Winning the Kashmir polls

Our Foreign Editor Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, in his column Wonk's World, tells how India used Sep 11 to counter Pak insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir.

The Indian Home Minister LK Advani has called the Kashmir state assembly election his government's "greatest success."

At first glance this is not obvious. Count the negatives: the most violent Kashmir election ever, with roughly one political worker killed during each day of campaigning; a failure to persuade the All Parties Hurriyat Conference to join the fray, scattered reports of coerced voting and a fragmented assembly. Also, as many in Indians may ask, why should anyone make a hoop and cry about holding an assembly election – something India's other 24 states hold on a regular, almost boring basis.

Let's step back and ask what exactly is the issue in Kashmir. India's goal has been simple – get Kashmiris to accept that their desire for political autonomy from New Delhi can be gained only through the ballot box and not the bullet.

The corollary to this has been to find a means to ensure Kashmiris would and could elect their own political leadership. The obstacles to the latter were twofold. One, a Pakistani military regime that saw the insurgency as the only way it could ever force India to come to the table and negotiate a Kashmir settlement favourable to Islamabad. Two, New Delhi's terrible record of rigged elections in Kashmir. A record so bad that even if all the guns fell silent most Kashmiris would have assumed that casting a ballot was a waste of time.

Over the years, Kashmiris have more or less come to accept that insurgency will not get them very much.

One reason is that India has persevered, absorbing the death of hundreds of uniformed personnel over the years without any major domestic upheaval at home. As one Indian cabinet minister said last year, "India is not bleeding because of Kashmir." India could fight the war almost forever.

Two, by accepting Pakistani arms, funds and training, Kashmiri insurgents found their fight for independence had metamorphosed into a fight for Pakistani strategic interests – which did not include independence for them.

Third, as the Kashmiris began falling out of the ranks of the insurgency, Pakistan filled the empty spaces with a motley collection of jehadi mercenaries from Afghanistan, Sudan, even China, but most of all from Pakistan. With each passing year the insurgency became less Kashmiri, more cosmopolitan; less Kashmiriyat, more Islamicist.

This was pretty much confirmed when the last truly Kashmiri guerrilla movement, the Hizbul Mujahideen, decided two years ago to holster their guns and hold talks with the Indian government. That move floundered when Pakistan put a knife to the Hizbul's throat.

It had already been clear for a number of years that such threats were why the new Kashmiri political leadership that New Delhi was waiting to negotiate with was not emerging. The most likely candidates were all cooped up in the Hurriyat, publicly insisting that it was independence or nothing, that Pakistan had to have a seat at the negotiating table and generally denouncing India at the drop of a hat. Everyone in New Delhi, Washington and Srinagar knew why: They were scared silly of having their heads blown off.

This was the scene in Kashmir 18 months ago. The attempt by some Hizbul Mujahideen commanders to talk turkey with India was in the freezer. The Hurriyat was too chicken to do anything. Pakistani mercenaries fighting under the banner of the Lashkar-e-Toeba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad were fighting Indian securitymen and ensuring that no Kashmiri dared offer a hand to New Delhi. As far as Kashmiris were concerned they were in a dead end.

Then September 11 happened. Reportedly it was the then Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, who first realized what an opportunity this meant for Kashmir. The equation was simple. The Taliban-Al Qaeda terror machine was simply the Afghan subsidiary of the terror machine India was fighting in Kashmir. Persuade Washington that its war on terrorism had to encompass both and there was a chance, however slender, that the militants would be silenced. If so, the political process in Kashmir could be restarted.