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Crack the nuclear sudoku
New Delhi?s most curious foe at the start of the 21st century is the Dublin-Wellington Axis against India, writes Pramit Pal Chaudhuri.
New Delhi’s most curious foe at the start of the 21st century is the Dublin-Wellington Axis against India. It was an alliance that revealed itself most overtly during last month’s Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary in Brasil. The NSG is the beating heart of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; the main link in the chain that has kept India in the atomic doghouse for three decades.
The US, backed by the likes of France and Britain, tried to get the NSG members to insert a paragraph in the press release “taking note” of the Indo-US nuclear deal. As one diplomat present at the discussions said, “Ireland and New Zealand immediately went into a huddle.” These two governments, backed by powers like Austria and Norway, insisted the relevant paragraph mention the NSG had “concerns” about the deal. The moral mites stood their ground. The plenary failed to give the Indo-US nuclear deal a hoped-for boost.
Understand that getting an Indian exemption from the NSG is the most important act in the unfolding drama of ending nearly three decades of technology discrimination against India. The NPT may have outlined the principles of nuclear apartheid, but it’s the NSG that converts theory into practice. This is where the beef is.
While it has a stand-alone significance in terms of bilateral relations between India and the US, the present legislation being contemplated by the US Congress wouldn’t be particularly crucial to India’s nuclear future if the NSG had opened up for India. Nuclear fuel and technology would then be available from any number of countries.
The 45-member NSG is roughly divided into three groups when it comes to whether or not India should get a free pass on dual use technology without signing the NPT.
The most supportive — and the only reason why the game is afoot — are the four Western nuclear powers. The US is the main man in the entire affair. But France and Britain are also pulling out all stops to garner support for India.
The only P-5 member to not endorse the nuclear deal is China. But Beijing has maintained “an unusual neutrality”. It is assumed in diplomatic circles that Beijing will eventually hold out for some sort of wording about possible future exemptions, something that can be passed on to Pakistan as a face-saver.
The ‘No’ camp are the holier-than-thou bloc. Their ideological stance against the deal is inversely proportional to their size. Ireland and New Zealand are among the most inflexible. Sweden, Norway and Austria are part of the orthodoxy. But the NSG’s non-proliferation fundamentalists have at least been weakened by the defection of Canada — a country that, even last year, New Delhi had internally rated as the toughest of the morality mob. The public support of Mohammed ElBaradei, chief of the International Atomic Energy Association, helps as well.
In-between are two dozen or so others who continue to sit on the fence. They range from an officially negative South Africa to a vocally supportive Spain. What has surprised diplomats involved in the NSG negotiations about India is how many countries have responded by saying, “We always thought this made sense. We just didn’t have the will or the way to take the lead on the issue.” This echoes ElBaradei’s argument that India is better as a non-proliferation partner rather than ‘pariah’.
But the NSG isn’t going anywhere until the US Congress makes the first move. “The way of the world is clear: the US has to take the first and biggest step,” said one Indian diplomat. However, the problem is that even the US can’t do everything on its own. The Bush administration has pulled out all stops to get the US Congress on board. It has also been lobbying with the NSG, as have France and Britain. But even if the ayes have it on Capitol Hill, there is no guarantee all 45 members of the NSG will second the motion.
There are a number of reasons that the NSG will be such a tough nut to crack.
First, the Indo-US nuclear deal is one part diplomatic jigsaw, one part chess and one part interactive video game. There are now four balls being juggled in the air. If one takes a spill, so may the other three. First, there is the US Congress’s vote for the nuclear deal. This is partly dependent on a 123 Agreement spelling out the nuts and bolts of Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation. This, in turn, depends on progress on a safeguards agreement between India and the IAEA, an agreement made all the more complex because the US is a necessary third party. If all these three elements are completed, then the final assault on the NSG, the last and highest peak, will be easier.
Second, the diplomatic lobbying within the NSG is a worldwide, multilateral effort. Diplomatic sources say most of the heavy-lifting is being done by the US and France, with Britain and Russia providing a helping hand. Paris, for example, claims to have helped persuade many European countries like Spain and Belgium to back the nuclear deal.
However, questions are being asked both in New Delhi and Western capitals whether India is doing enough for a deal that, in the end, is about helping India. US diplomats who approach third countries have been effectively asked, “Since when has the State Department become a call centre for South Block?” The prime ministers of Norway and Ireland have both visited India in the past year. Neither was engaged in any meaningful manner by New Delhi on their NSG positions.
Indian officials admit New Delhi was “slow off the block” but that this is changing. “Even the president of Cyprus was asked about his country’s position when he visited here in April,” said one diplomat. Some tangible accomplishments by the Indian side may manifest themselves at the September IBSA summit of India, Brazil and South Africa where New Delhi hopes for a supportive statement. Brazil and South Africa, both of which surrendered their nuclear arsenals and joined the NSG, have been less than pleased that India will be allowed to have both swords and ploughshares. India is in the fray, admittedly in a small way, for a positive mention of the deal at the upcoming G8 summit in Moscow.
The end of India’s nuclear exile in the international system is big time stuff. New Delhi needs to be wary of the country’s free-riding internationalism; its tendency to try and reap benefits on the world stage while incurring no political costs.
Reportedly, when US diplomats urge their Indian counterparts to do more, the latter promptly quote the Manmohan Singh-George W Bush July statement and the US promise that it would “work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes” in India’s favour. The message: it’s not our job to help ourselves. This reinforces views that India is not a power-in-the-making but rather a lapdog-in-training.
