Slow and steady progress in US-Iran nuclear talks

The role of the other members of the P5+1 will be crucial in fashioning a compromise necessary for an agreement

On May 11, Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi and US special envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met in Muscat for the fourth round of Omani-mediated nuclear talks since April 12. After the negotiations, the Omani foreign minister stated that the “discussions included useful and original ideas reflecting a shared wish to reach an honourable agreement” and that the fifth round will be held after both parties have consulted their leadership. Initially scheduled for May 3, the fourth round was postponed for ‘logistical reasons.’ In the interim, the policy divide on Iran within the Trump administration played out in the media. However, the continued talks suggest both sides are serious about avoiding war. In fact, US President has said that the US and Iran are close to a nuclear deal.

IBefore each round of talks with the US, Araghchi travelled to Moscow or Beijing, briefing them about negotiations as they progressed (via REUTERS)

Witkoff echoed the zero Iranian enrichment position held by foreign policy hawks in the administration, while criticising the ‘neocon element’ in Washington for their bias in favour of a military solution. Araghchi hit back that Tehran will not give in to “unrealistic and irrational” US demands. Also, Washington imposed new sanctions on Iran, and the US defence secretary Pete Hegseth threatened Iran with consequences for supporting the Houthis before a bilateral ceasefire deal was reached between the Yemeni armed group and the US.

The continued talks suggest both sides are serious about their dialogue and avoiding a scenario of war. The task of diplomacy is to reach a compromise given the widely divergent red lines regarding the objectives of the negotiations. Trump wants a new deal that will permanently keep Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In 2018, when Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed in 2015 by the P5+1, he called it the worst deal ever. His primary criticism was its so-called “sunset provisions” stipulating when the various restrictions imposed on Iran’s nuclear programme expire. Some members of the Trump team, led by secretary of State Marco Rubio, have revived the earlier demands of eliminating Iran’s uranium enrichment programme as a requirement to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Others, including Witkoff, had initially suggested a scaled-back and heavily monitored enrichment programme. Iranian officials insist the new agreement should guarantee Iran’s economic benefits and mutual fulfilment of the commitments. Further, Iran is sticking to its long-held position that under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signatories have an inalienable right to independent civilian nuclear capability and that Iran cannot be treated as an exception within the global non-proliferation framework.

Over the last two decades, Iran has made significant advances in developing a national nuclear fuel cycle. Much progress was made between 2006, when Iran ended its voluntary suspension of enrichment, resulting in the IAEA referral of Iran’s nuclear file to the UNSC for punitive sanctions and 2012, when it agreed with the P5+1 on the negotiation framework. Iran created both technological capabilities and infrastructure for uranium enrichment up to 20%, the fabrication of fuel for its power and research reactors, and nuclear waste disposal. Despite escalating sanctions and military threats, Iran’s rulers formed an intra-elite consensus and rallied wider society by framing the nuclear issue in terms of technological achievement and autonomy. In response to Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and Israel’s campaign of sabotage against nuclear facilities and assassination of Iran’s top nuclear scientist, the Iranian parliament passed a law to scale up nuclear activity as a leverage-building exercise. Iran demonstrated its capacity to quickly scale up by installing new generations of centrifuges and enriching uranium to 60%.

During talks with the Biden administration on reviving the JCPOA, Iran argued that, since Washington could not provide legal guarantees against another withdrawal, there should be ‘inherent guarantees’ under which Iran would have the provision to scale up its nuclear activities as a retaliation measure. In this context, it is highly unlikely that Iran will agree to dismantle its enrichment programme. Tehran has, however, made novel gestures of potential scientific and commercial collaboration with the US in Iran’s civilian nuclear programme. Previously, analysts, including high officials in Iran, have broached the idea of joint-venture enrichment plants, with European or even Russian and Chinese participation, to resolve the impasse over the enrichment issue.

Over the years, Tehran has relied on Russia and China to stave off US military threats over its nuclear programme. In recent months, Iran has strengthened coordination with Russia and China on the nuclear issue. In mid-March, the US and five other countries convened a closed-door session of the UN Security Council, where Britain indicated support for the ‘snapback’ of UN sanctions on Iran if necessary. Subsequently, after a meeting in Beijing, the deputy foreign ministers of Iran, Russia and China issued a joint statement emphasising the importance of diplomatic engagement and dialogue. While noting that Iran was committed to full compliance with its obligations under the NPT and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, they stressed the need to fully respect Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Opposing a potential snapback, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that a “forced intervention” by the UNSC will destroy years of diplomatic efforts.” Before each round of talks with the US, Araghchi travelled to Moscow or Beijing, briefing them about negotiations as they progressed. Tehran has also made fresh overtures to Europeans to ensure they do not side with the US’s maximalist demands. The success of the US-Iran talks is far from certain; the role of the other members of the P5+1 will be crucial in fashioning a compromise necessary for an agreement.

Deepika Saraswat is an associate fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The views expressed are personal