Outcome of India-Pakistan conflict: Much to be pleased about, much to learn
Since Kargil we have treated war as something fought by professionals a long way from our homes. This time it came so close that it worried many civilians.
The Taste
So, how big was our victory in the conflict with Pakistan? Like most Indians, I would argue that we did very well and that we should commend the government and our armed forces.
We made it clear to Pakistan that all terrorist strikes have consequences. It cannot harbour, train, arm and finance terrorists and then expect to be believed when it says these were either indigenous Indian militants or so-called non-State actors.
The consequences will not just be military action but will extend further. Nothing is out of bounds now, not even the Indus Waters Treaty which we once treated as sacrosanct. Any terror attack that has a Pakistani component will be treated as an act of war. And if Pakistan wishes to avoid the trauma of the last fortnight it has to rein in its pet terrorists.
All of this is indisputable. So why then does it not feel like a major victory? Why is there less of the euphoria that followed Kargil or Balakot? Why is the mood of the country muted and still slightly confused?
And even those of us, like me, who argue that we achieved what we set out to do have to confront world opinion which does not see us as the good guys, as the people with the moral high ground — and certainly not as the victors in this conflict.
Here are some possible explanations:
1) The world is much more international than it used to be. Information and opinion are both now disseminated so rapidly that it is much harder to influence, let alone control, the narrative. And we have still to master how to fight the information war. This time around Pakistan has managed to get its message across more effectively than ever before.
2) I remember, as a small boy, celebrating our victory over Pakistan in 1965. It took me years to realise that the same celebrations had taken place in Pakistan where they claimed they had won the war.
The balance of opinion internationally is that nobody won that war; it was a stalemate.
That may well happen this time around but we are no longer as shut off from global opinion as we once were because of the information revolution which allows Pakistan to manipulate global media. And, we can no longer declare our own victories.
We have responded to Pakistani claims of success with an excellent briefing by the armed forces and satellite pictures showing how much damage we inflicted on Pakistani airfields. But by launching their own victory celebrations, just as they did in 1965, the Pakistanis have muddied the waters
3) Whenever India has won a clear victory our objectives have been clear. In 1971 we fought Pakistan to liberate Bangladesh. When that was achieved our victory was undeniable. We fought the Kargil war to repel the Pakistani troops who had infiltrated our territory and to prevent them from advancing any further into India. (In the official Pakistani version, the troops were mujahideen.) We succeeded and won.
Even the Balakot strike had a clear purpose. We wanted to strike at a terrorist base to punish a terrorist organisation. Once we did that, we were satisfied. And nothing, not even Pakistani claims that we had missed our target could diminish our euphoria.
This time around it was harder to declare a clear single objective. Obviously, we wanted to take revenge for Pahalgam. But once we had done that the conflict was transformed into an air battle between the two militaries that public opinion had not been prepared for.
How do you decide who won that battle? Both sides are claiming victory because the final objective was so unclear. We need to continue emphasising that our intention was to make Pakistan pay for Pahalgam and that we succeeded.
4) There is always a rah-rah element to the Indian media when it comes to a war. This is not necessarily always a bad thing. But never has it backfired so substantially on the government. Not only did the TV channels declare goals and targets that were never even on the table (‘we will flatten Pakistan’) they also lied night after night (‘Karachi port has been destroyed’) in a manner that heightened public expectations to absurd and unrealistic levels.
The government acted against media outlets that it felt were damaging the war effort. Perhaps, it should actually have been more concerned about those that were so supportive that they told lies and raised expectations to ludicrous levels.
5) There is no doubt that the world did not pay enough attention to our perspective on the reasons for the war. We acted to prevent terrorists from slaughtering our people. That’s justified and is a principle that many countries including the US regard as legitimate. We were consistent in getting this message across and Indian envoys abroad did a sterling job in appearing on media outlets to say that our sole concern was to act against terrorism.
Unfortunately, the Pakistanis were able to persuade much of the western media that this was just another episode in the battle for Kashmir. It’s significant that nearly every western media outlet and most leaders saw this as a continuation of the Kashmir conflict.
6) Was this at least partly because we waited too long to strike? Perhaps we had no choice because our forces were not ready.
But shouldn’t they have been? We waited for a similar length of time after the Pulwama massacre so by now we should have known what we had to do.
Shouldn’t we have had a contingency plan for a lightning response? A strike in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack would have made the connection clearer. By waiting so long we may have given the impression that this was just another India-Pakistan war.
On the other hand, we did manage to get our message across despite a similar delay after Pulwama, so perhaps this time it was a combination of factors that diluted the impact of our message.
7) Not since 1971 have citizens outside of the immediate border area felt as much at risk as they did this time because the drones and missiles put everyone in danger.
Since Kargil we have treated war as something fought by professionals a long way from our homes. This time it came so close that it worried many civilians.
8) We should never have let Donald Trump announce the ceasefire. And even if we were powerless to stop him we should have grabbed the narrative back. The Prime Minister or the defence minister should have addressed the nation to explain why we had agreed to a sudden ceasefire when we claimed we were crushing Pakistan.
To say only that the DGMOs of the two countries negotiated the peace is an insult to the intelligence of everyone.
9) So yes, I think we achieved what we set out to do. And yes, of course it is a victory. There is much to be pleased about.
But there is also much we can learn from the experience of the last fortnight.
