), plus Germany and the EU. He predicts that any new pact with Iran, even one backed by America’s hard power, may rather resemble the JCPOA, the multilateral agreement generated by those talks that Mr Trump quit in 2018. He laments the past seven years as “a big detour” of lost time and credibility.

No cowboy sunsets in the real world

A big change since 2018 involves the splintering of the P5, whose members—America, Britain, China, France and Russia—were remarkably unified in their opposition to an Iranian bomb, says Catherine Ashton, who as EU foreign-policy chief from 2009 to 2014 chaired nuclear negotiations with Iran. The assembled envoys felt a sense of historic common purpose, says Baroness Ashton. That survived even crises like the political protests that swept Ukraine in 2013. She recalls leaving the Iran meetings in Vienna and flying to Kyiv to denounce Russian meddling in Ukrainian politics. Russia’s lead negotiator would fly to Moscow to condemn the West. Then both would return to Vienna for constructive talks. She remembers China as “a team player” on Iran nukes, too.

Today Mr Trump seems interested in bilateral dealmaking, observes Lady Ashton. That approach raises hard questions about Iran’s incentives to disarm. America acting alone can apply coercion. But given Iranian distrust of Mr Trump, only an international coalition can credibly offer the reward that Iran seeks: a long-term economic reopening to the world.

The Lone Ranger was not big on commitment. After dispensing vigilante justice he would ride into the sunset. Western leaders know the limits of that approach. Alas, they must deal with the American president they have.

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